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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I shall examine the uses and limitations of
New York State’s Martin Act, adopted in 1921,1 as a means of
combating various types of financial, business, and social mis-
conduct both large and small. The major innovation of the
Martin Act was that it stripped down the basic fraud action by
eliminating the standard elements of knowledge, reliance, and
damages. Potential liability under the Martin Act therefore is
broader than that found under the common-law tort of deceit
in both cases of civil and criminal liability. In addition, there
are ways in which liability under the Martin Act is broader than
that found under federal securities and exchange laws, passed
in 1933 and 1934,2 which themselves rely in modified form on
the basic system of common-law actions.
In Part I, I shall outline the rising unease about the en-
forcement procedures that have taken place under the Martin
Act. In Part II, I shall canvass anew the early history of the
Martin Act and its relationship to the common law of fraud
and both the federal securities laws and state “blue-sky” laws,
with which it must be compared. In Part III, I shall examine
the early historical application of the Martin Act in order to set
the stage for a closer examination of two controversial con-
texts: the prosecution of alleged commercial frauds in the
cases brought against Maurice “Hank” Greenberg of AIG, and
global warming in connection with the now-halted investiga-
tion of ExxonMobil and the recent public nuisance cases
against five oil companies in both California and New York. A
1. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-c, 353 (McKinney 1996).
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
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brief conclusion argues that the procedural changes that limit
the discretion of the New York Attorney General are more im-
portant, especially in high profile cases, than any substantive
reform of the Martin Act, which on most critical points tracks
the federal securities laws.
I.
THE UNLEASHING OF THE MARTIN ACT
The Martin Act was passed in 1921, and has been continu-
ously enforced for close to 100 years. But in the last 25 years, it
has been transformed from a relatively modest operation into
an 800-pound gorilla. The transformation started under now-
disgraced former New York Attorney General (NYAG) Eliot
Spitzer, who served as Attorney General between 1999 and
2006. Spitzer ratcheted up his powers under the Martin Act to
cudgel favorable settlements from large firms doing business
in New York. Spitzer’s efforts were often directed against Wall
Street firms that were subject to direct regulation by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC). But using his formida-
ble investigative powers under the Martin Act, Spitzer ex-
tracted large settlements against brokerage houses for finan-
cial fraud. In many cases, the substantive results appear
unexceptionable; he extracted, for example, a huge settlement
from Merrill Lynch because it touted shares to the public that
it had disparaged privately.3 But the means he deployed under
the Martin Act were troubling. Spitzer’s operations depended
on his ability to unilaterally conduct major investigations
backed by his power of indictment. Once filed, an indictment
could prove a death knell to financial firms. An indictment
could cost these firms both their licenses and reputations. In
an effort to stave off that threat, firms yielded to various de-
mands, including oversight, that were far more onerous than
the relatively modest fines that could be imposed after a con-
viction was obtained in a legal action, where the defendant
had all the procedural protections of the criminal law. It was
for circumventing of structural and procedural safeguards that
Spitzer was strongly castigated by business groups such as the
Chamber of Commerce, whose president, Thomas Donahue,
denounced Spitzer for appointing himself “investigator, prose-
3. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, The Sheriff of Wall Street, CBS NEWS (May 23,
2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-sheriff-of-wall-street/.
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cutor, judge, jury and executioner” over all U.S. businesses.4
“Spitzer’s approach,” he claimed, “is to walk in and say, ‘we’re
going to make a deal, and you’re going to pay $600 million to
the state, and you’re going to get rid of this person and that
person, and if you don’t do it by tonight, we’re going to indict
the company.’”5
Former NYAG Eric Schneiderman has brought the Martin
Act back into the spotlight. His most notable endeavor was the
climate-change investigation of Exxon Mobil, which involved
activities going back decades on the energy and environment
frontier.6 The gist of the charges was that internal politics
turned a company that had been a leader in the fight against
global warming into one that consciously sought to obfuscate
the work of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC).7 When these charges failed to pan
out, Schneiderman shifted his investigation from Exxon Mo-
bil’s past conduct to its current efforts to influence the policy
debate over the use of fossil fuels in the light of the risks of
global warming, which in turn led the company to overvalue
its reserves in ways that he claimed presented a false picture of
the company’s financial health.8 Schneiderman sought exten-
sive discovery, and changed his theory of the case multiple
times, all within the broad confines of the Martin Act.9 His
campaign mirrored Spitzer’s strong-arm tactics but extends
4. U.S Group is Taking on Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/01/06/business/worldbusiness/us-group-is-taking-
on-spitzer.html.
5. Id.
6. See John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Climate Change Inquiry in New York
Gains Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2016, at B3 (listing the Martin Act as among
Attorney General Schneiderman’s New York-specific tools to investigate Ex-
xon).
7. For a collection of posts attacking the overall pattern of Exxon’s
changing position, see Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon:
The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter The
Road Not Taken], https://insideclimatenews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-
Not-Taken.
8. John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fraud Inquiry Said to Focus More on Future
Than Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2016, at B1 (in which Schneiderman claims
that, since burning even a fraction of declared oil reserves would heat the
world to a dangerous level, Exxon is overvaluing its oil reserves because the
company will have to leave much of the oil in the ground).
9. See generally People v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016 NYLJ LEXIS
3688, at *2–7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).
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them beyond the traditional context of financial fraud. It
makes some sense for a prosecutor to look at sales and promo-
tions to identify fraud against customers to whom the sales
pitches were directed, but it makes little sense to look to a
company’s position on global warming, where a host of other
factors are at play.
At the outset, therefore, it is important to stress one simi-
larity that links these two campaigns—namely, the inordinate
power that it vested in one person, the NYAG, to launch major
attacks against established businesses. In these cases, the process
issues are as important as the substantive ones. It is possible to
engage in prosecutorial abuses against firms that are guilty of
some unrelated offense, since the public may too hastily con-
clude that these shortcuts were justified because they allowed
virtuous prosecutors to attack bad commercial actors. But the
hasty conclusion that the ends justify the means is wrong in
this context, as in so many others, for three reasons. First, the
same dubious means can be used against the innocent as well
as the guilty, bludgeoning them into costly and unjust settle-
ments. Second, bullying tactics undermine the public legiti-
macy of prosecutions against the guilty. Demoralization about
the law-enforcement process leads to the loss of confidence in
the overall system, leading to widespread dissatisfaction both
within the business community and the public at large. Finally,
aggressive prosecution leads firms that operate on the margins
of the law to take excessive precautions, abstaining from sensi-
ble and desirable projects for fear of an unfortunate exposure
to undeserved legal sanctions.
In dealing with both civil and criminal sanctions, there
should be no free pass to the aggressive prosecutor. It is not
just under-deterrence that causes serious social dislocations.
Over-deterrence can, and does, bring about the same result. In
this context it is good to recall the words of Justice Felix Frank-
furter in McNabb v. United States10:
A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity
of all men is central, naturally guards against the mis-
use of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking
down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness
of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement
does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liber-
10. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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ties. Experience has therefore counseled that safe-
guards must be provided against the dangers of the
overzealous, as well as the despotic. The awful instru-
ments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a
single functionary. The complicated process of crimi-
nal justice is therefore divided into different parts, re-
sponsibility for which is separately vested in the vari-
ous participants upon whom the criminal law relies
for its vindication.11
Frankfurter’s anxiety about excessive reliance on a single
functionary applies with even greater force to many modern
regulatory schemes, of which the most notable is the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which was created
as part of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act.12 The distinctive features
of CFPB are numerous. The CFPB has enormous powers that
consolidate the enforcement of some 19 different consumer
protection statutes that run the gamut: student loans, credit
cards, home mortgages, and much more. Inside the CFPB, the
complete oversight for its far-reaching operations is lodged in
a single director whose decisions are subject at most to a
highly limited review. There is no budgetary constraint by
Congress, as the agency has by design a guaranteed source of
funding through the Federal Reserve Bank, which cannot be
checked by Congress or, indeed, even the Federal Reserve it-
self. Finally, Dodd–Frank provides that the CFPB Director
serves for a five-year term—which necessarily allows one presi-
dent to bind his successor, given that the Director is subject to
presidential removal only limited grounds—namely for “ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”13
The question of whether this unique statutory arrange-
ment offends the basic constitutional structure dealing with
separation of powers on the one side and checks and balances
on the other came to a head in PHH Corporation v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau,14 under facts that could be scarcely
more illustrative of the dangers of this top heavy organization.
11. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
12. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018).
14. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2016), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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PHH specializes in home mortgage lending, and it also partici-
pates in a mortgage insurance market, through its “captive”
subsidiary Atrium Insurance Corporation that supplied rein-
surance to outside insurers that wrote coverage for mortgages
issued by PHH. There was a complex question of whether
PHH was, in accordance with historical practice, exempt from
certain kickback or self-dealing provisions which had pro-
tected it under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,
passed in 1974, so long as the fees paid the mortgage insurers
was reasonable. But once the enforcement functions were
transferred to the CFPB, it ruled, without any change in the
substantive law, that this long-standing interpretation no
longer held. On appeal to the Director, the initial fine (for
this dubious act of statutory interpretation) was increased
from $6 million to $109 million15—a punitive fine after a uni-
lateral reinterpretation of an established interpretation of a
statute on which there was extensive industry reliance.
The imperial nature of this CFPB decision lay it open to
the charge that this concentrated power violates the general
requirements of separation of powers. In one sense the issue
arises in a second-best world because it assumes that indepen-
dent agencies, whose officers are immune from removal at the
will of the President,16 are consistent with the basic constitu-
tional system, even though the Constitution itself contains no
explicit authorization for their use. Thus the process of impli-
cation is necessarily invoked to both define the scope and lim-
its of that exception.
In the initial round, Judge Brett Kavanaugh held for him-
self and Senior Judge Raymond Randolph that independent
agencies, or those whose heads can only be removed for
cause,17 have too much power to be led by a single official.18
Given that all administrative agencies “pose a significant threat
to individual liberty and to the constitutional system of separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances,” they “have histori-
cally been headed by multiple commissioners, directors, or
15. For a discussion of substantive issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Tyranny
Within the Administrative State, HOOVER INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (May 31, 2016),
https://www.hoover.org/research/tyranny-within-administrative-state.
16. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 603 (1935).
17. Id.
18. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 8–9.
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board members who act as checks on one another.”19 Given
the CFPB head’s level of unilateral authority, Kavanaugh held
that the constitution requires that the President can remove
such an official at will.20
That initial decision was reversed en banc by a divided
court that showed the deep progressive/classical liberal split
on this issue.21 The majority decision written by Judge Nina
Pillard took a very different view of the overall matter. In its
view, heading an agency with a sole director and not a multi-
ple panel was its virtue because the streamlined structure was
designed “to imbue the agency with the requisite initiative and
decisiveness to do the job of monitoring and restraining abu-
sive or excessively risky practices in the fast-changing world of
consumer finance.”22 In response to the Kavanaugh view that
the issue of removal could not be examined apart from the
other structural provisions, Pillard concluded: “The relevance
of ‘internal checks’ as a substitute for at-will removal by the
President is no part of the removal-power doctrine, which fo-
cuses on executive control and accountability to the public,
not the competing virtues of various internal agency design
choices.”23 So long as removal could be properly limited for
cause, in her view the other design features did not matter.
As a matter of recent historical decision, the Pillard posi-
tion draws some support from the long history of deference to
Congress in the design of administrative agencies. But as a
matter of first principle, her entire approach is inconsistent
with the basic conception of separation of powers that drove
the initial constitutional design. These design decisions recog-
nize the inherent trade-offs between going too fast and too
slow. Of course, it is important to be zealous in the pursuit of
wrongdoing. But that tendency that creates the risk of over-
zealous behavior, which was on ample display in PHH, makes
the Kavanaugh approach preferable as a matter of principle.
Indeed, it is just that principle of aggressive concentration of
powers in the hands of a single executive, here the NYAG,
that, even more than its substantive provisions, makes the cur-
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 8.
21. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
22. Id. at 81.
23. Id. at 79.
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rent operation of the Martin Act so dangerous. In the hands of
cautious NYAGs, the risk of excess is subject to internal politi-
cal constraints. But under NYAGs like Spitzer and Schneider-
man, surely the opposite is true.
Speaking generally, a sound legal system has to contend
with two kinds of error: both over and underenforcement. It is
always hard to know whether it is socially preferable to trade
away the upside of effective enforcement in order to minimize
the downside of wrongful or excessive punishments. Any effort
to beef up procedural protections will unfortunately trammel
good public officials but simultaneously limit the harm from
zealous overenforcement. In a perfect world, I would prefer
that good leaders be unconstrained by procedural hurdles.
But in our imperfect world, procedural protections are neces-
sary, indeed urgent. The ultimate prudential calculation re-
quires assessing which form of error is greater, and, as Justice
Frankfurter’s admonition reminds us, it is never wise to disre-
gard the downside. But it is just that error that the Martin Act
has committed—especially as it has been interpreted and ap-
plied by recent NYAGs.
Textually, there is nothing about the Martin Act that com-
pelled Schneiderman’s behavior any more than there is in the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Section 5, which
broadly prohibits “using unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce . . . .”24 But it takes awareness of the
dangers to control the excesses. Clearly there is wiggle room in
each of these two key statutes, which has led to some highly
controversial cases. Yet ironically, it took a one-page statement
from the FTC—a multimember body—to announce that it
would confine the application of this elastic provision to oper-
ate as an adjunct to the antitrust laws dealing with anticompe-
titive injury instead of a freewheeling statute that could be di-
rected at any contract that displeased the FTC.25 Given the
24. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
25. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES RE-
GARDING “UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION” UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FTC
ACT (Aug. 13, 2015). For my account of the evolution, which was largely
attributable to the work of Commissioner Joshua Wright, who has since re-
turned to the George Mason Law School Faculty, see Richard A. Epstein,
When Bureaucrats Do Good, HOOVER INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.hoover.org/research/when-bureaucrats-do-good.
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powers vested in the NYAG, some check on his unilateral pow-
ers could go a long way toward curbing prosecutorial excesses
under the Martin Act. Such a procedural change could then
be buttressed substantively by limiting the Martin Act to those
cases that are akin to the common-law tort of deceit.
Unfortunately, all of the implicit safeguards built into the
earlier common-law-inspired use of the Act have been eroded
by unsupported extensions of its substantive reach, which in
turn have increased the danger of invoking the extraordinary
remedial provisions built into the Act in the first place. These
provisions give huge investigative powers to the NYAG, acting
solely on his own authority, long before any trial. For example,
Section 352 of the Act enables the NYAG to undertake confi-
dential investigations in which he can subpoena witnesses,
compel attendance, and examine witnesses under oath, either
in private or before a magistrate court of record.26 Section 354
gives the NYAG the unilateral authority to order a public inves-
tigation by filing an application before a trial-court judge, who
has no choice but to grant the application.27 To paraphrase
Chief Justice John Marshall, the power to investigate is the
power to destroy,28 especially with respect to those businesses
whose reputation is critical to their ability to remain open.
Reputation, of course, is, and should be, of great importance
in the securities business. The decisions of individual and insti-
tutional investors to flee a firm that has committed a serious
violation of industry norms takes its effect immediately and
does so without the need for costly and prolonged litigation. It
is for that reason that losses in share values routinely exceed
any potential liability or fines for illegal behavior.29 This bond-
ing mechanism makes good sense when the bad news is accu-
rate about a firm. But it should be a source of unease when the
loss in stock value from a triggering event does not stem from
any actual bad conduct by the firm in question. The risk of
social harm from over-deterrence is exceedingly high when-
ever the simple announcement of an investigation can be
26. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352(2) (2016).
27. Id. at § 354.
28. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (“[T]he power to
tax involves the power to destroy . . . .”).
29. Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to
Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 547, 582
(2008).
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enough to trigger a suspension of the licenses needed to do
business—not to mention follow-on consequences in stock
price. In those settings, there is intolerable pressure to settle a
case short of the initiation of suit.
The federal government enjoys similar forms of leverage
under the federal securities laws, which, to some extent, ex-
hibit the same flaws as the Martin Act.30 This excessive concen-
tration of power is exemplified by the practice of the SEC to
try its own cases before administrative law judges (ALJs) that
the SEC appoints itself. Concentrating that power in the hands
of a political commission whose membership is determined
along party lines is asking for trouble. One recent decision on
the topic, Bandimere v. SEC,31 held that the ALJs appointed by
the SEC wield sufficient power in individual cases to count as
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. Therefore,
the Bandimere court held that the ALJs would need to be ap-
pointed, without Senate confirmation, either by the President,
the Courts of Law, or the Head of Department. As the SEC was
none of the above, its commissioners could not constitution-
ally appoint ALJs.32 The District of Columbia Circuit in Ray-
mond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC33 disagreed with this reading, and
held that the ALJs should be treated only as government em-
ployees because the decision of the ALJ was not final, but ulti-
mately depended for its validity on an enforcement decision
by the Commission as a whole, which has the power to review
every case.  That decision let the SEC resort to deferred prose-
cution agreements, which allowed parties to retain their li-
censes only if they acceded to onerous behavioral and struc-
tural changes in the conduct of their business.34
30. For a discussion of the perverse incentives that arise when the costs of
being indicted exceed the fines that could be imposed on conviction, see
Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the
Law of Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING
CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38 (Anthony S. Barkow &
Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011).
31. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc
denied, 855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017).
32. Id.
33. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
34. See, e.g., James R. Copland & Rafael Mangual, The Shadow Regulatory
State at the Crossroads: Federal Deferred Prosecution Agreements Face an Uncertain
Future, MANHATTAN INST. (June 27, 2017), http://www.manhattan-institute.
org/html/shadow-regulatory-state-crossroads-federal-deferred-prosecution-a
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For the moment at least, these abusive practices have
come to a halt as Justice Elena Kagan upended the District
Court decision by holding in Lucia v. SEC that the ALJs that
were appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
counted as inferior officers under the Appointments Clause.
Thus, they could not be appointed by the Commission’s staff,
but had to be appointed by its head alone.35 The court relied
heavily on its earlier decision in Freytag v. Commissioner, which
held that the special trial judges in the United States Tax
Court were inferior offices because, even though they were not
authorized under statute to issue final decisions, the extensive
scope of their authority meant that they had sufficient power
to shape the overall scope of the decision.36
The Appointments Clause issue is, however, only the tip
of a larger due process iceberg.37  The decision in Lucia spent
no time at all discussing the particulars of the case, which were
deeply troubling from a due process point of view.  Raymond
Lucia was permanently barred from practice as an investment
advisor because the administrative law judge in the case, Cam-
eron Elliot, found him guilty of serious violations of the securi-
ties laws for giving his “Buckets of Money” presentation to a
general audience.  Under the strategy presented by Lucia, an
investment portfolio would contain both stocks and bonds.
The low-risk investments would be sold first, while the high-
risk investments would be allowed to appreciate.  Lucia’s large
slide deck contained hypothetical examinations of how his
method works, and these were deemed to be materially mis-
leading and thus in violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the
Investment Advisors Act of 194038 and applicable regula-
tions.39 This was despite the fact that the slides had passed
greements-face-uncertain. For my longstanding opposition to these agree-
ments, see Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Incentive Structures of Nonprosecu-
tion and Deferred Prosecution Agreements, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 26, 2014),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/06/the-dangerous-incen
tive-structures-of-nonprosecution-and-deferred-prosecution-agreements.
35. Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June 21, 2018).
36. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991).
37. For my longer discussion of this issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Miscar-
riage of Justice at the SEC, HOOVER INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.hoover.org/research/miscarriage-justice-sec.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1940).
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1(a)(5) (2012) (prohibiting misleading ad-
vertising).
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muster before a private industry self-regulatory organization
known as FINRA (The Financial Industry Regulatory Author-
ity), on which the U.S. securities regulation regime relies heav-
ily for enforcement.40 In addition, the SEC itself raised no ob-
jections to the slides when it previewed the presentation.
None of the 50,000 people who attended these presentations
over the years filed any complaint against Lucia, let alone lost
any money as a result.  At these presentations, Lucia asked at-
tendees to contact him directly if they wanted additional per-
sonal advice.
The case was then referred to ALJ Cameron, who had
never previously ruled against the SEC’s enforcement division
in the approximately 50 or so cases he oversaw.  According to
Professor Ronald Mann, Elliot “adopted a bright-line rule of
issuing lifetime bans on employment in the investment indus-
try against any defendants who had the nerve to contest the
proceedings against” the SEC.41 This case followed true to
form. Elliot presided over a full-scale trial, after which he con-
cluded that Lucia should be suspended for life from the secur-
ities profession. This initial decision was not final; it had to be
reviewed by the agency’s five commissioners, who in 2015 fol-
lowed Elliot’s recommendation in a 3–2 decision.42  In the
Court’s opinion, Justice Kagan simply prefaced her remarks by
noting that the Dodd–Frank Act allows the Commission to pre-
side over these cases, but also allows it to delegate that activity
to an ALJ.43  Her opinion never raised these due process issues
despite the fact that the Commission’s power to select individ-
ual judges on an ad hoc basis gives rise to the appearance of
bias.  Such risk is hardly cured even if the SEC mends its ways
and now requires the head of the SEC to make those appoint-
ments.  It should seem clear that the risk of bias is not con-
40. See generally FINRA, https://www.finra.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2018).
41. Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: Justices Turn to Constitutional Limits on
Appointments of Administrative Law Judges, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2018), http:
//www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/argument-preview-justices-turn-to-constitu
tional-limits-on-appointment-of-administrative-law-judges/.
42. For the opinion and order of the Commission, see Lucia, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-75662, 2015 WL 5172953 (Aug. 11, 2015). An interim
remand order is unreported. For the relevant initial decision of the adminis-
trative law judge, see Initial Decision Release No. 495, 2013 WL 3379719
(July 8, 2013) (ALJ).
43. Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 21, 2018).
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fined solely to the Martin Act, but also arises under the SEC
generally, where delegation can result in the same kind of ag-
gregation of power in the hands of a single public official.
These issues will surely have to be vetted in future cases.
In addition to trusting plausibly unconstitutionally ap-
pointed ALJs with immense power, the SEC resorts to deferred
prosecution agreements, whereby the defendant accedes to
prosecutors’ demands for structural and behavioral changes in
exchange for deferring a prosecution that could, among other
things, result in a loss of licenses to do business. These agree-
ments can prove to be especially onerous on defendants, given
that they can be imposed without offering defendants the ben-
efit of any form of judicial oversight.44  These two features of
the SEC’s enforcement regime show how easy it is for adminis-
trative agencies to centralize power and then abuse it to the
detriment of private parties.
The Martin Act’s scheme is still more perverse, inasmuch
as it centralizes power in the hands of a single individual. The
need for some judicial or institutional check against self-ag-
grandizement is as important with the SEC as in the Martin act
context, and remains critical even if the substantive law re-
mains relatively unchanged. The level of prosecutorial discre-
tion in all such cases is sufficiently broad that the identity of
the prosecutor really matters. Put in its simplest form, it is bet-
ter to have an overbroad statute with a prudent prosecutor
than a finely tuned statute with an overzealous prosecutor. Af-
ter the fact remedies are notoriously ineffective in controlling
abuses of prosecutorial discretion.45 Ex ante schemes of con-
trol are more important. This point becomes even clearer after
reviewing the substantive evolution under the Martin Act, in its
relationship to both the common law and the SEC.
44. See, e.g., Copland & Mangual, supra note 34. For Epstein’s opposition
to these agreements, see Epstein, supra note 34.
45. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV
399, 427 n.139 (surveying literature to this effect).
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II.
THE MARTIN ACT, THE COMMON-LAW ACTION FOR DECEIT,
AND THE FEDERAL SECURITY AND EXCHANGE ACTS
A. The Origins of the Martin Act
To better understand the recent growth of the Martin Act,
it is useful to look back to its origins and basic structure. When
enacted in 1921, the Martin Act was among the last of the
many “blue-sky” laws enacted in the early part of the twentieth
century to deal with a spate of flagrantly dishonest marketing
practices targeting “an enormous population with an unusu-
ally high per capita wealth suddenly made security con-
scious.”46 These blue-sky laws were intended to prevent un-
scrupulous promoters from bilking innocent investors out of
their savings by offering them securities whose market value
was no greater than the blue sky above.47
Early Supreme Court decisions showed no hesitation in
sustaining the constitutionality of the blue-sky laws, chiefly on
the ground that they fell squarely within the scope of the po-
lice power. Passed at the height of the so-called Lochner era,
when the protection of economic liberties from government
regulation was at its zenith,48 these laws produced little consti-
tutional doubt.49 The worry that these laws might over-deter
46. Ambrose V. McCall, Comments on the Martin Act, 3 BROOK. L. REV. 190,
193 (1933).
47. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (“The name
that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed; that is, to use
the language of a cited case, ‘speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of ‘blue sky’; or, as stated by counsel in another case, ‘to
stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold
mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations.’”). For discussion, see Elisa-
beth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Intro-
duction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331–34 (1988).
48. The era took its name, of course, from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), which struck down a New York law that limited workers in certain
classes of bakeries to 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week, as an uncon-
stitutional “labor” statute that was directed more toward suppressing compe-
tition than protecting health and safety—which indeed was the case. See, e.g.,
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011).
49. See Hall, 242 U.S. at 552 (upholding Ohio’s blue-sky law); Caldwell v.
Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) (upholding South Dakota’s
blue-sky law); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding
Michigan’s blue-sky law).
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legitimate business behavior was a distant worry in the hectic
years of the First World War, when crooked behavior was ram-
pant.50
Since its original passage, the scope of the Martin Act has
been expanded by legislative action. In 1955, Section 352-c au-
thorized the Attorney General to institute criminal proceed-
ings against parties engaged in fraudulent practices, even ab-
sent proof of scienter or intent.51 In 1976, Section 353(3) au-
thorized the NYAG to seek monetary restitution for persons
defrauded by the defendant’s activities.52
The major doctrinal innovation of the Martin Act was to
soft-pedal the role of scienter, reliance, and damages—all es-
sential elements of a common-law fraud claim. However,
within the context that sparked passage of the Martin Act,
these shortcuts were perfectly appropriate responses for deal-
ing with blatant fraudsters, and the Martin Act preserved other
common-law rules that kept liability from running rampant.
For instance, its application extended to misrepresentation by
omissions as well as by affirmative utterances, but was limited
to material misrepresentations, ruling out mere statements of
opinions and predictions. The Martin Act also respected the
common-law privity limitations that grew up in connection
with the tort of deceit, which blocked litigation for persons
who suffered only from the indirect consequences of fraud.
There is much that is distinctive about the Martin Act, but
there is also much that it shares with both federal securities
law and the older common law. As the New York Court of Ap-
peals has recognized, “[a]lthough the Martin Act was enacted
in 1921, its present form generally tracks the Federal securities
acts of 1933 and 1934. Accordingly, we have looked to Federal
50. In those years, “[s]windlers stalked Gotham’s streets, fleecing the
people who were investing with solo speculators and putting money into the
stock market for the first time in a burst of postwar patriotic fervor.”
Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF. (May/June 2004),
https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature_thompson_may
jun04.msp.
51. See People v. Landes, 645 N.E.2d 716, 717–18 (N.Y. 1994) (outlining
this history).
52. See Assured Guar. Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 962 N.E.2d
765, 768 (N.Y. 2011) (describing this history); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 353(3)
(McKinney 2014).
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court decisions construing those statutes when interpreting
our own.”53
The original Martin Act gave a broad definition to the
types of activities that fell within its scope. Section 352-c con-
tains a list of activities prohibited by the statute:
It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, part-
nership, corporation, company, trust or association,
or any agent or employee thereof, to use or employ
any of the following acts or practices:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppres-
sion, false pretense or fictitious or pretended
purchase or sale;
(b) Any promise or representation as to the fu-
ture which is beyond reasonable expectation or
unwarranted by existing circumstances;
(c) Any representation or statement which is
false, where the person who made such repre-
sentation or statement: (i) knew the truth; or (ii)
with reasonable effort could have known the
truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascer-
tain the truth; or (iv) did not have knowledge
concerning the representation or statement
made;
where engaged in to induce or promote the issuance,
distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation or purchase
within or from this state of any securities or commod-
ities, as defined in section three hundred fifty-two
[giving extensive investigative powers to the Attorney
General] of this article, regardless of whether issu-
ance, distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation or
purchase resulted.54
The initial version of the law had a schizophrenic quality,
being broad in scope but feeble in its application. Indeed, the
statute has been described as “deliberately enfeebled” at
birth.55 As Nicholas Thompson explained in criticizing
Spitzer’s ramped-up enforcement efforts, the original Martin
Act embodied a political compromise whereby the broad
reaches of the law were directed to marginal players, both in-
53. See Landes, 645 N.E.2d. at 718.
54. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c(1) (McKinney 1982).
55. See Thompson, supra note 50.
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side and outside the financial industry, while the established
players received something of a free pass.56 For instance,
Thompson noted that the New York law did not have a regis-
tration requirement of the sort found in many other blue-sky
statutes, because for large institutions “a registration law was a
bureaucratic burden to be avoided. A simple fraud statute
seemed like a good way to swat down small-time sharks and
keep the field open for themselves.”57 Enforcement in this
early era was predictably light.58 But the shifting tides of en-
forcement notwithstanding, a comparison with the common-
law tort of fraud or deceit shows how wide a liability net the
Martin Act has always cast.
B. The Common Law of Deceit
To put the Martin Act in context, it is useful to compare
its provisions to common-law tort of deceit that awarded pri-
vate parties money damages for the loss attributable to fraudu-
lent conduct.59 The elements of the common-law tort are em-
bodied in Section 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of
fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of in-
ducing another to act or to refrain from action in re-
liance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in
deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifia-
ble reliance upon the misrepresentation.60
It is also instructive to note that the standard federal defi-
nition of securities fraud takes exactly the same tack. Under
federal law, plaintiffs must prove “(1) a material misrepresen-
tation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a con-
nection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepre-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Lydie N.C. Pierre-Louis, Hedge Fund Fraud and the Public Good, 15
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 34 (2009) (“The original Martin Act was a
weak law and no enforcement actions were commenced for years after its
adoption.”).
59. See Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (KB).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
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sentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causa-
tion.”61
The tort and its constitutive elements necessarily give rise
to all sorts of knotty doctrinal questions. What is the basis of
liability? Does the tort cover fraud only, or does it extend fur-
ther? How is the element of causation cashed out when the
loss is financial, as opposed to the more familiar tort context
of physical injury? Is there a materiality limitation? Does liabil-
ity for false statements cover omissions, mere opinions, predic-
tions, and statements of intention? The express text of the
Martin Act answers some of these questions, but it remains si-
lent on other key issues. It is therefore common for cases
under the Martin Act to draw explicit comparisons to the fed-
eral security acts, which in turn rely on explicit comparisons to
the various common-law rules. All of these interactions must
be examined.
C. Basis of Liability: Fraud, Recklessness, Negligence, and Beyond
At common law, the basic instinct was to impose liability
for deceit but not for innocent or even negligent misrepresen-
tations.62 There are good reasons for this distinction, even
though the harm to the aggrieved party may be the same. Im-
perfect information—from whatever source—distorts any deci-
sion-making process, because it leads people to attach false
weights to the goods and services they purchase or sell. Attach
too high a value to some object, and you will pay too much for
it. Attach too low a value, and you will part with it for too low a
price.
Unfortunately, incomplete information is the normal
state of human affairs, so any legal system must be picky about
the shortfalls in information that it will target for attack. The
basic presumption that all individuals should ordinarily bear
the costs of their own mistakes provides a sensible point of de-
parture for two reasons. First, it offers a strong incentive for
individuals to ferret out good information to counteract the
61. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008). See also Pits, Ltd. v. Am. Express Bank Int’l, 911 F. Supp. 710, 719
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting the exact parallel between the common-law action
for deceit in New York and an action for federal securities fraud under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5).
62. See, e.g., Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337 (HL).
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bad, so long as the incremental value of superior information
outweighs the cost in time, effort, and money it would take to
learn it. Second, this rule protects other parties by removing
(in most cases) the obligation to correct the errors of their
trading partners, some of which they may not know at all. The
security of transactions is remarkably improved if everyone un-
derstands that his own mistakes are not a ground on which he
can upset transactions made with others.
This rule holds best where there are unilateral mistakes
for which no one else is to blame, let alone one’s trading part-
ner. Like all legal rules, however, this one is subject to excep-
tion. More specifically, fraud in the inducement (note the
causal element) changes the calculation because now one per-
son has invested in disinformation of another solely for his
own advantage. In general, it is common to treat reckless disre-
gard of the truth as though it were a specimen of fraud, on the
ground that the parties who engage in these steps well know
what they have done wrong.63 This is a far cry from both inno-
cent misrepresentation and even negligent misrepresenta-
tion,64 neither of which involve conscious awareness of the
likelihood of falsehood.
This carefully crafted definition of fraud makes sense
functionally because the correct legal approach is to always
start with the low-hanging fruit: the area where the minimum
of legal intervention will generate the maximum of social im-
provement. Under this simple test, the primacy of fraud—
which is the primary target of the common law, the federal
securities laws, and New York’s Martin Act—should be appar-
ent. On the one hand, fraud constitutes the greatest peril to
voluntary transactions, because fraudsters will work overtime
to deceive the individuals from whom they wish to extract
money or other forms of private benefit. On the other hand,
fraud is far less common than simple mistake or ordinary neg-
ligence, so both civil and criminal enforcement may properly
focus on the most egregious form of misconduct. The dangers
of fraud are recognized in the common-law rules that govern
its application, which, in virtually every jurisdiction, specifically
63. See id.
64. See id. at 375 (“Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false represen-
tation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3)
recklessly, careless whether it is true or false.”).
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provide that contributory negligence is not a defense to a
fraud action, precisely because we want people to be able to
know that they are protected from deliberate fraud when they
rely on information received from others.65 To be sure, there
remains some residual risk that people will make mistakes be-
cause of the innocent misrepresentations of others. But in
most contexts, where there is a parity of access of information
to both parties, the more prudent rule is to eliminate liability
altogether, cautioning both sides to confirm the key assump-
tions on which they base their own decisions.
Negligent misrepresentations present a harder case, given
that it is never clear on whom the burden of discovering the
hidden truth of various assertions should fall. There has long
been a reluctance to develop any generalized remedy of negli-
gence that parallels the scope of fraud. The usual legislative
efforts are to impose these duties of care only in those cases in
which good institutional reasons make it clear that the parties
on one side of a transaction (say, the issuer of a new class of
securities) are likely to have better and cheaper access to infor-
mation than those on the other (such as the multitude of in-
vestors interested in buying the securities). In Britain, one
early law reflecting this compromise was the Director’s Liabil-
ity Act of 1890,66 passed in the immediate aftermath of Derry v.
Peek, which made directors and promoters liable to purchasers
of stocks and bonds unless the director or promoter could
show that “he had reasonable ground to believe,” and at all
material times did believe, his statements to be true.67 Modern
American law goes one step further and holds firms strictly lia-
ble for false statements made in a prospectus.68
Nonetheless, in most contexts other than the highly spe-
cialized one of securities sales, a party can bear the risk of ordi-
65. See Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1941) (“Negligence on
the part of the plaintiff in failing to discover the falsity of a statement is no
defense when the misrepresentation was intentional rather than negli-
gent.”).
66. Director’s Liability Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 64 (Eng.).
67. Id. § 3(a).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) states:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part be-
came effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any per-
son acquiring such security . . . [may] sue.
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nary negligence by his trading partner, in no small part be-
cause the means of self-protection are readily available. One
simple line of defense is to get independent information from
two or more people, and then to push harder when there is a
discrepancy between them. The great methodological mistake
on this topic is to assume that the question of liability for negli-
gence should be resolved as one of abstract theory, when in
fact the more reliable method is to look at the explicit terms of
liability in this context, as in so many others, where the risk of
disproportionate loss is one that leads to routine exemptions
from liability for negligence.69 Thus, it is common for brokers
and other suppliers of information to demand (and receive)
explicit protection against liability for losses resulting from
merely negligent counsel. The alternative position, treating
the advice as an implicit guarantee, could lead to the break-
down of the industry, because it would allow the customer to
keep the upside of successful trades while gaining the right of
action against the broker in the event of poor outcomes. No
party would pay for this kind of insurance in a voluntary mar-
ket, which is why it is routinely not required as a matter of law.
In other contexts, liability for a wholly innocent misrepresenta-
tion will sometimes be less important if the defendant who rec-
ommends an investment to the plaintiff has made that same
investment himself. After all, it is very common for people who
seek to recruit others into some risky venture to announce at
the outset that they are putting their own money at risk as well,
which acts as an implicit bond against poor advice. And once
the promoter’s own private investigations reveal the true state
of affairs, we no longer deal with innocent misrepresentations
but with ordinary fraud.
The plain text of the Martin Act does not compel grave
departures from the common law’s sensible distinctions. The
Act imposes liability for any false statement connected with se-
69. Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd. contains a powerful de-
nunciation of the various distinctions between paid and gratuitous transac-
tions before switching gears and honoring the standard exemption clause
put into the contract, by saying: “A man cannot be said voluntarily to be
undertaking a responsibility if at the very moment when he is said to be
accepting it he declares that in fact that he is not.” [1964] AC 465 (HL) 533.
The same rejection of negligence applies in cases where there is an effort to
hold someone responsible in ordinary negligence for some catastrophic loss
that might have been prevented by an adequate inspection.
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curities trading when the party making the statement “(i)
knew the truth; or (ii) with reasonable effort could have
known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascer-
tain the truth; or (iv) did not have knowledge concerning the
representation or statement made.”70 If the statute were meant
to institute a strict-liability rule, there would be no need for
this careful enumeration of mental states, and the text does
not support a strict-liability reading. The first case described is
a clear case of intent, and the second and third refer to negli-
gence. The fourth mental state is the hardest to construe, and
could admittedly be bent into a strict-liability shape, but the
better reading is that it targets statements made by parties who
know they lack the knowledge they pretend to have.
Judicial interpretation, however, has diverted the Act
from this sensible reading, and it is now commonly said that
the Martin Act requires no proof of scienter in civil actions.71
In an early case interpreting the Act, the New York Court of
Appeals urged: “The words ‘fraud’ and ‘fraudulent practice,’
in this connection, should therefore be given a wide meaning,
so as to include all acts, although not originating in any actual
evil design or contrivance to perpetrate fraud or injury upon
others, which do by their tendency to deceive or mislead the
purchasing public come within the purpose of the law.”72
More recently, in People v. Sala, a New York appellate court
stated that “the People need only prove that the defendant
committed an intentional act constituting fraud, which under
the Martin Act ‘includes all deceitful practices contrary to the
plain rules of common honesty and all acts tending to deceive
or mislead the public.’”73 And in State v. 7040 Colonial Road
70. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-C(1)(C).
71. HAROLD K. GORDON, JONES DAY, ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER
NEW YORK’S MARTIN ACT 26 (2015), https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publi
cation/cc6cfc9e-1517-4707-958d-8ea80d2042c2/Presentation/PublicationAt
tachment/9be275fc-e882-499c-9045-9a429519ab82/FebMar15_%20NYSup
plement_MartinActFeature.pdf; John C. Coffee, Jr., On Thin Ice: Climate
Change, Exxon, the NYAG and the Martin Act, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 23,
2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/11/23/on-thin-ice-climate-
change-exxon-the-nyag-and-the-martin-act/.
72. New York v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926).
73. People v. Sala, 695 N.Y.S.2d 169, 177 (App. Div. 1999) (citing KAUF-
MAN, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES, MCKINNEY’S CONS LAWS OF N.Y., BOOK 19,
GENERAL BUSINESS LAW ART 23-A, at 32-33); see also People v. Lexington Sixty-
First Assocs., 345 N.E.2d 307, 311 (N.Y. 1976).
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Associates Co., a New York trial court held that the term “fraud”
as used in the Martin Act “includes all deceitful practices con-
trary to the plain rules of common honesty and all acts tending
to deceive or mislead the public, whether or not the product
of scienter or intent to defraud.”74
These expansive definitions play fast and loose with the
distinction between “deceive” and “mislead.” In so doing, they
create the risk of imposing ill-considered liability on innocent,
but false, statements. But that perceived risk is often greater in
theory than in practice, as the facts of many of the landmark
Martin Act cases illustrate. The broad statement in Sala was
made in connection with a criminal prosecution for a fraudu-
lent plan to gain tenant approval for a conversion of rental
units to condominiums under New York City’s convoluted
Rent Stabilization Law.75 The landlord filled vacant units with
family and friends in order to boost the number of unit hold-
ers who voted in favor of the conversion.76 This elaborate
scheme was plainly an intentional—indeed, a conspiratorial—
deception. Similarly, 7040 Colonial Road involved a successful
suit to enjoin the conversion of residential premises into a co-
operative arrangement, when the Attorney General deter-
mined that the defendants had not disclosed certain key facts
relating to the financial condition of the premises, including
its own failure to make good on the maintenance obligations
for the retained units.77 This case, too, looked like a culpable
misrepresentation (albeit one by omission, a wrinkle discussed
below). Neither of these real estate transactions involved a
wholly innocent misrepresentation, and both were sensibly
covered by Section 352-e(1) of the Martin Act.78
Thus, for the archetypal Martin Act case of yore, the eli-
sion of the scienter issue was more troubling in theory than in
practice. Indeed, the New York courts’ frequent invocation of
“deceit” and the standard of “common honesty” could be char-
74. State v. 7040 Colonial Rd. Assocs. Co., 671 N.Y.S.2d 938, 941 (Sup. Ct.
1998) (citing KAUFMANN, INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY OVERVIEW MCKIN-
NEY’S CONS. LAWS OF NEW YORK, BOOK 19, GENERAL BUSINESS LAW, ARTICLE
23-A, at 32–33).
75. Sala, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 177; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-501 to 26-520
(2017).
76. Lexington Sixty-First Assocs., 345 N.E.2d at 311.
77. 7040 Colonial Rd. Assocs. Co., 671 N.Y.S.2d at 941–42.
78. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352(1) (McKinney 2014).
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itably read to parallel the common law’s sensible hesitance to
impose liability for innocent and negligent misstatements, the
cases’ no-less-frequent disclaimers of any scienter requirement
notwithstanding. At the very least there is a stipulated element
of the definition of fraud, given that Section 353(1) of the
Martin Act authorizes actions by the Attorney General against
“practices or transactions heretofore referred to as and de-
clared to be fraudulent practices.”79 Moreover, the NYAG’s ef-
fort to obtain only injunctive relief minimized the importance
of the intent issue: it is perfectly proper to enjoin harmful be-
havior, regardless of the defendant’s state of mind. A strict-
liability rule works well for enjoining ordinary nuisance cases,
and those rules can apply just as well in these financial situa-
tions. Indeed, once an injunction is sought, no one could
claim, having been warned, that the activities in question re-
mained unintentional, no matter how innocently they began.
D. Statements of Fact: Materiality, Omissions, Opinions, and
Predictions.
In many ways, the single most important feature of the
common-law action for deceit is that it covers only statement
of facts. The term “facts” can obviously be read very broadly to
cover all assertions that a given state of affairs corresponds to
the description that the defendant has made of it. Indeed, in
most fraud cases, the point passes by without dispute. If the
defendant claims that he owns a well-oiled machine that turns
out not to function at all, it does not take deep philosophical
awareness to conclude that this statement of fact is false, and
therefore imposing civil recovery and criminal punishment is
so clear that no one gives the matter a second thought. In a
hardcore fraud case, lying does not consist only in shaving cor-
ners. It also consists in making up matters out of whole cloth.
Hence the term “blue sky” accurately reflects the proper state
of affairs when the fraud goes to the sale of stock.
Nonetheless, just as the term “statement of fact” impli-
cates some easy cases, it also gives rise to some hard ones. The
use of language is often variable, and there are some state-
ments that are regarded properly as weighty and consequent-
ial and others that are rightly dismissed as light and trivial. The
law of fraud must take this complication into account, and in
79. Id.
830 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:805
response it develops an initial filter of “materiality” to indicate
which statements are capable of supporting potential liability
and which are too evanescent to matter. A statement’s context
matters as well as its content; sometimes a statement is made in
relative isolation, while in other cases the identical statement
may be just one of many statements, often made by many inde-
pendent individuals, about a given issue. Clearly the statement
is more likely to be material when it stands solo than when it is
part of a symphony of statements concerning broad matters of
public interest where other voices have weighed in.
Subject to that caveat, the overarching inquiry into mate-
riality can conveniently be broken down into three separate
issues, each of which forms a discrete piece of the whole. The
first of these is the basic question of whether, and if so when,
an omission should be regarded as a statement of fact covered
under the common law of deceit, the federal securities laws,
and the Martin Act. The answer, as will become clear, is that
these omissions must be covered by the same contextual stan-
dards that are used with actual statements of fact. In this con-
text, the correct impulse is to expand the basic liability for de-
ceit, for there is no doubt that omissions can be as telling, or
material, as statements of fact. The second issue relates to
statements of opinion as distinct from statements of bald fact,
and the third relates to predictions of future events, a subset of
opinion. In both of these latter two contexts, it becomes criti-
cal to distinguish between “puffing,” i.e., vague commenda-
tions of goods and services, and specific statements that are
properly the source of liability in all three settings. I examine
each of these subcases after addressing the general conception
of materiality.
1. Materiality
The inquiry into statements of fact is framed by the legal
inquiry into “materiality.” Although Section 525 of the Second
Restatement of Torts does not use the term, it is widely under-
stood that any misrepresentation must involve some “material”
or major fact to be actionable. Otherwise any minor or incon-
sequential remark could generate a large liability, which is why
traditional writers on the topic spoke of actionable misrepresen-
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tations, as a subclass of the larger whole.80 The exact formula-
tion of materiality necessarily treats a question of degree as
though it were a hard line. Nonetheless, since speech is ubiq-
uitous in a way in which liability determinations cannot be,
there needs to be some initial filter that keeps a large amount
of small talk out of the legal system. How this is best done is
subject to much dispute. There are always ample grounds, for
example, to differ as to whether the determination of material-
ity turns on an independent judicial assessment of the impor-
tance of the statement, or whether materiality should be mea-
sured by reference to the specific persons to whom it is made,
which raises extra difficulties for any statement made to that
diverse group of individuals known as the public at large.
The definitive Supreme Court precedent on this matter is
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,81 which involved charges that a
proxy statement issued in connection with a proposed acquisi-
tion of TSC was “incomplete and materially misleading.”82 In
addressing this question, the Supreme Court opted for the ob-
jective standard by explicitly rejecting the broader definition of
materiality adopted by the Seventh Circuit, which had used the
phrase “all facts which a reasonable shareholder might con-
sider important.”83 The Supreme Court’s narrower standard
followed “the conventional tort test of materiality whether a
reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepre-
sented or omitted in determining his course of action.”84 That
answer seems correct in the context of any public offering, for
it is not possible for any offeror to take into account the multi-
ple individual variations between different prospective sellers
(or buyers, as the case may be). But the subjective standard
could prove more acceptable in those cases where there is a
one-on-one transaction in which the defendant is aware of the
weakness and foibles of his trading partner. Clearly, for most
80. Hence the title of George Spencer Bower’s book, Actionable Misrepre-
sentation (1911), an early masterpiece on this topic. It is now in its fifth edi-
tion. SPENCER BOWER & KEN HANDLEY, ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION (5th
ed. 2014).
81. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
82. Id. at 441.
83. Id. at 445 (quoting Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d. 324,
330 (7th Cir. 1975)).
84. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (2)(a) (Tentative
Draft No. 10, 1964)).
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purposes, the public setting dominates. In that context, the
Supreme Court in TSC Industries put the words “would” and
“might” in italics to stress the difference between these two def-
initions. The Court then cashed out this view by insisting that,
in the public context of investment decisions, “there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made availa-
ble.”85
Although sensible in its basic outlook, this principle in ap-
plication often overlooks some of the complexities of deciding
what kinds of statements or omissions should create potential
liability in dealing with acquisitions and mergers of publicly
traded stock. The best illustration of the hybridization of state-
ments and omissions is the 1988 Supreme Court decision in
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,86 where the question before the Su-
preme Court was whether it was a material misrepresentation
to say that a company’s board was not in preliminary merger
negotiations when in fact it was. Any release of this informa-
tion is obviously very ticklish, for its disclosure could push
stock prices upwards, which could make the deal less attractive
for the acquiring party.87 But if mum is the word, what should
be done in response to a direct question about whether these
negotiations took place? The district court took the position
that these statements were not material because they were not
“destined” to lead to an agreement in principle.88 As a matter
of simple economics, its broad contention must be wrong, be-
cause anyone thinking about buying shares in a company will
vary his estimate of their value, up or down, given knowledge
of the possible merger agreement, so that the price will move,
either up or down, on the information in the short run no
85. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
86. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
87. The same risk arises when insiders, like lawyers or investment advi-
sors, trade on information supplied by the acquirer on their own account,
driving up the price of the stock. It is for this reason that the agent binds
itself by contract not to trade on that information. See United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997) (applying the insider trading statute
to these misappropriation cases). For a critical analysis of this issue, see Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-law Principles of Insider Trading After New-
man v. United States, 125 YALE L.J. 1482 (2016).
88. Basic, 485 U.S. at 229.
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matter what the ultimate outcome of the acquisition effort.
What is evident about this situation is that the reason for keep-
ing quiet is the same as the reason for making a misleading
statement. Here is one class of disclosures that hurts share-
holders as a group. So long, therefore, as management is not
trading on its own account, the statements it made should be
regarded as justified as the only effective means to preserve
the needed secrecy in the negotiations.
Unfortunately, securities law does not have a well-devel-
oped category of justified falsehoods, so the hard question be-
comes how to determine the materiality of various noncom-
mittal board responses over the life cycle of merger and acqui-
sitions negotiations, many of which fail. The laundry list of
factors offered in Basic89 is so comprehensive that it is beyond
useless, so that in practice the only way for firms to handle the
question in practice is to adopt a blanket approach by which
they always say “no comment” whenever asked about possible
merger negotiations. That sphinxlike response conveys no in-
formation, but it is far from clear whether that private adapta-
tion is more efficient than a legal regime that does allow for
justified concealment. More specifically, there may well be
cases in which it makes sense for the firm to let the market
know that there is no pending merger so that they can better
price the shares. But that option is precluded by Basic.
To make matters more difficult, the proof of reliance by
individual traders—the causal link that will be discussed in de-
tail later90—does not mesh well with the facts in Basic that led
89. Id. at 239, which states that:
Whether merger discussions in any particular case are material
therefore depends on the facts. Generally, in order to assess the
probability that the event will occur, a factfinder will need to look
to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate
levels. Without attempting to catalog all such possible factors, we
note by way of example that board resolutions, instructions to in-
vestment bankers, and actual negotiations between principals or
their intermediaries may serve as indicia of interest. To assess the
magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of the securities alleg-
edly manipulated, a factfinder will need to consider such facts as
the size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums
over market value. No particular event or factor short of closing the
transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render
merger discussions material.
90. See infra Section II.E.
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to the fraud-on-the-market theory and posits that the price of
shares in the market reflects all “available material informa-
tion regarding the company and its business,” even if there are
no acts of individual reliance.91 Hence the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory is introduced to fill that gap so as to provide a
rough estimate of the price differential at the time of the false
announcement. But the situation is ultimately unstable be-
cause those who sold improvidently recouped their losses,
while those who purchased fortuitously get to keep their gains,
so that shareholders at the time of the judgment suffer the
diminution in value. It is no wonder that the all-silent ap-
proach dominates any potential remedy given, proving once
again the difficulty in using these theories to establish liability.
As will become evident, theories of liability that work reasona-
bly well in direct negotiations do not always work as well in
connection with public offerings with the diffuse distribution
of information.
The complexities on the topic of materiality at common
law, under the federal securities laws, and under the Martin
Act, are compounded when the plaintiff’s case involves not a
single statement but an elaborate course of dealing in which
multiple statements are made in multiple arenas. More specifi-
cally, many financial fraud cases do not result from a single
statement by one party to another. Instead there is a constant
stream of information that may be accurate in part, but inaccu-
rate in some respects and incomplete in others. Any effort to
control fraud that looks at the former but ignores the latter is
woefully incomplete, so that any effective control of fraud
yokes together the treatment of omissions and misrepresenta-
tions.
That interplay between material statements and omissions
was very much in play in the important Supreme Court deci-
sion Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,92 a spiritual sequel to
TSC Industries. Matrixx was the defendant in a class action for
securities fraud brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act of 1934. The gist of the complaint was that the defendant
had made a material omission when it had failed to disclose
that it had received information from reliable physicians who
91. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154,
1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
92. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
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had detected a high level of anosmia, or loss of smell, among
individuals who had used its main product, Zicam, a cold rem-
edy. The previous controlled studies on the topic had not, as
Matrixx had stressed, revealed any systematic connection be-
tween the two, even though other studies had noted that anos-
mia had occurred in individuals who had used other zinc-
based products. The defendant’s contention was that the com-
plaint did not adequately allege that Matrixx made a material
representation or omission or that it acted with scienter be-
cause the complaint did not allege that Matrixx “knew of a
statistically significant number of adverse events requiring dis-
closure.” A unanimous Supreme Court held that it was proper
to let the case go to the jury because any analysis of “the mate-
riality of adverse event reports cannot be reduced to a bright-
line rule.”93
Ironically, the Court’s analysis seems wrong on both
points. The evidence in this case did support a bright-line re-
sult, but for the plaintiff, not the defendant. While there are
often situations for which bright line rules are hard to man-
age, this case was not one of them. Adverse events are always a
big deal in medicine, wholly apart from their financial implica-
tions.94 A single adverse event might give rise to a jury ques-
tion of whether it is a powerful enough signal to warrant a
directed verdict for the plaintiff. But usually reports of adverse
events come in bunches, and the case is certainly not a jury
question when an extended series of documented cases reveal
the same adverse consequence, whose seriousness is not in
doubt.
To give two points of reference in this case, it is clear be-
yond any doubt that a plaintiff in a medical-malpractice case
would have slam-dunk proof that the omission of this informa-
tion created a breach of the physician’s duty to disclose possi-
ble material complications from the proposed treatment.95
Worse still, as in Matrixx, the FDA had received multiple
clinical reports on the side effects of the drug, on the strength
93. Id. at 30.
94. For a glimpse of how big the impact can be, see FDA ADVERSE EVENTS
REPORTING SYSTEM (FAERS) PUBLIC DASHBOARD, https://www.fda.gov/drugs
/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrugeffec
ts/ucm070093.htm.
95. For the basic doctrine, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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of which it launched its own investigation. Days later, the de-
fendants issued a press release stating that the FDA had not
found any connection between Zicam and anosmia, which
knowingly gives a false impression about the impact that an
FDA study would have on the marketability of the drug.96 In
this situation, moreover, the omission in question was mani-
festly material because the mere fact that drug is subject to
FDA investigation is itself sufficient to drive down the share
price even if the drug is ultimately exonerated. In cases where
there are these obvious benchmarks keyed to the notion of
materiality, there is no need for a jury determination. As is so
often the case, the common strategy of courts in tort cases is to
allow juries to decide cases when a cleaner appreciation of the
underlying substantive law supports a partial summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff.
2. Omissions
In light of the fact pattern in Matrixx and similar cases, it
should come as no surprise that even though the term “omis-
sion” is not found in the Martin Act, the term has, by judicial
decision, always been read into the definition.97 Hence the
overall analysis takes place in the same fashion as it does when
the term “omission” is included, as in Section 11 of the Securi-
ties Act dealing with registration statements.98 Section 11 cov-
ers strict liability in a registration statement that “contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a mate-
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading.”99 Nonetheless, in practice,
the actual language of the governing law takes a back seat to a
functional analysis in ways that expand the operative scope of
the Martin Act. Any isolated utterance resists classification un-
96. See Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 34–35.
97. See, e.g., People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714
N.Y.S.2d 844, 864 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“It is well settled that fraud exists not only
where there has been an affirmative misstatement of a material fact, but also
where there has been an omission of a material fact.”).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (“In case any part of the registration statement,
when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquir-
ing such security . . . may . . . sue.”).
99. Id.
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til the background context, whether specific to an individual
case or socially generalizable, is understood. As in Matrixx, to
say a good fact about X—the FDA had not found any negative
correlation between Zicam and anosmia—only to omit a bad
fact about X—the FDA was investigating recent reports of that
connection—is to speak a half-truth, which is a lie if the omis-
sion is deliberate and is all the more insidious because the
half-truth lends an aura of plausibility to the overall transac-
tion. To turn a blind eye to these omissions would allow fraud-
sters to disarm their listeners en masse with impunity.
Doctrinally, therefore, it is no surprise that the Martin Act
has always been construed in ways that bring it in line with the
federal securities laws and the common law on the general is-
sue of materiality and the specific problem of omissions.100 In-
deed, in New York v. Rachmani Corp.,101 the New York Court of
Appeals explicitly adopted the definition of materiality articu-
lated in TSC Industries, and further noted that “[a]n omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasona-
ble shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote.”102 The statement was made in connection with indi-
viduals who voted in favor of a cooperative sale when they
lacked full information about the transaction. As with all omis-
sions, there is no obvious way to rely on what has not been
said.103
The use of the term of “omitted fact” was essential to
Rachmani because of the nature of the underlying dispute,
namely the conversion of rental units to condominiums. The
problem arose because of “the failure to mention an unsatis-
fied precondition to a cooperative conversion of an apartment
house constituted fraud which justified the issuance of an in-
junction” under the Martin Act.104 The New York Court of Ap-
peals denied injunctive relief on the ground that there was no
“actionable” fraud because the disputed condition was not sig-
100. For the industry view, see DECHERT LLP, THE MARTIN ACT: A PRIMER
(Jan. 15, 2004), https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/
onpoint/2004/1/new-york-state-s-martin-act-a-primer/FS_2004-04.pdf.
101. New York v. Rachmani Corp., 525 N.E.2d 704, 726–27 (N.Y. 1988).
102. Id. at 726.
103. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
104. Rachmani Corp., 71 N.Y.2d at 721.
838 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:805
nificant and had, in any event, been disclosed in the original
offering plan.105
The conceptual point, however, is that in all cases, the
tort of deceit cannot be limited to false statements, but must
also take into account omissions that when set against the
background of what was discussed and mentioned, could have
an impact on the course of conduct in a particular case.106 But
here too there is nothing in the architecture of the Martin Act
which makes the common law or federal securities law analysis
on this critical initial coverage issue obsolete, otiose, or irrele-
vant.
3. Statements of Fact and Opinion
The basic inquiry follows similar lines in drawing the dis-
tinction between statement of facts and statement of opinions.
It is easy enough to conjure statements of the latter. The radio
commercial on WFMT that states that the Goodman Theatre is
the “foremost” theater in Chicago may sound like a statement
of fact, but is, in fact, widely regarded as a statement of opin-
ion, because of the drastic consequences that would flow from
the opposite interpretation. There are many theaters in Chi-
cago, and there are surely some rankings that hold that the
Goodman is not the best theater, or perhaps even in the top
ten. The same analysis applies to heaping praise on athletes,
entertainers, CEOs, or just about anyone else. There is a
strong and justified sense that the public at large, especially
the universe of theater-goers who care about these matters, is
context-sensitive, and will appropriately discount any claim of
supposed preeminence that is made in such bald terms.
One common way to put the point is to note that the
ubiquitous practice of “puffing” is not actionable even if liter-
ally false. One standard account of what falls into a safe haven
is offered by Learned Hand in Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons
Mfg. Co.107:
105. Id.
106. It is common for a trial judge to instruct the that “the definition of a
‘false statement’ included both affirmative misrepresentations and any rep-
resentation that ‘effectively conceals or omits a material fact.’” See People v.
Sala, 739 N.E.2d 727, 730 (N.Y. 2000).
107. Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1918).
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There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man
takes seriously, and if he does he suffers from his cre-
dulity. If we were all scrupulously honest, it would not
be so; but, as it is, neither party usually believes what
the seller says about his own opinions, and each
knows it.108
A social code, universally accepted, vanquishes any hyper-
bolic literalism in thinking about ordinary discourse. Until the
claims in question become more specific, the better approach
by far is to let matters slide, so that self-correction takes place
on the side of the listener, in light of public facts. But when
the nature of the claim is specific, such as “Good Housekeeping
has ranked our product as best in class,” it is a false statement
of fact if Good Housekeeping has done no such thing. The inevi-
table hard cases therefore arise when the implicit background
understandings do not hold, precisely because one side has a
hidden store of information that the other lacks.
One early case that shows a deep appreciation of this dis-
tinction and all it entails is Smith v. Land and House Property
Corp.,109 in which the plaintiff had offered a hotel for sale, stat-
ing that it was then let to “‘Mr. Frederick Fleck (a most desira-
ble tenant).’”110 Before the contract of sale could be signed,
Fleck made several late payments on the lease and then went
into bankruptcy. When the defendant refused to complete the
transaction on the ground that the plaintiff’s statement about
Fleck was a misrepresentation, the plaintiff sought specific per-
formance, claiming that their gauzy remark was “a mere ex-
pression of opinion.”111 Lord Justice Bowen rejected that con-
tention, hitting all the right notes:
If the facts are not equally known to both sides, then
a statement of opinion by the one who knows the
facts best involves very often a statement of a material
fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which
justify his opinion. Now a landlord knows the rela-
tions between himself and his tenant, other persons
either do not know them at all or do not know them
equally well, and if the landlord says that he consid-
108. Id. at 856.
109. Smith v. Land & House Prop. Corp. (1884) LR 28 Ch D 7 (Eng.).
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 10.
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ers that the relations between himself and his tenant
are satisfactory, he really avers that the facts pecu-
liarly within his knowledge are such as to render that
opinion reasonable. Now are the statements here
statements which involve such a representation of
material facts? They are statements on a subject as to
which prima facie the vendors know everything and
the purchasers nothing. The vendors state that the
property is let to a most desirable tenant, what does
that mean? I agree that it is not a guarantee that the
tenant will go on paying his rent, but it is to my mind
a guarantee of a different sort, and amounts at least
to an assertion that nothing has occurred in the rela-
tions between the landlords and the tenant which
can be considered to make the tenant an unsatisfac-
tory one. That is an assertion of a specific fact. . . . In
my opinion a tenant who had paid his last quarter’s
rent by driblets under pressure must be regarded as
an undesirable tenant.112
The fact/opinion distinction plays out the same way in
defamation cases as in deceit cases. Thus, suppose some third
party had made the same statement that Frederick Fleck was a
most desirable tenant to another third party, who then pur-
chased the property from his landlord who had said nothing,
or that a third party had deliberately understated the size of
the farm that the plaintiff purchased, likewise when the owner
had said nothing. In both settings, the plaintiff took the risk as
against the owner, but not against the third party, because a
defendant in a defamation case could not defend on the
ground that the basic statement was simply a matter of opinion
if he knew as much as the defendant did in Smith. The still
classic 1910 treatment of the issue by Van Vechten Veeder
took just this view.113 Let the underlying facts be stated before
112. Id. at 15–16.
113. See Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV.
413, 419–20 (1910):
The distinction is fundamental, then, between comment upon
given facts and the direct assertion of facts. And the significance of
the distinction is plain. If the facts are stated separately, and the
comment appears as an inference drawn from those facts, any injus-
tice that the imputation might occasion is practically negatived by
reason of the fact that the reader has before him the grounds upon
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the conclusion is reached, then third parties can make their
own judgment whether the evidence presented supports the
conclusion. Hence a detailed account of a transaction that is
then branded a theft is not defamatory if the underlying fac-
tual statements are true. But if the charge of theft is made
without that supporting context, the identical statement is now
transformed from one of opinion based on known facts to a
statement of fact that can support liability for either defama-
tion or deceit. The one obvious exception is where the un-
stated facts are so widely known to the public from multiple
sources that there is no reason to repeat them each time the
topic arises, because the requisite symmetry of which Lord Jus-
tice Bowen spoke is again present. The bottom line is that it is
the presence of asymmetrical information that controls the
characterization of any given statement as one of fact or opin-
ion.
This same limitation is carried over into securities law
where again the question is whether a given statement escapes
sanction because it counts as one of opinion, on the tests out-
lined above. This issue came to the fore in the recent Supreme
Court decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Con-
struction Industry Pension Fund,114 which is notable for how Jus-
tice Elena Kagan first relied on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 539,115 then on a brief excerpt from Bowen’s opinion
which the unfavorable inference is based. When the facts are truth-
fully stated, comment thereon, if unjust, will fall harmless, for the
former furnish a ready antidote for the latter. The reader is then in
a position to judge whether the critic has not by his unfairness or
prejudice libeled himself rather than the object of his animadver-
sion. But if a bare statement is made in terms of a fact, or if facts
and comment are so intermingled that it is not clear what purports
to be inference and what is claimed to be fact, the reader will natu-
rally assume that the injurious statements are based upon adequate
grounds known to the writer. In one case, the insufficiency of the
facts to support the inference will lead fair-minded men to reject it;
in the other, there is little, if any, room for the supposition that the
injurious statement is other than a direct change of the fact, based
upon grounds known to the writer, although not disclosed by him.
114. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
(1) A statement of opinion as to facts not disclosed and not other-
wise known to the recipient may, if it is reasonable to do so, be
interpreted by him as an implied statement
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in Smith, to the effect that when “the facts are not equally
known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one
who knows the facts best . . . impliedly states that [the speaker]
knows facts which justify his opinion.”116
Omnicare arose under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities
Act, which, as mentioned previously, subjects the registration
statement of an issuer to liability if that statement “contained
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading.”117 In connection
with a new public offering of common stock, Omnicare stated:
“We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare
providers, our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy
practices are in compliance with applicable federal and state
laws.”118 It further averred: “We believe that our contracts with
pharmaceutical manufacturers are legally and economically
valid arrangements that bring value to the healthcare system
and the patients that we serve.”119 Both statements were ac-
companied by caveats; Omnicare “mentioned several state-ini-
tiated ‘enforcement actions against pharmaceutical manufac-
turers’ for offering payments to pharmacies that dispensed
their products.”120 It then cautioned that the laws relating to
that practice might “be interpreted in the future in a manner
inconsistent with our interpretation and application.”121
The plaintiffs sued for violation of the strict-liability Sec-
tion 11, claiming that defendant’s representations were “mate-
rially false” because the federal government later investigated
Omnicare for violation of its anti-kickback laws.122 The pattern
necessarily raises the much-mooted interconnection between
statements of fact and opinion. Justice Kagan thought that the
(a) that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with
his opinion; or
(b) that he knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming it.
(2) In determining whether a statement of opinion may reasonably
be so interpreted, the recipient’s belief as to whether the maker has
an adverse interest is important.
116. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1330–31.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1933).
118. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1324.
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last statement could be actionable given that it did not men-
tion the possibility of the federal investigation, but only state-
initiated actions. In my view, the gap between this statement
and one treating Frederick Fleck as a desirable tenant when
known to be in arrears on his rent and teetering on bank-
ruptcy seems enormous because of the differences in the back-
ground knowledge of the two target audiences. The Omnicare
investors, often represented by learned intermediaries, were
not in the dark about the general structure of the securities
laws and the extensive substantive overlap between state and
federal laws regulating every aspect of the health care business.
Nor did they lack the common knowledge that government
investigations of billing standards and practices are a fixed and
inescapable part of any ongoing health-care business. There-
fore, it seems hard to believe that anyone who is apprised of
the risk of investigation at the state level can somehow be bliss-
fully ignorant of the parallel risk at the federal level, knowing
that overlapping federal and state enforcement systems is the
norm in virtually every regulatory area today.
It is possible to go further. Whenever a dispute arises
about regulatory risk, the close case is one in which the pro-
spectus says nothing about regulatory risk at any level. Even
here, there is much to be said for the view that everyone knows
that healthcare is a heavily regulated industry, so that the risk
of an administrative investigation is too obvious to belabor.
But even if, as seems the case, that somewhat jaded view is in-
correct, the level of inference rightly expected from sophisti-
cated buyers is so powerful that it becomes hard, even if this
supposed omission is given weight, to credit the claim for its
materiality in light of all the obvious inferences that can be
drawn from the extensive set of stated and background infor-
mation. And there is a heavy cost for flyspecking these registra-
tion statements, for the volume of offerings will diminish sub-
stantially if virtually every registration can be found with the
benefit of hindsight to contain some material exaggeration or
omission, under a strict liability regime no less. The oft-ex-
pressed fear of common-law judges was that expanding the
class of false statements of fact could by degrees make every
speaker a warrantor of the success of any deal that turns sour.
Indeed, Justice Holmes said it well: “The rule of law [that
“vague commendation” of wares is not actionable] is hardly to
be regretted, when it is considered how easily and insensibly
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words of hope or expectation are converted by an interested
memory into statements of quality and value, when the expec-
tation has been disappointed.”123 In my view, a summary judg-
ment for the defendant in Omnicare puts a clear limit on the
scope of misrepresentations of fact that lines up well with the
common-law theory that should animate this entire area.
4. Predictions
The same conceptual framework carries over to the line
between statements of fact, which are actionable under the se-
curities law, and “mere” predictions, which are not. Often the
initial cut into the problem stems from the quotation from
Learned Hand in Vulcan about the line between mere puff
and an actionable misrepresentation.124 The distinction reso-
nates in this context, because predictions deal with the future,
which is often highly uncertain, and not the past, whose events
are fixed even if not always known with precision. In this con-
text, it is well-nigh universally held that statements of “corpo-
rate optimism” of the sort which insist that sales are “going
reasonably well,” or that the company was “pursuing the right
strategy,” or that the firm will “start to grow revenue” in the
second half of the year, are regarded as non-actionable puffery
by modern judges,125 and for the identical reason expressed by
Lord Justice Bowen and Judge Hand:
[N]ot every unfulfilled expression of corporate opti-
mism, even if characterized as misstatement, can give
rise to a genuine issue of materiality under the securi-
ties laws. . . . In particular, courts have demonstrated
a willingness to find immaterial as a matter of law a
certain kind of rosy affirmation commonly heard
from corporate managers and numbingly familiar to
the marketplace—loosely optimistic statements that
are so vague, so lacking in specificity, or so clearly
constituting the opinions of the speaker, that no rea-
123. Deming v. Darling, 20 N.E. 107, 108–09 (N.Y. 1889).
124. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-501 to 26-520, and supra text accompa-
nying note 75.
125. Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217–19 (1st Cir. 1996),
abrogated on other grounds by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1934).
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sonable investor could find them important to the to-
tal mix of information available.126
Judicial pronouncements of this sort in the decided cases
can be multiplied at will,127 and the degree of unanimity of
opinion over the question covers not only federal securities
laws but also state securities laws.128 The logic is again the
same. It is not enough to look only at the statement as made; it
is also necessary to take into account the general background
knowledge of the audience, whose members are unlikely to be
taken in by bland, commonplace predictions of future com-
mercial success. All of these observations on facts, opinions,
and predictions carry over to the Martin Act, where exactly the
same dynamic takes place.
The moral is that on key points of doctrine, the differ-
ences between the common law, the federal law, and the Mar-
tin Act are overstated. It is easy to miss this point if one fails to
appreciate that the common law is not just some arbitrary as-
semblage of rules but instead a coherent intellectual structure
for which it is difficult (especially on short notice) to gin up a
rival. Accordingly, the best cases from over a century ago sur-
vive undiminished today. Therefore, if it is impossible to en-
join these statements under the Martin Act, it would become
indefensible to think that such statements should be the
source of a damage suit, let alone a criminal prosecution. So
much of the interpretation of the securities laws is sensible
gloss that the lessons learned from common-law cases and fed-
eral securities laws should not be ignored in dealing with the
Martin Act, and for the most part, judicial decisions respect
the overlap in analysis on the points of commonality.
E. Causation
A good deal of attention must also be paid, moreover, to
the causal issues implicit in any case of fraud, or even misrepre-
sentation. As a matter of basic theory, causation is a key ele-
126. Id. at 1217.
127. See, e.g., Robert N. Kravitz, Room for Optimism: The “Puffery” Defense
under the Federal Securities Laws (Part 1 of 2), 19 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. J., Winter
2009, at 23; Kravitz, Room for Optimism: The “Puffery” Defense under the Federal
Securities Laws (Part 2 of 2), 19 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. J. Spring 2009, at 1. See also
ECA v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 553 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2009).
128. See, e.g., Next Century Commc’ns Corp. v. Ellis, 318 F.3d 1023 (11th
Cir. 2003) (applying Georgia law).
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ment in all torts cases, whether for physical injury or financial
losses, because it links up the act or omission of the defendant
to the plight of the plaintiff. The simple assertion that the
plaintiff has been hurt is consistent with the harm being self-
inflicted, being the result of an act of God, or being inflicted
by any third party unrelated to the defendant. To be sure, no-
fault systems compensate injured persons regardless of the
cause of injury. However, under that approach, the compensa-
tion always comes from a general fund raised by tax revenues
or some insurance scheme like employer-based workers’ com-
pensation—not from a specific exaction collected from one
isolated person among millions who is singled out for special
treatment.
The same logic that applies to damages awards also ap-
plies to injunctive relief. Any particular person is entitled to an
injunction only if she faces the prospect of some imminent
harm, including the repetition of some past adverse event. But
that injunction can only be directed to the person who caused
the harm or created the risk. When these harms are global,
either a class action or some direct government enforcement
is appropriate, under the rules of public nuisance that have
been well established for nearly 500 years.129 The basic line is
that special harms to a single person are remedied by a direct
action, while those low-level harms that are broadly felt are
remedied by an administrative action by some public body
against the wrongdoer that could both fix the wrong and im-
pose a fine for its occurrence. (In the latter case, the funds in
question stay in the public treasury, typically to be spent on,
say, the road or waterway that has been subject to damage.)
The same general logic can apply to false public statements or
omissions in which it is impossible to pinpoint the individuals
who have suffered the damages. These basic rules apply to
omissions as well as acts of commission, and the usual, and
correct, approach is to first find some statutory or private law
duty that requires some action, and then hold the failure to
discharge that duty an actionable wrong. In some cases, these
duties are strict, but in most they tend to require some level of
care that can vary by circumstances. But causation remains an
element in both kinds of cases.
129. Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1536) (Eng.).
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In dealing with physical harms, respecting the rules on
remoteness of damage for both acts and omissions are essen-
tial to the overall integrity of the system. To be sure, the for-
mal test of causation in the law of torts relies on an unhappy
amalgam of “but for” causation, limited by some notion of
proximate causation, based alternatively on foresight or direct-
ness.130 But this two-part test makes matters more complicated
than they really are, for in practice, most cases of causation
work backwards from the injury to a particular defendant, and
not forward from a distant act of some potential defendant to
the injury of the plaintiff.131 Thus, the paradigmatic case of
causation is the direct application of force—hands, sticks,
guns, and the like—covered by the common law rules of tres-
pass. The complex variations on it are those cases of indirect
harm where the defendant sets a dangerous condition that re-
sults in harm to the plaintiff by the application of some inter-
mediate force.132 In these situations, the damages are too re-
mote for liability when the dangerous condition created by the
defendant is corrected, as when a trap is filled before anyone
can fall in it, or a bomb is defused before it explodes. If some
other person resets the trap or rearms the bomb, responsibility
for the harm should lie with the later actor. Only in very rare
cases could one go back behind that action to the remote
stranger on an expanded theory of causation.
A parallel form of analysis applies to the tort of misrepre-
sentation at common law, and by extension to all actions that
take place under the federal securities laws or the Martin Act
and other blue-sky laws. In this context, the key element, as
articulated in all the cases discussed above, is that of the plain-
tiff’s reliance on the misstatement of the defendant. Omissions
also are generally judged by a test that asks whether the provi-
sion of additional information would have altered the plain-
tiff’s conduct in whole or in part in a way that would have re-
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
131. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 341–43 (11th ed. 2016).
132. For the classic discussion, see Scott v. Shepherd (1773) 96 Eng. Rep.
525 (KB). In Roman law, the same distinction applies between killing (oc-
cidere) and furnishing a cause of death (causam mortis praestare). DIG. 9.2.7.1
(Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18); DIG. 9.2.51.pr.
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duced or avoided the loss. There is no tighter test, and giving
up on causation in omission cases is tantamount to a huge
compromise of the entire system of public and private enforce-
ment. Where that causal connection is established in particu-
lar cases, an award of damages is appropriate for harm suf-
fered. Where it is threatened, or even imminent, in connec-
tion with speech directed to a specific person, private
injunctions are not likely to play much of a role because any
person who is smart enough to request a private injunction
against being deceived or misled is smart enough not to need
it. Armed with the truth, he should never be deceived by a
falsehood. But public injunctions, such as those contemplated
under both the federal securities laws and the Martin Act, re-
main fitting because it is perfectly appropriate to protect un-
suspecting members of the public from systematic frauds which,
if allowed to go forward, would result in substantial financial
losses. Fraud on the public is thus an obvious analogue to the
common-law public nuisance.
The role of reliance in these cases is made clear by this
simple, but often overlooked, distinction. It is one thing to lie
to another person, but it is quite another to deceive that person.
In the former case, the target of the lie is not misled, or even if
misled, did not take any steps that led to his own damage. The
lie is an attempt at deceit, but, like the blow that does not land
or the bomb that does not go off, it is not a completed tort.
The point is evident from the grammar of both verbs. “I lied to
you” is not an equivalent to “I deceived you.” Reliance by the
particular plaintiff on the false statement of the defendant is
thus needed to complete the private wrong. As Judge Francis
Buller said in the landmark 1789 case of Pasley v. Freeman,133
“Fraud without damage, or damage without fraud, gives no
cause of action; but where these two concur, an action lies.”134
In Pasley, the defendant stated to the plaintiff that Falch
was worthy of credit, but the defendant knew that he was in
fact not creditworthy. The novel feature of the case was that
the fraud in question appeared to be not for the plaintiff’s di-
rect benefit, so that one judge, Judge Grose, took the position
that no liability should attach because there was no collusion
133. Pasley v. Freeman (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (KB). The decision to
allow the action was 3 to 1.
134. Id. at 453.
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between the defendant and Falch and there was no contrac-
tual privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, given that
the loan was made to a third person.135 But the three judges in
the majority were not troubled by the want of a return benefit.
Indeed, they regarded the defendant’s action as being “more
diabolical” because of the lack of an immediate self-interest.136
But for present purposes, the key element is that the plaintiff
relied explicitly and immediately on the defendant’s state-
ments about the creditworthiness of Falch. In causal terms,
there was no possible intermediate action that could sever the
connection in this discrete financial context. It was not as
though the defendant had made this statement to some stran-
ger who in turn had relayed the information to the plaintiff.
That immediacy requirement is abundantly satisfied in cases
like Smith, with the face-to-face interactions between buyer and
seller.137
F. Privity
The discussion of causation in Pasley opens yet another
complication in these situations, for the prospect of third-per-
son interventions raises serious questions as to whether the de-
faults suffered should be attributable to the defendant. In-
deed, the reference to privity obviously brings forward the
early history of the actions for harms caused by defective prod-
ucts after they left the hands of the defendant and passed
through intermediate hands. Thus, the early case of Winterbot-
tom v. Wright138 held that the driver of a defective coach could
not recover from the defendant, who had supplied coaches to
the Postmaster General, who in turned leased them to the
plaintiff’s employer, when the plaintiff was injured when the
coach broke down because of a latent defect. The want of priv-
ity was held to defeat the action against the defendant who
had supplied and maintained the coach, even though the
plaintiff did not have an action against his employer unless he
could prove, which seemed unlikely, the latter’s improper
maintenance or use of it.
135. Id. at 451–53.
136. Id. at 456.
137. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
138. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
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This legal doctrine slowly reversed itself through case af-
ter case in which latent defects caused damage to innocent
plaintiffs after going through the hands of one or more third
parties, such as distributors or retailers.139 The question was
whether the use of that conduit, which severed privity of con-
tract, also made any damage suffered by the plaintiff too re-
mote. That rule applied to the full range of products, includ-
ing the poison belladonna sold as a harmless dandelion ex-
tract in Thomas v. Winchester,140 the broken wheel in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,141 or the alleged defective bottle
of Coca-Cola in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.142 In each of
these cases three conditions combined to limit liability. The
defect in question was latent; it reached the plaintiff in its orig-
inal condition; and the plaintiff made normal and proper use
of the product.143 The mischief of the privity requirement—its
excessive restrictiveness—was well captured by Judge Cardozo
when he said: “The dealer was indeed the one person of whom
it might be said with some approach to certainty that by him
the car would not be used. Yet the defendant would have us
say that he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty
to protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a con-
clusion.”144
Yet if the traditional privity rule was too restrictive, its
abandonment opened the door too wide to liability, as all of
the limitations initially built into the early formulations of
product-liability law were consciously peeled away. Thus,
under the new regime that began to emerge in the 1960s, up-
stream manufacturers were systematically held liable for losses
from patent defects, downstream product modifications, or
plain misuse, all of which are better controlled either by inter-
mediate parties or by the plaintiff herself.145 These shifts may
139. For my account of this early history, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 9–24 (1980).
140. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
141. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
142. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 468 (Cal. 1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring) (“The manufacturer’s liability should, of course, be de-
fined in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use, and
should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to the product as it
reached the market.”).
143. EPSTEIN, supra note 139.
144. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053, quoted in Escola, 150 P.2d at 465.
145. EPSTEIN, supra note 139, at 76–92.
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seem small in the abstract, but they had huge practical conse-
quences. The insurance needed to cover losses under the Es-
cola strict-liability regime was a tiny fraction—less than one
percent—of what the new regime demanded.146
Properly understood, the privity requirement served as a
rough but clearly imperfect proxy for the causation require-
ment. But in dealing with financial losses in all sorts of con-
texts, the privity requirement retains a much more tenacious
role. Information moves so quickly among persons that there
remains to this day a genuine fear that liability can easily go
too far. To put the point in its simplest form: no matter how
many times a single product is transferred, it remains a single
product—one drug tablet, one Coke bottle, one car. But every
time information is transferred, there is a huge multiplicative
effect. That information is retained by the original party and is
now shared, time and time again, with a new round of individ-
uals. In some of these iterations the information retains its
original form, but in many it is mixed and combined with in-
formation from other sources, so that it is hard to know exactly
how much of the original information remains.
These difficulties were apparent to Justice Cardozo in the
most influential case dealing with financial losses, Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,147 which he wrote fifteen years after his deci-
sion in MacPherson and which reveals a far different mindset
toward the privity issue. The case involved the movement of
information among three parties, in contrast to more public
offerings or statements. The defendant accountant failed to
detect the fraud of its client, Fred Stern & Co., which in turn
was able to procure extensive loans, both secured and un-
secured, from the plaintiffs. The complication arose because
Stern subsequently went bankrupt. In a first-best world, the ac-
146. In August 1976, I was hired by the American Insurance Association
(AIA), consisting of the major stock companies, to analyze the industry’s
large losses and premium hikes. At that time, the AIA had no systematic
institutional understanding of the issue. Most people thought that the strict
liability rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, was the
major cause of the change, but that was in fact wrong. It was the three ele-
ments just mentioned—expanded definition of defect, no insulation from
product modifications, and a broad foreseeable misuse standard—that drove
the analysis. For my then-contemporary account of the problem, see Richard
A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV.
643 (1978), which summarized the results of my work for the AIA.
147. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
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countants would be out of the picture, as the plaintiff would
have been able to recover with interest all the sums that it ad-
vanced to the bankrupt party. But the question of Touche’s
negligence liability arose precisely because Stern was insolvent,
and thus the issue became whether the defendant accountant
should be liable for its inability to detect a third-party fraud by
exercising reasonable care in doing its audit. It was evident
that the accountants and the plaintiffs were not in privity with
each other, although it was perfectly evident that the audit
statement was intended to be used, and would be used, to ob-
tain loans from third parties like this plaintiff. Judge Cardozo
nonetheless denied the action by drawing a distinction be-
tween fraud and negligence:
To creditors and investors to whom the employer ex-
hibited the certificate, the defendants owed a like
duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice
in the circumstances of its making that the employer
did not intend to keep it to himself. A different ques-
tion develops when we ask whether they owed a duty
to these to make it without negligence. If liability for
negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover
of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a lia-
bility in an indeterminate amount for an indetermi-
nate time to an indeterminate class.148
This passage is notable for several key points. The first is
that Cardozo thinks that the ambit for liability in fraud is al-
ways narrower than negligence. In both settings, he is pre-
pared to go beyond the strict privity limitation found in Mac-
Pherson. He is willing to extend liability for fraud to those per-
sons to whom the client exhibited the audit report, for it was
well known that the document would be key in making a loan
or a sale, and would typically be transmitted without alteration,
although not necessarily without written or oral embellish-
ment. The power of that privity limitation remains largely in-
tact today, as efforts to expand the potential right of recovery
to the public at large,149 or even to those whom the defendant
148. Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
149. See, e.g., White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. 1977) (confin-
ing liability to “a known group possessed of vested rights,” and not “the ex-
tensive and indeterminable investing public-at-large”).
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might “reasonably foresee” might rely on the statement, have
largely faltered, given that it would impose enormous liability
upon parties, like accountants, who may receive but a modest
financial reward for their services.150
The reason why courts are willing to go beyond privity in
fraud cases is that the defendant has it wholly within its power
to avoid making these wrongful statements. In cases like Ul-
tramares, however, where only negligence is at issue, the poten-
tial liability could unintentionally ratchet up, rapidly ex-
tending far and wide. Cardozo himself was well aware of the
difference. In Ultramares, citing MacPherson, he mused that
[A] manufacturer who is negligent in the manufac-
ture of a chattel in circumstances pointing to an un-
reasonable risk of serious bodily harm to those using
it thereafter may be liable for negligence though
privity is lacking between manufacturer and user. A
force or instrument of harm having been launched
with potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of
prudence, the one who launches it is under a duty to
keep it within bounds . . . . Even so, the question is
still open whether the potentialities of danger that
will charge with liability are confined to harm to the
person, or include injury to property. . . . In either
view, however, what is released or set in motion is a
physical force. We are now asked to say that a like
liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a
release of the explosive power resident in words.151
His answer to the question was no, and the explanation
rests on the different characteristics of goods and information.
As noted earlier, words can move with a rapidity that is not
possible with respect to physical forces, which in most cases
quickly come to rest. In ordinary physical-injury cases, the
number of joint-causation situations tends to be very small,
and so (for the most part) the extension of MacPherson from
personal injuries to property damage seems relatively safe.
Certainly, if the crash damaged the contents of the car, the
150. For details of that view, see Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 147 (N.J.
1983), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25 (West 2017), which
was in turn rejected in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 767 (Cal.
1992).
151. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 181 (citations omitted).
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principle of liability would be about the same, and the exten-
sion to different types of personal property is little different
from the extension of tort liability to multiple persons in the
same car. It is also worth noting that, historically, MacPherson,
like Escola afterwards, had no impact whatever on business ac-
tivities given the remaining constraints on liability. It was only
when tort law was applied to toxic releases that it encountered
the hazards latent in seeking to impose damage remedies on
countless individuals, each of whom has contributed at most a
tiny fraction of loss to any one of countless other individu-
als.152
The flow of information, however, differs radically from
the movement of goods, which helps explain the powerful eco-
nomic rationale that lies behind the restrictive rules in Ul-
tramares. In any face-to-face negotiations, the defendant must
receive compensation sufficient to cover the risk of tort liabil-
ity. Where negligence is the supposed norm, a principle like
res ipsa loquitur could easily allow a jury to infer negligence
from the fact of error, so that the system verges on strict liabil-
ity,153 which may be fine in cases involving physical injury to
strangers, but is more dubious in medical malpractice cases,
where the strict liability principle has long been regarded as
too expansive for a sustainable market in medical or health-
related services, given the inherent riskiness of medical proce-
dures.154 The market for medical services will shut down if the
liability in question is disproportionate to the payment re-
ceived to enter into the transaction in the first place, which is
why Cardozo, for example, was acutely aware of the need to
keep the total financial exposure proportionate to the consid-
eration received for the services rendered.155 As he observed,
“A promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind the as-
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (AM.
LAW INST. 1965) (dealing with the apportionment problem).
153. For its various formulations, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328D (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
154. For an early statement of this rationale, see Clarence Morris, Custom
and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1164–65 (1942).
155. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898–99
(N.Y. 1928) (dealing with the question of liability of a utility for the failure to
supply water pressure), cited in Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.
2018] REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE MARTIN ACT 855
sumption of a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward.”156
Nor, it should be added, should the promisee labor under any
such illusion that it can impose liability to remove or cushion
its loss. The common thread that comes through all these
cases is that a market system will break down if the liability
imposed by courts for adverse events is disproportionate to any
fee that the defendant had earned. So, the judgment in Ul-
tramares (and similar cases) is best understood as insisting that
the plaintiff could have hired its own auditor on terms that
would have, for a healthy premium, allowed it to recover for
any losses made on the advances, on whatever terms and con-
ditions the two parties agree.157 The principle of freedom of
contract thus sneaks in through the back door to explain the
use of the privity doctrine in these cases of financial loss.
The narrow approach to privity and remoteness of dam-
age in Ultramares carried over to the instructive case of Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,158 which imposed a direct
injury restriction for cases of financial loss, even when attribu-
table to fraud. Holmes was a stock-manipulation case in which it
was alleged that, between 1964 and 1981, the defendants made
unduly optimistic statements about six companies in which
they held stakes in order to drive their stock prices higher;
they also engaged in a number of sham trades in order to
make these shares appear more liquid than they were. On the
strength of these activities, the broker-dealers purchased suffi-
156. Moch, 159 N.E. at 898. For an endorsement of this view, see Charles
O. Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 30,
60 (1951) (“Cardozo thought the sum of $42.50 insufficient to warrant the
conclusion that a negligent water company should be made to relieve a fire
insurance company from bearing the ultimate risk of loss by fire . . . .”). The
full explanation is a bit more complex, for it requires an explanation for why
the first-party market works better. It does so because it is easier to tie cover-
age to the harm suffered by the plaintiff than it is to those harms brought
about by a specific source, which may be difficult to identify in many cases.
The contract law also provides greater flexibility on such key issues as de-
ductibles and policy limits that cannot be introduced under a simple tort
regime.
157. Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Nec-
essary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 301 (1988)(urging that the best solution is for
courts to “allow the parties to resolve the problem by contract.”). The point
has also been made in the early cases in this area. See, e.g., Cabot v. Christie,
42 Vt. 121 (1869).
158. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
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cient quantities of the shares to lead to their financial ruin.159
The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) was
charged with protecting customers from financial loss when
the broker-dealers who held their accounts went bankrupt.
The SIPC made the appropriate payments to various custom-
ers, subrogated the customers’ rights against the defendants,
and then brought an action against Holmes and his co-con-
spirators. The SIPC alleged a pattern and practice of violations
of the Securities Act, which gave rise to liability under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)160 for participation in a stock-manipulation scheme
that was said to have “disabled” the broker-dealers from meet-
ing their obligations to their customers.161
The basic substantive provision of RICO states:
Any person injured in his business or property by rea-
son of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
sue therefor in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.162
In line with established case law, the Court held that “but
for” causation (always a dubious account) was not sufficient,
and that proximate cause had to be shown.163 In this context,
the reliance on that dual combination meant that the Court
looked closely at the various decisions by other actors that in-
tervened between what the defendant did and what losses were
suffered by the broker-dealers, incorporating “common-law
principles of proximate causation.”164 It then noted that even
if subrogation was accepted, tort liability did not follow be-
159. Id. at 262–63.
160. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1962, 1961(1) & (5) (West 1988).
161. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261.
162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1995).
163. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
164. Id., with the Court’s near-obligatory citation to W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264
(5th ed. 1984) (“Here we use ‘proximate cause’ to label generically the judi-
cial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that
person’s own acts. At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects ‘ideas
of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and conve-
nient.’”). In my view, the principles of proximate causation are a good deal
more precise than this counsel of despair suggests. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TORTS 258–73 (1999).
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cause the many factors apart from trading in these shares
could have led to the insolvency of the two broker-dealers. The
Court stated:
[T]he link is too remote between the stock manipula-
tion alleged and the customers’ harm, being purely
contingent on the harm suffered by the broker-deal-
ers. That is, the conspirators have allegedly injured
these customers only insofar as the stock manipula-
tion first injured the broker-dealers and left them
without the wherewithal to pay customers’ claims. Al-
though the customers’ claims are senior (in recourse
to “customer property”) to those of the broker-deal-
ers’ general creditors, the causes of their respective
injuries are the same: The broker-dealers simply can-
not pay their bills, and only that intervening insol-
vency connects the conspirators’ acts to the losses suf-
fered by the nonpurchasing customers and general
creditors. As we said, however, in Associated General
Contractors [of California, Inc. v. Carpenters],165 quoting
Justice Holmes, “The general tendency of the law, in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the
first step.”166
Justice Holmes’s opinion just cited, in Southern Pacific Co.
v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.,167 only adds to the confusion.
The difficulty is that Justice Holmes’s proposition about ordi-
nary tort law in physical injury cases was manifestly wrong. At
the time he wrote it, there was still some support for the so-
called “last wrongdoer” rule in physical injury cases,168 but it
had by and large given way to a rule that said that if the first
defendant created a dangerous condition, which then resulted
in harm because of the subsequent act of a second defendant,
both could be held responsible for the harm, even if they had
not coordinated the activities among them.169 The number of
165. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
534 (1983) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell–Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S.
531, 533 (1918)).
166. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271 (1992).
167. S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell–Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918).
168. For its leading defense, see THOMAS BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 45
(3d ed. 1908).
169. See, e.g., Atherton v. Devine, 602 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1979). For the gen-
eral statements about intervening acts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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cases is small, and the dangerous condition in question—say
an uncovered hole in the street—had to persist until the time
of the injury. But Darnell-Taenzer was a rate-regulation case in
which the plaintiff charged that he was hurt because he had to
pay excessive amounts for a shipment, which in turn he could
recover from his customers. Holmes thought that this question
prompted the following answer:
The answer is not difficult. The general tendency of
the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go
beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote
consequences to a defendant so it holds him liable if
proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss. The
plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of the verdict
when they paid. Their claim accrued at once in the
theory of the law and it does not inquire into later
events.170
The rule here is the soul of good sense, but only for ad-
ministrative reasons that are orthogonal to the theory of proxi-
mate causation. The immediate plaintiff is in a good position
to challenge the overpayment. But if there is a setoff for recov-
ery that the ratepayer receives from other parties, then one of
two things must happen. The first is that the next downstream
party, and the one after that, each have determinate losses
equal to a fraction of the overcharge. The second is that each
party up and down the chain must have an action for its actual
losses. In either case, the coordination problems among multi-
ple claimants are acute; one way or the other, it becomes nec-
essary to formulate estimates of the ultimate harm borne by
each injured party, which would nearly always consume more
resources, and involve more parties, than the whole case is
worth. Channeling all the losses to the immediate purchaser
eliminates these confusions while improving the incentives for
the plaintiff to sue to recover the amount of the overcharge.171
Historically, the rule announced is not limited only to rate
§§ 431, 448 & 449 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The Third Restatement does not
trouble itself with any of these refinements when it adopts broad tests in
cases of intervening actions and supervening causes. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS § 34 (AM. LAW INST. 2013). For a comprehensive account, see EP-
STEIN, supra note 164.
170. Darnell-Taenzer, 245 U.S. at 533–34.
171. On the importance of channeling, e.g., limiting the number of plain-
tiffs in torts cases, see William Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J.
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cases. Indeed, it was explicitly carried over to treble-damage
antitrust cases in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which treated
Darnell-Taenzer as a “particularly apt precedent.”172 These ad-
ministrative imperatives displace, rather than incorporate, a
common-law proximate-cause analysis, although leading to a
similar conclusion.
It is therefore easy to distinguish Holmes from its key pre-
cedent. Nonetheless, the decision makes perfectly good sense,
because of the problem of deciding how the purchase of these
inflated stocks mixed in with other management mistakes that
the broker-dealers may well have made. The ultimate lesson
thus remains the same. The complex patterns of interaction of
various decisions made on information that comes from multi-
ple sources tend to render the tort action difficult, but not
impossible, to sustain. It is therefore an open question
whether the action should apply if SIPC could prove that huge
purchases made in explicit reliance on the fraud, with all
other forms of mismanagement ruled out, caused the losses.
But excluding other causes, which is a staple of res ipsa loquitur
in physical injury cases, is much harder to accomplish as the
class of potential causes rapidly increases.173
Holmes has therefore been followed repeatedly whenever
it is hard to disentangle multiple influences on a given out-
come. To give but one other RICO example from the Second
Circuit, Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc. asked whether the plaintiff health and benefit fund could
recover from Philip Morris for the additional costs that it had
to bear in treating patients who had contracted additional ill-
nesses from smoking.174 Plaintiff alleged that Philip Morris en-
gaged in fraudulent conduct that induced its union members
to overconsume cigarettes. The RICO case followed closely on
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of
Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 305 (1982).
172. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 751 (1977).
173. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST.
1965), which refers to “(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct
of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evi-
dence.” The test in Prosser & Keeton on Torts requires that the accident “(2)
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant.” DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, supra note 164, at 244.
174. Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191
F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).
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the heels of Holmes and likewise foundered on the proximate-
cause questions that made it impossible to disentangle various
causes:
[P]laintiffs’ alleged damages might have derived
from inefficiencies in the Funds’ own management,
as well as from non-smoking related health problems
suffered by the smokers, and it would be the sheerest
sort of speculation to determine how these damages
might have been lessened had the Funds adopted the
measures defendants allegedly induced them not to
adopt. The complexity of these calculations makes
the ultimate question of damages suffered by the
Funds virtually impossible to determine.175
To this list can be added the question of how much each
individual plaintiff knew about the risk at various times in his
or her smoking career, and what other physical exposures
could have contributed to their underlying condition. The
causal chain is indeed filled with missing links, which explains
why the relatively generous rules on causation followed in
physical-injury cases are rejected in connection with financial
losses. The analysis here is perfectly general and applies with
equal force to common-law cases, securities-act cases, RICO
cases, and, of course Martin Act cases. The same cautious atti-
tude we saw in the privity context carries over to cases in which
the fraud is made in connection with a public offering of se-
curities, where the number of potential purchasers is far
greater.
The logic of Ultramares proved highly influential in the im-
portant Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores.176 Blue Chip was not a common-law action, but re-
lied instead on Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,177
as interpreted under Rule 10b-5, first promulgated in 1948.178
175. Id. at 240.
176. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747–48 (1975)
(quoting Ultramares).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). The text of the regulation in full reads:
§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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The case posed the simple question of whether a party who
was neither a buyer nor seller of shares could maintain an ac-
tion for damages by alleging that the defendant seller of the
shares had “made the prospectus overly pessimistic in order to
discourage respondent and other members of the allegedly
large class whom it represents from accepting what was in-
tended to be a bargain offer.”179 As a matter of basic incen-
tives, the reliance associated with a decision not to purchase
introduces the same distortion into the market as the converse
situation in which an unwise purchase or sale is made on the
strength of false statements. Therefore, if administrative con-
cerns did not loom large in the overall equation, the rough
economic equivalence between acting and not acting on ei-
ther the buy or sell side should make both equally relevant.
There were, however, two instructive responses to this
damage action, one statutory and the other administrative.
First, liability for transactions that did not take place because
of the defendant’s misrepresentations is not covered by the
key words in the federal statute, which limits coverage “in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.”180 As Justice
Powell noted in his concurrence, the clause in question did not
read “in connection with the purchase or sale of, or an offer to
sell, any security.”181 That limitation is not relevant with re-
spect to the Martin Act, which applies to these transactions “re-
gardless of whether issuance, distribution, exchange, sale, ne-
gotiation or purchase resulted.”182 As Justice Rehnquist’s
noted, twice before, in both 1957 and 1959, the SEC had re-
quested that Congress amend Section 10(b) to read: “in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or
sell, any security.”183
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
179. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 726–27.
180. 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b) (2012). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
181. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
182. N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 352-c(1)(c).
183. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 732.
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Yet, when those words were put into the 1921 Martin Act,
the sole remedy was injunctive relief, and it made perfect
sense to allow the stoppage of these offerings before they
could work harm on ordinary individuals if left uncorrected.
Here, the governing principle in the fraud context is no differ-
ent from that governing the various kinds of property damage
attributable to common-law nuisances: It often makes sense to
allow the state to enjoin a nuisance before it occurs, rather
than to have to wait for the occurrence of the harm. But the
same caveat applies in both cases as well. The definitions of
fraud and nuisance should be appropriately cabined to ensure
that prophylactic relief does not lead to some massive abuse
that suppresses freedom of expression, in the one case, and
freedom of action, including the use and development of real
property, in the other.
Given these basic considerations, it should come as no
surprise that the SEC also has statutory power to issue injunc-
tive relief under Section 20(b) of the 1933 Securities Act for
violations of Section 17(a)184 of that same law, which applies
only to sellers who engage in the use of fraud or other manip-
ulative devices by sellers “in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties,”185 authorizing both damages and injunctive relief.186
184. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties . . . by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, di-
rectly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (2010)).
185. Id.
186. Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is en-
gaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute
or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this subchapter [e.
g., § 17 (a)], or of any rule or regulation prescribed under author-
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Similarly, the SEC has the power under Section 21(d)187 of the
1934 Act to seek injunctive relief against a person who is “en-
gaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a
violation” of the Act, including Section 10(b),188 and the regu-
lations promulgated thereto under Rule 10b-5.189 In dealing
with this fourfold set of statutory provisions, Congress (at least
as construed by the Supreme Court) divided the baby by find-
ing that scienter was not required for violations of Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act, but was required for injunctive relief
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.190 In Aaron v. SEC, the
Supreme Court, relying largely on the legislative history, held
that scienter was required for both injunctive relief and for
damages under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,191 but it issued
a divided verdict under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, finding
that scienter was required in damage actions under Section
17(a)(1) but not under Section 17(a)(2).192 The latter prohib-
its any person from obtaining money or property “by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact”193 and contains no scienter requirement at all.
The Court also reached the same conclusion with respect to
Section 17(a)(3),194 which made it unlawful “to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit,”195 and was directed to-
ward effects and not intentions. It seems quite clear that the
differences between the Securities Acts and the Martin Act on
injunctive relief are on the smaller side, especially since it is
always easy to establish scienter for a defendant who continues
ity thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district
court of the United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or
restraining order shall be granted without bond.
Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 48 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b) (2010)).
187. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 48 Stat. 900 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2015)).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
190. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
191. Id. at 691.
192. Id. at 697.
193. Id. at 687.
194. Id. at 697.
195. Id. at 687.
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to engage in certain practices after being warned of their ille-
gality.
The central point of principle, however, is that it is gener-
ally unwise to authorize individual damage actions against po-
tential buyers and sellers, which was the point raised in Blue
Chip. On this point, the attitude taken in Ultramares invited the
Court in Blue Chip to stress the key points of principled differ-
ence between the action given to defrauded buyers and sellers
and that action which might be given to other persons who did
not go forward with the purchase or sale. Of these differences,
two are key. The first is the potential scope of the action. The
requirement of an actual transaction limits the number of po-
tential parties to the suit. An offering to the public that under-
states potential value could drive away countless numbers of
individuals, when it is never clear whether they would have
purchased or sold even if provided with full and adequate in-
formation. These potential plaintiffs have the benefit of hind-
sight so that the disappointed purchasers make their claims
only for those stocks that have soared after the original offer-
ing. Otherwise, they remain silent. Second, the absence of a
specific transaction and interaction makes it difficult to prove
the fact of reliance, rendering it difficult to determine the ap-
plicable measure of damages.196 Any current shareholder that
neither buys nor sells is always a potential plaintiff once the
class of putative plaintiffs is expanded to cover at least some
parties who engage in no action.
It is therefore no wonder that the Supreme Court shrank
from giving the normative theory of deceit full range in cases
rich with institutional complications. In cases like these, it
must be remembered that direct administrative oversight by
the SEC can be imposed without the remedial complications
involved in private rights of action, which makes it sensible to
withhold private liability even when some form of government
action is warranted. And what makes sense in connection with
the common law and the federal securities law also makes
sense in connection with the Martin Act. Indeed, the New York
courts have worked an effective integration between regulatory
relief and private rights of action. In CPC International Inc. v.
McKesson Corp., a divided New York Court of Appeals had held
196. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735–39
(1975) (discussing these points).
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that no private right of action could be implied under the Mar-
tin Act.197 The result paralleled that under Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, which, the New York Court of Appeals again
held, implied no private right of action.198 Once again the par-
allels between the state and federal law are more significant
than any differences on the same point. Yet by the same token,
in Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Investment Manage-
ment Inc., the New York Court of Appeals held that the Martin
Act did not preempt private rights of action for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and for gross negligence in the management of
portfolio assets, both non-fraud claims, for which the plaintiff
relied on a guarantee.199 Again the result is exactly correct,
because there is no reason why the regulatory oversight should
block a garden-variety private action brought under a contract
of guarantee.200 Instructively, Assured Guaranty did not cite to
Ultramares, because the case itself did not challenge any of the
outer limits on common-law actions for fraud that were impli-
cated in that case.
The same set of concerns about rapid information flow
also appear in the law of insider trading when the information
that comes from an unauthorized release by the insider travels
through the hands of multiple parties and is combined with
information that comes from other sources.201 The point was
of special urgency in the highly publicized decision in United
States v. Newman,202 where the alleged tippees were three or
four steps removed from the insiders who first divulged the
information. As that information passed through the hands of
these intermediaries before being, at last, received by the de-
fendants, it was combined with other information that made it
197. CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987).
198. Id. at 122.
199. Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 962 N.E.2d
765, 771 (2011).
200. See id. at 769 (“Here, the plain text of the Martin Act, while granting
the Attorney General investigatory and enforcement powers and prescribing
various penalties, does not expressly mention or otherwise contemplate the
elimination of common-law claims . . . . Certainly the Martin Act, as it was
originally conceived in 1921 with its limited [injunctive] relief, did not
evince any intent to displace all common-law claims in the securities field.”).
201. For my extensive treatment of these issues, see Epstein, supra note 87.
Note that the use of the common-law reference point is as appropriate for
insider trading cases as for misrepresentation cases. Id.
202. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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unclear how much of the information came from improper
inside sources and how much came from legitimate ones. In
the absence of solid evidence on the flow of the information,
the action foundered, as it should have. “[N]o rational jury
would find that the tips were so overwhelmingly suspicious
that Newman and Chiasson [a codefendant] either knew or
consciously avoided knowing that the information came from
corporate insiders or that those insiders received any personal
benefit in exchange for the disclosure.”203
Indeed, this issue is more complicated for another reason.
The securities law is at its greatest strength when the parties
who have given away or relied on information are acting in
breach of a voluntarily assumed fiduciary duty. For instance, in
United States v. O’Hagan,204 a partner in a law firm used confi-
dential information about their client’s forthcoming tender of-
fer to purchase stock and cash out when the offer became pub-
lic, a clear breach of fiduciary duty to that client. But in the so
called classical theory of insider trading endorsed in
O’Hagan,205 the basis of the duties that officers and directors
owe to shareholders is much more obscure: the standard rests
on positive law, not voluntary arrangement, and thus is far
more likely to be inefficient relative to what private parties
would desire in face-to-face negotiations. Indeed, one diffi-
culty in the plaintiff’s entire theory in Newman was that the
insider information was released in gray-market transactions,
where the managers of the firms wanted to get the informa-
tion out quietly, even selectively, in order to stimulate interest
in the stock. It was only the existence of a strong nondiscrimi-
nation rule imposed by the SEC in Fair Disclosure, Regulation
FD206 that made it possible to be completely above-board
about those releases. But those cases stand in sharp contrast to
203. Id. at 455. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (The last clause
refers to the misguided requirement that there be a return benefit to the
tippee for the receipt of the information to count, I regard that so-called
benefit requirement as wholly irrelevant). See also Epstein, supra note 87, at
1504–10 (the proper analogy is to the receipt of stolen goods, where the
good-faith donee does not prevail over the true owner. It is as wrong to trade
on donated information as purchased information).
204. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
205. See id. at 651–52.
206. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release
No. 33-7881, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (proposed Dec. 20, 1999), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
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others in which the information that is passed on to third par-
ties has been misappropriated from the company. In this last
setting, the information should be treated as stolen property,
which potentially makes everyone involved in the release, or in
receipt of the information as a tippee, both civilly and crimi-
nally liable.207
As these materials show, the proper approach is sensitive
to transaction-costs considerations. Thus when harms are wide-
spread, enforcement of the basic rules is better left to direct
government action than to individual suits. The key point,
however, is that the shift from private to public enforcement
should only be used to reduce the transaction cost of enforce-
ment. It is not an open invitation for legislatures or courts to
expand the definition of harm so as to create a decisive break
between the public and private law, thereby generating the
endless liability that Cardozo sought to avoid, especially in
these financial negligence cases.208 The sky is the limit on gov-
ernment action if administrative agencies can “redefine” prop-
erty rights at will, without having to pay just compensation for
the property interest taken. The constant cross-references be-
tween common-law rules, the federal securities acts, and the
Martin Act rests on the simple fact that they all address the
same fundamental problem of how best to deal with informa-
tion breakdown. Therefore, to the extent the Martin Act elimi-
nates the scienter problem, it contains the seeds of its own mis-
application whenever, as is sometimes the case, it expands the
potential scope of liability in ways that the traditional law of
misrepresentation, including privity limitation, rightly rejects.
III.
THE MALLEABLE MARTIN ACT IN ACTION
The next task is to examine the notable cases that have
been brought under the Martin Act. As the previous discussion
indicates, this job cannot be undertaken in a vacuum, because
207. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). For my commen-
tary, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Myopia On Insider Trading, HOOVER
INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.hoover.org/research/in
tellectual-myopia-insider-trading.
208. See Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection:
How the Modern Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 141, 143 (2015).
868 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:805
it is critical to note the similarities and differences between
Martin Act cases, on the one hand, and common-law actions
for deceit and federal securities-fraud actions, on the other. I
shall concentrate on three such situations here. The first is the
original Martin Act prosecution of bogus financial schemes.
The second is the Act’s use in the more complicated financial
transactions of AIG and its then-Chairman Maurice “Hank”
Greenberg and then-CFO Howard Smith. The third involves
the now fizzling campaign of former NYAG Schneiderman to
use the Martin Act against ExxonMobil on charges of climate
fraud. The overall verdict is that the early cases gave rise to
little social concern, at least on the basic matters of liability.
Indeed, the NYAG’s case against Greenberg and Smith was
sound, but only on the issue of liability, given their admissions
of scienter. But—by the same token—the decision to force his
resignation was on balance a classic example of government
overreach, just as it would have been overreach under the fed-
eral securities law. At the same time, the ongoing case that
Schneiderman brought against ExxonMobil for improper con-
duct was as unsound and ill-conceived under the Martin Act,
both on questions of liability and damage, as it would have
been under the federal securities law.
A. Busting Bogus Financial Schemes.
The initial use of the Martin Act was to attack routine fly-
by-night schemes of financial fraud. Judges perceived the basic
scope of the social problem, and in 1926 they consciously and
unanimously opted for a broad reading of the statute in New
York v. Federated Radio Corp.,209 a case involving only injunctive
relief. In opposing that decision, the defendants argued that a
broad definition of fraud ran afoul of the Due Process Clause:
“[The Martin Act] does not define the ‘fraud’ or the ‘fraudu-
lent practices’ which it purports to restrain. No enlargement
of the meaning of the act by implication being permissible, it
must be held to be applicable only to cases involving so-called
legal fraud according to the hitherto accepted definition.”210
There is, in fact, a long tradition arguing for the narrow con-
struction of statutes passed in derogation of the common
209. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33 (1926).
210. Id. at 33.
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law.211 Nonetheless, Judge Cuthbert Pound brushed this aside
by reverting to the Supreme Court decision in Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Corp.,212 which espoused a far broader proposition:
The purpose of the law is to prevent all kinds of fraud
in connection with the sale of securities and com-
modities and to defeat all unsubstantial and visionary
schemes in relation thereto whereby the public is
fraudulently exploited. The words ‘fraud’ and ‘fraud-
ulent practice’ in this connection should, therefore,
be given a wide meaning so as to include all acts, al-
though not originating in any actual evil design or
contrivance to perpetrate fraud or injury upon
others, which do by their tendency to deceive or mis-
lead the purchasing public come within the purpose
of the law.213
From our evaluative perspective, the key question is
whether this broader definition creates risks that should have
been guarded against in the context of this case. The answer is
no. The object of the litigation in Federated was that “the adver-
tising matter of the defendants, contained in a promoters’ pro-
spectus, unduly inflates the value of the stock and conceals cer-
tain facts in regard to such values which should in good faith
be revealed.”214 Given the private preparation of these selling
materials, it is highly doubtful that any one of the abundant
misstatements of fact contained therein were not deliberately
incorporated by the defendants as part of their sham selling
scheme. It is also highly doubtful that they could have credibly
contested their unique knowledge of the details of the venture
when they had sole control over the preparation of the sales
spiels from start to finish.
Moreover, the decision in Federated Radio Corp. puts no
pressure on the distinction between matters of fact and mat-
ters of opinion. The willingness to hold defendants responsi-
ble for culpable omissions is also consistent with basic tort the-
211. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 383, 386 (1908) (“We are told commonly that three classes of statutes
are to be construed strictly: penal statutes; statutes in derogation of common
right; and statutes in derogation of the common law.”).
212. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
213. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. at 38–39.
214. Id. at 40 (internal citations omitted).
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ory. Finally, the likelihood that some targets would rely on the
prospectus, if circulated, should be taken as a given, as poten-
tial purchasers were the prospectus’s sole intended audience.
Aiming for an injunction prior to purchase prevents the need
to sort out thorny questions of causation once the false infor-
mation is unleashed to the defendant’s target audience. The
statement of Judge Pound also contains the words “in connec-
tion with the sale of securities”215 and thus by implication ex-
presses the need to limit the potential ambit of the case, even
if under the Martin Act the context behind injunctive relief is
arguably broader than it was construed in some part of Blue
Chip Stamps.216 Since the injunction prevents the sale, it
removes the need to think about the refund, the purchase
price or the loss of reliance damages when the deal goes
south. Nor did the broad reading of the statute invite system-
atic abuse in enforcement, as long as it is confined to en-
joining the phony stock schemes to which it was originally ap-
plied. The broad statute works well in this context, even if, as
will become evident, it does not work equally well in all others.
The same kind of analysis applies with equal force to most of
the condominium conversion cases noted above.217
B. The AIG–Greenberg Litigation
As noted earlier in Section II.A,218 there is nothing in the
text of the Martin Act that limits its application to the blue-sky
fraudulent offerings cases that spurred its adoption. Prior to
Eric Schneiderman, the most aggressive use of the Martin Act
was by then-NYAG Elliot Spitzer, who, it was said at the time,
rejected the “unspoken gentleman’s agreement” that ex-
empted “the big boys” from the Martin Act, by limiting “ac-
ceptable targets” to the likes of “shady pharmacists, Ponzi
schemes, and peddlers of fraudulent Salvador Dali litho-
graphs.”219 Among the biggest targets that Spitzer attacked
were AIG, its former CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, and
Howard Smith, its CFO during the critical years between 2001
215. Id. at 38.
216. See discussions supra Sections II.D.4, II.E.
217. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
219. Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF. (May–June
2004), https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature_thomp
son_mayjun04.msp.
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and 2004. Thus, the original litigation covered a multitude of
transactions, prosecuted under both common-law rules of de-
ceit and the Martin Act.
Two transactions were key. The first of these, which took
place between 2000 and 2004, was between AIG and General
Re, a reinsurance carrier, while AIG was under the control of
Greenberg and his codefendant, Smith.220 The gist of New
York’s claim was that the transaction in question was a sham
because it did not transfer any real risk to General Re, but was
designed solely to improve AIG’s balance sheet in ways that
allowed it to increase the stated reserves on its financial state-
ments.221 That change was in turn alleged to have allowed AIG
to present a stronger position to public markets and thus enter
into more financial transactions.222 The second of the dis-
puted transactions was with CAPCO, a company financed by
AIG, in which AIG is alleged to have used CAPCO to convert
underwriting losses into investment losses and thus present a
rosier financial picture to analysts. In the opening act of this
drama, Spitzer had forced out Greenberg as Chairman and
CEO of AIG and Smith as its CFO in 2005, about three years
before the company experienced serious financial losses in the
meltdown of 2008 under new financial management. Much of
the litigation brought against Greenberg and Smith disap-
peared in the years after that initial encounter.223 By 2006,
with Greenberg and Smith out, new management quickly set-
tled those claims for $1.6 billion. One can criticize the size of
the settlement, but there is no dispute that AIG was, under
standard principles of vicarious liability, responsible for the ac-
tions of its two top officials.
The litigation against Greenberg and Smith went on for
another dozen years, as the defendants sought to derail the
prosecution. During the litigation, the NYAG dismissed all
common law fraud charges and dropped from his Martin Act
account all the transactions except for two that will be de-
scribed shortly. In People v. Greenberg,224 Greenberg and Smith
220. See People v. Greenberg, 994 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 2013).
221. See id. at 840.
222. See id.
223. See Bethany McLean, Hank Greenberg’s Other AIG Trial: A Fight That Just
Won’t End, FORTUNE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/27/
hank-greenbergs-other-aig-trial-a-fight-that-just-wont-end/.
224. People v. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2012).
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first sought to dismiss the charges on preemption grounds, in-
voking Title I of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 (SLUSA),225 the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995,226 and the National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act of 1996.227 But whether the matter turned on
express or implied preemption, there was no evidence whatso-
ever that these statutes, designed to recalibrate the operation
of the federal securities laws, had an unspoken collateral in-
tention to upend the long-established system of dual enforce-
ment that had been in place from the initial adoption of state
blue-sky laws, which predated the federal securities laws by fif-
teen years.228 The court rebuffed Greenberg and Smith’s sum-
mary judgment request on the underlying claim. In so doing,
it did not rely on any of the strict liability strands of the Martin
Act, but instead invoked the standard rule under which “of-
ficers and directors are liable for a corporation’s fraud where
they either personally participate in the fraud or have actual
notice of its existence.”229 As Greenberg and Smith had jointly
conducted both sets of negotiations, this participation stan-
dard was easily met.
The litigation continued for a further five years, but on
February 10, 2017, the case finally settled short of trial in part
due to the intercession of well-known mediator Kenneth Fein-
berg.230 At the time of the settlement, Schneiderman issued a
public statement announcing, “Greenberg and Smith agree to
225. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, § 101, 112 Stat. 3230 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2006)).
226. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(2006)).
227. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2006)).
228. People v. Greenberg, 994 N.E.2d 838, 840 (N.Y. 2013). Greenberg
and Smith sought certiorari in the preemption issue in Greenberg v. New York,
No. 16-294, filed August 30, 2016. It was denied on December 12, 2016. Peo-
ple v. Greenberg, 54 N.E.3d 74 (N.Y. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Greenberg v.
New York, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016). For relevant documents, see SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/greenberg-v-new-york/ (last
visited Aug. 16, 2018).
229. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
230. Randall Smith, Former A.I.G. Executives Reach Settlement in Accounting
Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/
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return multi-million dollar bonuses they received while the
frauds were on AIG’s books.”231 The statement also noted that
this settlement followed on the heels of an earlier settlement
that Greenberg and Smith had made with the SEC resulting in
the disgorgement of virtually all the payments made during
the 2001 to 2004 period when the transactions remained on
the books uncorrected. The wording of Schneiderman’s an-
nouncement tip-toed around the question of whether Green-
berg and Smith had personally committed fraud, even though
they had orchestrated the challenged transactions. The follow-
ing passage sums up the state of play:
If, as the parties presently concede, there was no risk
of loss in the [General Re] transaction, it should have
been recorded on AIG’s financials as a deposit. In-
stead, AIG recorded $250 million in loss reserves for
the fourth quarter of 2000 based upon the [General
Re] transaction and an additional $250 million in
loss reserves for the first quarter of 2001, consistent
with Greenberg’s intent when he reached out to Fer-
guson, to shore up the reserves. Had these amounts
not been credited in this manner, AIG would have
had a $187 million decline in its loss reserves by the
first-quarter of 2001.232
The history of the CAPCO transaction was similarly sus-
pect: “After Greenberg and Smith left the company in 2005,
AIG announced that CAPCO involved an improper account-
ing structure created to characterize underwriting losses relat-
ing to the auto warranty business as capital losses.”233 The
terms of the settlement called for Greenberg to pay $9 million
plus interest and for Smith to pay $900,000 with interest—part
of the money that the two men had received as performance
bonuses for the years between 2001 and 2004, when the al-
leged frauds had taken place. This settlement accompanied
Greenberg and Smith’s deals with the SEC, with the combined
10/business/dealbook/former-aig-executives-reach-settlement-in-account
ing-fraud-case.html?mcubz=0.
231. Press Release, N.Y. St. Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Set-
tlement of Martin Act Case Against Former AIG CEO Maurice R. Greenberg
and Former AIG CFO Howard I. Smith (Feb. 10, 2017).
232. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 3–4.
233. Id. at 5.
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disgorgement equaling the bonuses the defendants collected
during the 2001–2004 period. Schneiderman then pro-
claimed:
Today’s agreement settles the indisputable fact that
Mr. Greenberg has denied for twelve years: that Mr.
Greenberg orchestrated two transactions that funda-
mentally misrepresented AIG’s finances. After over a
decade of delays, deflections, and denials by Mr.
Greenberg, we are pleased that Mr. Greenberg has
finally admitted to his role in these fraudulent trans-
actions and will personally pay $9 million to the State
of New York.234
The simultaneous statement by Greenberg did not con-
tain the word “fraud” but did contain the following statements:
The General Re transaction was done for the purpose
of increasing AIG’s loss reserves, and the Capco
transaction was done for the purpose of converting
underwriting losses into investment losses. I knew
these facts at the time that I initiated, participated in
and approved these two transactions.
For the years 2000 through 2002 (in the case of the
Capco transaction) and 2000 through 2003 (in the
case of the [General Re] transaction), I certified
AIG’s publicly-filed annual consolidated financial
statements aware that the financial effects of these
transactions were and continued to be reflected in
those statements.
As a result of these transactions, AIG’s publicly-filed
consolidated financial statements inaccurately por-
trayed the accounting, and thus the financial condi-
tion and performance for AIG’s loss reserves and un-
derwriting income. The accounting for the [General
Re] transaction was correctly restated by AIG in AIG’s
2005 Restatement of the Company’s financial results
for the years 2000 through 2003 and the first three
quarters of 2004. The accounting for the Capco
transaction was also restated by AIG in AIG’s 2005 Re-
statement of the Company’s financial results.235
234. See Press Release, N.Y. St. Att’y Gen., supra note 231.
235. Statement, Maurice R. Greenberg (Feb. 10, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov
/sites/default/files/2017_02_10_greenberg_statement_final_2.pdf. See also
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The SEC and Martin Act suits against Greenberg and
Smith were not the only lawsuits that arose out of these trans-
actions. In addition, the SEC ran its own investigation of the
transaction that yielded positive results: “In June 2005, two
[General Re] executives pleaded guilty to participating in a
conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their role in the
[General Re] transaction. In February 2008, four other [Gen-
eral Re] executives were convicted on federal criminal charges
with respect to the [General Re] transaction.”236 The latter
convictions were reversed for a new trial on evidentiary
grounds, as one of the key witnesses, Richard Napier, a senior
General Re executive, “may well have testified falsely” on ma-
jor issues in the earlier federal case,237 which effectively side-
lined him from any role in the prosecution under the Martin
Act. The Wall Street Journal made much of the inconsistencies
in his testimony, reflecting poorly on the NYAG.238 But the
point is a sideshow. One can look into the disputed transac-
tion’s structure on its face by assessing whether AIG trans-
ferred sufficient risk to turn it into a legal transaction. Given
the admissions from Greenberg and Smith, it is apparent that
no risk was transferred. They rightly entered into the settle-
ment, in which they admitted scienter, because they knew that
the case against them was strong regardless of the disputed
and inconsistent Napier testimony.
On this score, it is worth noting that the original com-
plaint by Spitzer included other counts, both at common law
Statement, Howard I. Smith (Feb.10, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default
/files/2017_02_10_smith_statement_final.pdf.
236. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
237. United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 281 (2d Cir. 2011) (dealing
with key questions of who attended what meetings that were thus critical to
the question of conspiracy). On remand, the defendants entered into de-
ferred-prosecution agreements in which they acknowledged that “aspects of
the [General Re] transaction were fraudulent” and that they should have
“attempted to stop [the transaction] from going forward, but instead contin-
ued to participate in it.” Consent Motion for Deferred Prosecution Continu-
ance, United States v. Ferguson, No. 06-cr-137 (D. Conn. June 22, 2012);
Deferred Prosecution Order, United States v. Ferguson, No. 06-cr-137 (D.
Conn. June 25, 2012).
238. For the Wall Street Journal’s continued attack against New York’s case,
see, for example, The ‘Risk-Free’ Hank Greenberg Case, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-risk-free-hank-greenberg-case-1424
390839.
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and under the Martin Act. The pressure to remove Greenberg
and Smith was undoubtedly heightened by the full array of
charges, many of which were subsequently withdrawn. One
possible interpretation of this maneuver is that the govern-
ment dropped all of its common-law counts because it did not
think that it could meet their distinctive scienter barrier. But
that explanation does not cover the decision to drop both com-
mon law and all but two Martin Act counts. Nor is it consistent
with the public admission of scienter in the two claims that
Greenberg and Smith settled. It seems likely that these other
claims were dropped for reasons that likewise apply to com-
mon-law and Martin Act claims, implicating the need to prove
false and material statements of fact. Otherwise, the prosecu-
tion would have no reason not to keep all of the Martin Act
counts.
The next point of interest is the resultant punishment,
and its integration with the earlier decision. Prior to settle-
ment, the question of remedy required special attention. Since
the litigation arose only after the General Re and CAPCO
transactions had been reversed, there was no need for an in-
junction once Greenberg and Smith were out of AIG. Simi-
larly, it would have been difficult for any private investors to
prove that they had lost money because they traded in reliance
on the false information allegedly generated by these transac-
tions, whose effect on the net earnings of AIG was uncertain.
To avoid both of these traps, the prosecution requested, as au-
thorized under the Martin Act amendments, equitable relief,
more specifically, “including but not limited to a ban on
[Greenberg’s and Smith’s] participation in the securities in-
dustry and a ban on serving as an officer or director of a public
company.”239 The NYAG also sought disgorgement of cash bo-
nuses the defendants had received from AIG. In its second de-
cision on the case, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the award of disgorgement from Greenberg and Smith did not
depend on a showing of irreparable harm, but, after trial,
could be tailored to the overall facts and circumstances of the
case.240 There is nothing exceptional about this approach: res-
titution for illicit gains is a long-established remedy the origins
239. See People v. Greenberg, 994 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 2013).
240. See People v. Greenberg, 54 N.E.3d 74 (N.Y. 2016).
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of which lie at common law and not in modern courts of eq-
uity.241
The harder question is whether the appropriate remedy,
if push had come to shove, would allow the NYAG to remove
Greenberg and Smith from their positions at AIG. The NYAG
has broad remedial discretion, but removal would be virtually
impossible to justify if Greenberg and Smith’s scienter were
not established. No strict-liability offense could justify such
draconian public intervention. Thus, once again, the issue of
scienter—although formally irrelevant under the Martin Act—
plays a role in the case. On this score, the initial question is
whether the removal of a person from private (that is, non-
governmental) office should be subject to a public official’s
oversight or reserved in the first instance to the discretion of
the organization’s governing body. There is of course no de-
bate that, to the extent that a particular statute requires that
an officer or director be barred from participation in the se-
curities industry, the decision is neither that of the public en-
forcer nor that of the board of directors. The matter has been
taken out of their hand by a clear statutory directive. Yet the
situation is quite different in connection with civil actions
where the finding of scienter still leaves open the choice of
remedy, which depends on a variety of factors dealing with fre-
quency, severity, and self-aggrandizement in the particular
case.
The governmental imposition of restitution, or even fines,
on individual defendants is perfectly appropriate to maintain
deterrence against particular actions. The great advantage of
using some combination of these two remedies is that they
only impose a cash transfer penalty on the defendants, without
imposing losses on innocent shareholders who played no part
in the decision. In addition, these targeted measures do not
distort the incentives or operation of the firm of which the
defendants had long been an integral part. But banning de-
fendants from work in a firm or an industry is necessarily far
more intrusive on firm activities, because CEOs and CFOs are
not fungible. Executive searches are so arduous and time-con-
suming precisely because the difference between the first- and
241. See Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL) 431 (“The case of a
chattel is easy: A shopkeeper delivers an article at the house of B in mistake
for the house of A. An action would lie against B for restitution.”).
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second-best candidate could be the difference between success
and failure. Thus one key, if not the key, decision of any board
is the selection of its CEO, just as the key decisions of that
CEO involve the appointment of her chief subordinates.
In light of the critical relationship between executive se-
lection and firm success, the first-line decision on these mat-
ters to rest with the Board itself, which can of course take into
account the outcome of the civil prosecution under the Martin
Act and its proof of scienter. Clearly, care must be taken to
avoid conflicts of interest so that in this instance, neither
Greenberg nor Smith should participate in any of the delibera-
tions or vote on the outcome. If the Board, properly consti-
tuted, thinks, on the basis of its own internal deliberations,
that it should replace the defendants, that should be the end
of the matter, so long—and this is a critical qualification—as
its action was not taken under an explicit or implicit threat of
further investigations or litigation by any regulatory body, be it
the NYAG or the SEC. It is impossible for an outsider to pro-
ject how a board’s deliberations whether to fire an executive in
light of possible criminal sanctions will or should come out in
any particular case; in a sense, that is precisely the point. The
Board has better incentives than any insiders on the Board to
make the correct trade-offs. It will, of necessity, have more
complete knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
particular sanctions, and it will be able to place any one deci-
sion in the larger context of the overall performance of the
corporate officers, like Greenberg and Smith, have provided
to the corporation through their entire tenure.
On this score, it surely should matter to the Board that
the historical success of the firm since Greenberg took over
had been legendary. The Board is likely also to find it in
Greenberg’s and Smith’s favor that they did not seek personal
enrichment, and neither of their actions had any direct effect
on the AIG’s bottom line in either the short or long run. Their
actions were undertaken to bolster the position of AIG in fi-
nancial markets, for it was undisputed that Greenberg and
Smith were deeply concerned about the underwriting profits
that they considered to be a bellwether test of the firm’s suc-
cess and failure. Accordingly, the transaction was intended to
change public perceptions of the firm’s position in the market-
place, and to increase, at least in the short run, the ability of
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AIG to expand its business. A mistake in judgment, but one
subject to rectification.
In light of this record, if the Board, armed with full knowl-
edge, favors retention, it is difficult to come up with any strong
public-policy rationale for permitting the NYAG or the SEC to
overrule that decision. This intervention would impose upon
the firm the arduous duty to find a new management team
that would be responsible for overall firm direction. In retro-
spect, the decision to remove Greenberg and Smith may have
proved very costly because of the huge financial losses that
were incurred in the financial meltdown of 2008. To be sure, it
is always difficult to guess whether whether any CEO or CFO,
old or new, could have unwound AIG’s complex positions in
time to fix the problem. But the ousted pair’s large experience
in handling complex transactions might have led them to re-
duce AIG’s reliance on complex swaps, which put the firm at
risk during the crisis of 2008.
Rather than resorting to the ultimate remedy of dismissal,
a responsible board could have dealt with the matter by impos-
ing lesser sanctions: internal fines, additional oversight,
preclearance, and reporting requirements inside the firm; a
redefinition of responsibilities; a change in contracting prac-
tices; and a strong warning of what would happen if the error
were repeated, without forcing a precipitous change in top
management. If the entire system does not meet with public
approval, a decline in share value could offer a quick gauge of
public response to the initiative that could easily lead to a
change of firm direction. Indeed, in those cases where the
Board does not sufficiently respond to egregious CEO and
CFO behavior, shareholders have available private derivative
suits against the Board of Directors for breach of its duties of
care and loyalty. It is precisely because shareholders are not
likely to want to bring those disruptive actions that the entire
process of corporate governance should not be short-circuited
by officious, unilateral threats by regulatory authorities.
Spitzer’s serious lapse in judgment imposed threats against the
AIG board, which essentially forced their hand on a matter
that was better left to their judgment.
Once scienter is introduced into the case, it is of course
possible to pursue punitive action in these removal cases, but
no more so under the Martin Act than under the federal se-
curities laws, both of which go beyond the conventional com-
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mon-law tort action’s limit to compensation for discrete past
harms. At this point, the strong equitable remedy of removal
from office would be questionable if it rested solely on bad
transaction outcomes without any proof of scienter, given the
huge sanctions requested and the inevitability of some transac-
tional failures under the best of circumstances. In complex
transactional cases, moreover, it should be clear that some sci-
enter requirement has to be read into the law, notwithstanding
the Martin Act’s apparent indifference to that element, be-
cause adopting some version of the business judgment rule is
the only way to cabin both civil and criminal liability within
reasonable bounds.
By way of background, publicly and privately traded com-
panies book all sorts of transactions in ways in which the ac-
counting methods do not perfectly track the underlying eco-
nomics of the situation. In some cases, the rules they follow are
dictated by either tax or securities authorities. In other cases,
they are the result of business judgments by the firm on how
best to account for certain complex transactions, given issues
such as the timing of income or deductions, or the allocation
of income or loss among various parties to myriad transac-
tions. It would impose an impossible regulatory burden on all
firms if any false public impression created by the choice of an
accounting method could expose a company to potential civil
or criminal liability without scienter.
The rule in practice, therefore, for both the federal secur-
ities acts and the Martin Act, has been that sanctions are im-
posed only where there is a known and deliberate flouting of
standard accounting rules of the sort found in the AIG case.242
As to the other difficult transactions, the usual rule requires
firms to add notes to their financial statements to clarify cer-
tain balance sheet entries. Once that is done, the entire matter
is left to potential purchasers of these securities to ferret out
an accurate picture of the institutions’ financial health for
themselves. Ultimately, the question is who bears the risk of
inaccurate information. The accommodation under both the
securities acts and the Martin Act charges firms and their se-
nior officers with responsibility for sham or bad-faith transac-
tions, and nothing more. The rest of the risk rightly falls on
individual investors. The admissions of both Greenberg and
242. See supra notes 233–235 and accompanying text.
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Smith, like that of BMS, fall into the first class and thus break
no new ground.
It is also worth noting that the NYAG did not seek to im-
pose a deferred-prosecution agreement (DPA) on Greenberg,
Smith, or AIG. DPAs are commonly imposed under the federal
securities law, as illustrated in the federal prosecution in Fergu-
son.243 The use of DPAs, however, has rightly given rise to seri-
ous condemnation because the warped prosecutorial incen-
tives they create can lead to systematic abuse.244 Bringing a
lawsuit triggers huge collateral consequences in the form of
lost licenses to do business, which can be far more serious than
the penalties imposed upon conviction for the stated offense.
Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case, yet the barriers to starting an investigation are
almost nil. Deciding to investigate a case requires no proof at
all, nor does a decision to file criminal charges. There is, ac-
cordingly, less protection against this serious charging practice
than there is against conviction, and this structural defect al-
lows prosecutors to push to get extensive settlements. Just this
dynamic happened under the federal securities laws when J.P.
Morgan Chase was bludgeoned into a $1.7 billion fine for its
supposed role in not detecting the Bernard Madoff scandal,
even though J.P. Morgan was not mentioned even once in the
SEC’s own exhaustive report on how the scandal had gone un-
detected for so long. That report first noticed that the SEC
had all sorts of “red flags” in dealing with Madoff, but none-
theless managed to exonerate all SEC employees of “any finan-
cial or other inappropriate connection with Bernard Madoff
or the Madoff family that influenced the conduct of their ex-
amination or investigatory work.”245 Nonetheless, the SEC
243. See Copland & Mangual, supra note 34.
244. See, e.g., James Copland & Isaac Gorodetski, The Shadow Lengthens: The
Continuing Threat of Regulation by Prosecution, MANHATTAN INST. (Feb. 25,
2015), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/shadow-lengthens-contin
uing-threat-regulation-prosecution-5898.html; Epstein, The Dangerous Incen-
tive Structures, supra note 34; Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial,
supra note 30.
245. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION
OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME—
PUBLIC VERSION (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.
pdf. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of JP Morgan, HOOVER
INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/research/de-
fense-jp-morgan. For the evolution of the case, see Christian Dem, JPMorgan
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used its prosecutorial power against J.P. Morgan, whose sole
responsibility was to make routine disbursements to Madoff’s
clients, from which it did not and could not infer any illegality.
Notably, those heavy-handed tactics were not employed
against Greenberg or Smith. On the financial side, the only
remedy was disgorgement of bonuses received during the
2001–2004 period when these transactions were still on the
books. This was accompanied by an allowance for the dis-
gorgement previously made to the federal government for the
case brought and settled under the federal securities laws. This
complementarity shows that the common elements between
the two statutes were greater than any differences. There is lit-
tle reason to think that the major dispute over the AIG transac-
tions will result in unanimous agreement. But for these pur-
poses at least, the potential dangers that are found under the
Martin Act are also present under the federal securities laws,
which give rise to dangers of dual enforcement and an abuse
of the investigative process. But in this case at least, the admis-
sion on scienter dampens the charges with respect to liability,
and the admitted liability therefore leaves us uncertain as to
whether a court would have removed Greenberg and Smith
had they not resigned under pressure.
C. Global Warming: Fraud and Free Speech
1. The Litigation
a. ExxonMobil
The most recent Martin Act situation involves the cam-
paign started by NYAG Schneiderman to invoke the Martin
Act to attack ExxonMobil for allegedly creating a false climate
of public opinion that would allow the company to artificially
raise the price of its stock. The supposed technique consisted
of a decades-long effort by ExxonMobil to poo-poo the science
on global warming, in order to dampen the incredible legal
and social pressure to curtail or eliminate the use of fossil fuels
that lie at the heart of its business. The simple argument put
Chase Could Face Penalties Related to Madoff Scandal, DAILY KOS (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/10/24/1250190/-JPMorgan-Chase-
could-face-penalties-related-to-Madoff-scandal#; see also Jessica Silver-Green-
berg & Ben Protess, JPMorgan Chase Nears a $2 Billion Deal in a Case Tied to
Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014, 10:00 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/01/05/jpmorgan-chase-nears-a-2-billion-deal-in-a-case-tiedo-madoff/.
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forward by Schneiderman was that the First Amendment does
not protect against fraud, and a pervasive industry fraud is
what ExxonMobil perpetuated. The baldness of his claim was
made clear in his March 29, 2016 press conference that an-
nounced the legal assault, brought in part under the Martin
Act246:
[W]e are here for a very simple reason. We have
heard the scientists. We know what’s happening to
the planet. There is no dispute but there is confu-
sion, and confusion sowed by those with an interest
in profiting from the confusion and creating mis-
perceptions in the eyes of the American public that
really need to be cleared up. The U.S. Defense De-
partment, no radical agency, recently called climate
change an urgent and growing threat to our national
security. We know that last month, February, was the
furthest above normal for any month in history since
1880 when they started keeping meteorological
records. The facts are evident. This is not a problem
ten years or twenty years in the future. . . .
[ExxonMobil is] using the best climate models so
that when they spend shareholder dollars to raise
their oilrigs, which they are doing, they know how
fast the sea level is rising. Then they are drilling in
places in the Arctic where they couldn’t drill 20 years
ago because of the ice sheets. They know how fast the
ice sheets are receding. And yet they have told the
public for years that there were no “competent mod-
els,” was the specific term used by an Exxon executive
not so long ago, no competent models to project cli-
mate patterns, including those in the Arctic. And we
know that they paid millions of dollars to support or-
ganizations that put out propaganda denying that we
can predict or measure the effects of fossil fuel on
246. For this transcript, see Appendix in Support of Petition and Emer-
gency Motion of Exxon Mobil Co. to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investiga-
tive Demand or Issue a Protective Order at App. 002–021, In re Civil Investi-
gative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36 (Mass. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2016) (No. 16-
1888F)  [hereinafter Massachusetts Superior Court Appendix], http://
www.mass.gov/ago/docs/energy-utilities/exxon/appendix-in-support-of-pe
tition-and-emergency-motion.pdf.
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our climate, or even denying that climate change was
happening.
There have been those who have raised the question:
aren’t you interfering with people’s First Amendment
rights? The First Amendment, ladies and gentlemen,
does not give you the right to commit fraud. And we
are law enforcement officers, all of us do work, every
attorney general does work on fraud cases. And we
are pursuing this as we would any other fraud matter.
You have to tell the truth. You can’t make misrepre-
sentations of the kinds we’ve seen here.247
These statements are not unique to Schneiderman, for
similar findings were part of a proposed California statute, the
Climate Science Truth and Accountability Act of 2016, which
would have allowed similar climate-related fraud prosecutions
under the California unfair competition and consumer protec-
tion laws248:
Sec. 2. (a) The legislature finds and declares all of
the following:
There is broad scientific consensus that anthropo-
genic global warming is occurring and changing the
world’s climate patterns, and that the primary cause
is emission of greenhouse gases from the production
and combustion of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and
natural gas.249
Outside the Martin Act, it is possible to find literally hun-
dreds of statements that make the same proposition: the sci-
ence on global warming is clear, and it is settled, so it is only
the obstructionists and the deniers who block the path to so-
cial redemption. Thus, a group of prominent scientists have
written: “Human-caused climate change is not a belief, a hoax,
or a conspiracy. It is a physical reality. Fossil fuels powered the
Industrial Revolution. But the burning of oil, coal, and gas also
caused most of the historical increase in atmospheric levels of
heat-trapping greenhouse gases. This increase in greenhouse
247. Id. at App. 003–005.
248. S.B. 1161, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legisla
ture.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1161.
249. Id.
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gases is changing Earth’s climate.”250 Note that this letter con-
tains no specifics, but does assert that climate change is re-
sponsible for “sea level rise, altered rainfall patterns, retreat of
Arctic sea ice, ocean acidification, and many other aspects of
the climate system.”251
More specifically, global warming has been advanced to
explain the recent break off of a huge, trillion metric ton ice-
berg from the Larsen C ice shelf in Antarctica. According to
David Remnick of the New Yorker, “[s]uch events now seem al-
most ordinary—and harbingers of far worse.”252 It is quite pos-
sible that, “should the much larger West Antarctic Ice Sheet
thaw and slip into the ocean, sea levels across the globe could
rise as much as seventeen feet.”253 In other writings, sober-
minded writers working through the Climate Leadership
Council,254 including George Shultz, Jim Baker, and Martin
Feldstein, have taken the position that “[m]ounting evidence
of climate change is growing too strong to ignore. While the
extent to which climate change is due to man-made causes can
be questioned, the risks associated with future warming are too
big and should be hedged. At least we need an insurance pol-
icy.”255
Their recommendation was that the United States impose
a $40 per ton tax on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, subject
to gradual increase, which will be then returned to the public
in the form of a carbon dividend that they hope will exceed
any additional energy costs that most Americans would have to
bear. The tax will be protected against international arbi-
trage—i.e., selling goods made outside the US by companies
250. An Open Letter Regarding Climate Change From Concerned Members of the
U.S. National Academy of Sciences, RESPONSIBLE SCIENTISTS (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://www.responsiblescientists.org.
251. Id.
252. David Remnick, Trump Family Values, NEW YORKER (July 24, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/24/trump-family-values.
253. Id.
254. For a description of the organization, see Founding Statement, CLIMATE
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL (June 20, 2017), https://www.clcouncil.org/founding-
statement/.
255. JAMES A. BAKER, III, MARTIN FELDSTEIN, TED HALSTEAD, N. GREGORY
MANKIW, HENRY M. PAULSON, JR. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, THOMAS STEPHENSON &
ROB WALTON, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR
CARBON DIVIDENDS 1 (2017), https://www.clcouncil.org/media/TheConser
vativeCaseforCarbonDividends.pdf.
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that do not have to pay local carbon taxes—by imposing bor-
der carbon adjustments. These three elements in turn will al-
low for the removal or rollback of direct forms of regulation,
including the Obama Clean Power Plan, and would also blunt
any effort to use the tort system to impose liability on separate
companies—which has long been regarded as a most unrealis-
tic proposal given the impossible logistics of litigation.256 Still
other writers, most notably David Wallace-Wells, predict more
dire consequences: an “Uninhabitable Earth,” from which we
can expect “[f]amine, economic collapse, [and] a sun that
cooks us.”257
There is little doubt that these are dire statements. But
wholly apart from the question of their accuracy, there is the
difficult question about the connection to the Martin Act it-
self. The first point to note is that the definition of fraud used
by Schneiderman in his press conference is one of hardcore
legal fraud, which posits that ExxonMobil knew all the rele-
vant environmental impact information that is taken, without
demonstration, as though it were a key fact. If his account were
correct, he would have no need to rely on the expanded defi-
nition of fraud that dispenses with scienter, which in this con-
text does raise serious First Amendment issues, given the sup-
pression of debate that could follow if all statements of opin-
ion that proved false were actionable. Indeed, an SEC
composed of five Schneidermans could bring exactly the same
case under the federal securities laws, using the same narrow
definition of scienter. In both cases, any claim that Exx-
onMobil should be subject to sanction even if it were simply
unaware of the truth when it issued its reports and made its
statements would be dead-on-arrival as an approach to stimu-
late public outrage against the company. If Exxon is the only
firm that did serious climate research, it would be ironic that it
256. For a rejection of this theory, at least for federal courts, see Am. Elec.
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). The proposal has been sup-
ported by Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Gov-
ernment in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011). For my re-
sponse, see Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the Con-
ventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming,
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 317 (2011).
257. David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, N.Y. MAG. (July 9, 2017),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-
hot-for-humans.html.
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alone should be held responsible for its foresight. But if other
oil companies did the same, why exempt them from liability
given that they could also be subject to suit under the current
scienter theory?
The popular campaigns against ExxonMobil take the
same form. None of these efforts rely on anything that re-
motely resembles a strict-liability theory under which proof of
the defendant’s negligence or intention to harm is irrelevant.
Schneiderman was well aware that this theory could not sup-
port any kind of financial remedy or injunctive relief against
ExxonMobil, without imposing potential liability on virtually
everyone else who had made some erroneous climate forecast.
The most that could be sought would be some requirement,
similar to that imposed on AIG, for misstating reserves or
other metrics used in the oil and gas business. Far from ap-
pealing to strict liability, the hashtag used by opponents of Ex-
xon was, and remains, #ExxonKnew.258 These opponents do
not rely on the niceties of the Martin Act when they proclaim:
“Exxon knew about climate change half a century ago” and
“[t]hey deceived the public, misled their shareholders, and
robbed humanity of a generation’s worth of time to reverse
climate change.”259 Each of these references speaks in terms of
deception, duplicity, and worse.
One notable expose´ in the Los Angeles Times, “What Exxon
Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic,”260 claims Exxon
downplayed the risks of global warming externally as its own
scientists were “closely studying the impact of climate change
on the company’s operations.”261 The article noted that the
change in Arctic conditions was both good and bad news for
the company. On the one hand, it reduced the cost of explora-
tion in the oil-rich Arctic; on the other hand, climate change
258. See #EXXONKNEW, http://exxonknew.org/ (last visited Nov. 19,
2017).
259. Id. See also Neela Banerjee et al., CO2’s Role in Global Warming Has Been
on the Oil Industry’s Radar Since the 1960s, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 13,
2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13042016/climate-change-
global-warming-oil-industry-radar-1960s-exxon-api-co2-fossil-fuels; NAOMI
ORESKES & ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIEN-
TIST OBSCURED THE TRUTH OF ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING (2010).
260. Sara Jerving et al., What Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/.
261. Id.
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could create “higher sea levels and bigger waves,” and poten-
tially impede drilling operations. The claim was that Exxon
wanted to tamp down claims of global warming to reduce pres-
sure to keep fossil fuels in the ground. But at no point does
the article explain in what way Exxon had or relied on any
private information of value when the standard temperature
measures were at all times in the public domain. Nor did it
bother to mention that, at the time the Los Angeles Times wrote
its article, the level of sea ice in the Arctic was in the process of
recovery from its 2012 low, which was inconsistent with their
doomsday view of the underlying science.262
The denunciations, moreover, quickly reached a fever
pitch. One representative of this style of argumentation is a
report entitled “The Climate Deception Dossiers: Internal Fos-
sil Fuel Industry Memos Reveal Decades of Corporate Dis-
information.”263 The expose´ starts with the observation that
half of all carbon emissions have taken place since 1988264—
without noting the weak correlation between those higher
emissions and the steady global temperatures over the same
period.265 It also claims that “[g]lobal warming is accelerating
the rate of sea level rise and dramatically increasing flooding
risks,”266 without addressing any of the abundant evidence to
the contrary. The study notes that some of these companies
“continue to support groups that spread misinformation de-
signed to deceive the public about climate science and climate
policy,”267 again without explaining why the work of such
groups as the CO2 Coalition is flawed, resting as it does on its
interpretation of independently generated and publicly availa-
ble data. Indeed, this critique does not systematically engage
the views of any scientists on the other side of the debate, let
alone address any of the particular points raised above. In-
stead, the constant trope is that the “deniers,” a clear allusion
262. Id.
263. See KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIEN-
TISTS, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS: INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY
MEMOS REVEAL DECADES OF CORPORATE DISINFORMATION (2015), http://
www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Decep
tion-Dossiers.pdf.
264. Id. at 3.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 320–322.
266. MULVEY & SHULMAN, supra note 263, at 2.
267. Id.
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to Holocaust deniers, practice nonstop deceit in the effort to
preserve their business.
Here is one final example. Inside Climate News published
a series of expose´s on the subject in the last half of 2015, which
allowed no room for doubt. Some of the tenor comes through
in the headlines of the separate studies: “Exxon’s Own Re-
search Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming De-
cades Ago: Top executives were warned of possible catastro-
phe from greenhouse effect, then led efforts to block solu-
tions.”268
To give some sense as to the overstatement in these stud-
ies, it is useful to look at just one of the documents that Inside
Climate News treats as a smoking gun. That document was a
June 6, 1978 presentation by J.F. Black, a scientific advisor at
Exxon, to high-ranking Exxon executives.269 That presenta-
tion refers to an earlier oral presentation, the graphs from
which are included at the end of the report, that he had made
to the Exxon Corporate Management Committee the previous
July. It is exceedingly difficult to distill the ultimate message
from that report, given its constant diffidence on the sound-
ness of the underlying theory or the available data. Thus it
notes “[t]he CO2 increase measured to date is not capable of
producing an effect large enough to be distinguished from
normal climate variations.”270 Shortly thereafter his report
states: “There is considerable uncertainty regarding what con-
trols the exchange of atmosphere CO2 with the ocean and with
carbonaceous materials on the continents,” and, “[m]odels
which predict the climatic effects of a CO2 increase are in a
primitive stage of development.”271 Black’s report is replete
with further references to the uncertainties in question. In one
telling section, Black discusses the effect of the “doubling of
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere,” and con-
268. Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon’s Own Research
Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago, INSIDE CLIMATE
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092015/Exx
ons-own-research-confirmed-fossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming.
269. J.F. Black, Sci. Advisor, Exxon Res. & Eng’g Co. Prods. Res. Div., The
Greenhouse Effect: Transcript of a Talk Delivered Before the PERCC Meet-
ing (May 18, 1978), http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/docu
ments/James%20Black%201977%20Presentation.pdf.
270. Id. at 1.
271. Id. at 2.
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cludes “this will have a negligible effect on sea levels” and
“probably no effect on the polar ice sheets.”272 At another
place, his report says:
A study of past climates suggests that if the earth does
become warmer more rainfall should result. But an
increase as large as 2°C would probably also affect the
distribution of the rainfall. A possible result might be
a shift of both the desert and the fertile areas of the
globe toward higher latitudes. Some countries would
benefit but others could have their agricultural out-
put reduced or destroyed. The picture is too unclear
to predict which countries might be affected favora-
bly or unfavorably.273
The Inside Climate News report quotes only one sentence
from this passage: “Some countries would benefit but others
could have their agricultural output reduced or destroyed.”274
The lead-in to this quotation reads: “He warned Exxon scien-
tists and managers that independent researchers estimated a
doubling of the carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration in the
atmosphere would increase average global temperatures by 2
to 3 degrees Celsius (4 to 5 degrees Fahrenheit), and as much
as 10 degrees Celsius (18 degrees Fahrenheit) at the poles.”275
Black’s letter does not use the word “warning,” and it also con-
tains this sentence: “More research is needed, however, to es-
tablish the validity and significance of predictions with respect
to the Greenhouse effect.”276
This passage was presented in the final “Summary” of the
report, but it offers no evidence for its most striking proposi-
tion—that any increase in the earth’s temperature will gener-
ate a three-fold increase at the poles. The basic theory at most
explains why some greater polar increase should occur, but
gives no clue for what that number or effect would be. In addi-
tion, previous temperature changes, either up or down, did
not show such an extreme reaction at the poles. Black’s letter
does not give any indication whether other scientists inside the
company accepted his presentation. Indeed, the last sentence,
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id. at 1.
274. Id.
275. Banerjee, Song & Hasemyer, supra note 268.
276. Black, supra note 269, at 10.
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which was an obvious call for further research, is inconsistent
with the tenor of the rest of the report. And no one has of-
fered any reason to think that there was a groundswell of pro-
fessional opinion, inside or outside Exxon, agreeing with this
prediction, which was after all, based largely on publicly availa-
ble information.
It should go without saying that virtually all of the Exxon
documents now available for public viewing are fair game for
investigative journalists determined to cherry pick data in or-
der to make a point. Yet ironically, the moderate level of the
observed changes in global temperatures are perfectly consis-
tent with the subsequent uncertainty expressed by Exxon on
the impact of global warming. This insistent pillorying of Exx-
onMobil does not make sense if the critics themselves have, as
seems to be the case, overstated their position on the impact of
global warming. Yet Inside Climate News never noted that
Black’s dire prediction of 10°C changes in polar temperature
had proved resoundingly false, given that the amount of Arctic
sea ice had already rebounded from its 2012 low when its story
came out in 2015. Indeed, the entire condemnation rests on
the unexamined assumption that the harmful effects of global
warming have been conclusively established. Such is the in-
complete and inaccurate state of the evidence on which
Schneiderman relied.
It is, of course, possible to amass evidence that under-
mines any skeptical account of global warming. But for the
purposes of the Martin Act, the ultimate truth on the scientific
question is not what matters. For these purposes, the key issue
is whether the categorical statements made about the defini-
tive science on global warming are defensible when made by
the NYAG, without bothering to look at any of the theoretical
and empirical evidence lined up on the other side of the de-
bate. For the purposes of the Martin Act, it does not matter
that lots of people, including many reputable scientists, agree
with Schneiderman. What matters is whether any supposed
consensus view on a matter of scientific concern should be al-
lowed to shut down scientific debate. I have gone through a
fraction of the evidence with some care in order to make clear
that the proper object of public condemnation is less the Mar-
tin Act than the dogmatic insistence by Schneiderman and
others that these tough issues of climatology are so cut-and-
dried that only one view of them is acceptable in public dis-
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course, and ultimately definitive of the boundaries of legal
fraud.
In response to the pointed criticism, ExxonMobil has
taken two lines of defense. The first is to announce, along with
many other oil companies, its support of the carbon tax propo-
sal advanced by Baker and Shultz.277 Their support has been
mocked as skin deep by environmental groups such as 350.org
(which claims that any level of CO2 that exceeds 350 number
of parts per million is dangerous, including the current levels
that are now over 400 ppm).278 And it is always difficult to fig-
ure out dual-motive cases when it is clear that ExxonMobil
fought back with uncommon vigor against the requests of
Schneiderman to continue its investigation into its accounting
practices. At this point in time, the entire unfortunate matter
is bogged down in the details of pre-trial motions. ExxonMobil
pleaded in vain with New York federal district judge Valerie E.
Caproni, to take depositions of Schneiderman and Massachu-
setts Attorney General Maura Healey in an effort to establish
their abuse of power.279 At the same time, in New York State
Court, ExxonMobil attacked Schneiderman’s “frivolous”
claims, which it insists are filled “with inflammatory, reckless
and false allegations of an ‘ongoing fraudulent scheme’ and
‘sham’ business practices.”280 They added, “No further evi-
dence is required to establish the political motivation of the
attorney general’s fruitless year-and-a-half long investigation
pursuing his ever-shifting and unraveling investigative theo-
ries.”281 The first of these theories relates to the knowledge
277. John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Lends Its Support to a Carbon Tax Proposal,
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/science/
exxon-carbon-tax.html.
278. Id.
279. David Hasemyer & Nicholas Kusnetz, Exxon’s Opposition to Climate
Fraud Probes Gets Less Sympathy from NY Judge, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 21,
2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/21042017/exxon-mobil-cli
mate-change-scandal-fraud-investigations-new-york-schneiderman.
280. Erik Larson, Exxon Says N.Y. Attorney General Distorted Company’s Cli-
mate Data, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2017, 4:12 PM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2017-06-09/exxon-says-n-y-attorney-general-distorts-
company-s-climate-data.
281. John Siciliano, Exxon Mobil Blasts New York AG’s ‘Sham’ Climate Investi-
gation, WASH. EXAM’R (June 9, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/exxon-mobil-blasts-new-york-ags-sham-climate-investigation/article/26
25545.
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that Exxon (before it was ExxonMobil) had forty years ago.
The second is a claim that ExxonMobil today has manipulated
the evidence on the costs of regulatory compliance that should
be expected in the light of anticipated climate control regula-
tions.
The record on the historical claims is far more favorable
to Exxon than Schneiderman’s allegations suggested. Anyone
who cares to look at the reams of information already in the
public sphere would see that much of the research undertaken
by ExxonMobil on the subject largely consisted of its own in-
terpretation of publicly available studies. The Martin Act case
against Exxon bore absolutely no relationship to the flagrantly
false statements of private information contained in a business
prospectus, targeted to a particular vulnerable population,
which provoked the strong endorsement of the Martin Act
back in 1926 in Federated Radio Corp.
Note the differences in the two scenarios. With global
warming, it is impossible to link the research to any effort to
influence the buying or selling of shares at all. The statements
were made at odd times, and were never associated with the
purchase or sale of any security or with any effort to buy or sell
any securities, both of which are explicit limitations on the
NYAG’s authority under the Martin Act. In addition, given the
wealth of information that forms the backdrop of all of Ex-
xon’s work, it seems clear that none of the asserted falsehoods
would count as a false statement of fact, to which the Martin
Act is restricted. These clearly would fall under the class of
predictions, as to the future course of world climate change,
or opinions about the same course of action. No person could
possibly or properly rely on this information to make a deci-
sion to purchase shares, which means that, given the context,
anyone would be hard pressed to say that the information pro-
duced by Exxon was material in the sense that this term is used
in the securities law (as Columbia Law Professor Merritt Fox
has noted in a public panel on the topic282). As discussed ear-
lier, there is a proper distribution of responsibility for error in
cases of this sort. The defendant companies are only held re-
282. See Chris White, Law Expert Blasts NY Attorney General for Investigations
Against Exxon, DAILY CALLER (June 7, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://dailycaller.
com/2016/06/07/law-expert-blasts-ny-attorney-general-for-investigations-a
gainst-exxon/.
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sponsible for what are known to be sham transactions. For the
rest, it is the duty of all investors to seek out information on
their own to determine the extent, sources and effect of global
warming on the use of fossil fuels. They are free to think that
the prospects are dire, or that the entire matter may blow over.
The legal implications seem clear. No decided case of the
Martin Act has ever applied the term “fraud” to transactions
that are wholly unrelated to the buying and selling or the po-
tential buying and selling of stock. Whether one accepts the
narrower definition of “in connection with” that was used in
Blue Chip Stamps to exclude statements which were not fol-
lowed by a purchase or sale, or the broader views under the
Martin Act, which allow for the injunctions of potential sales,
the answer is the same. These statements have so many pur-
poses that they could not fall into any class of false statement
of facts. There are, of course, First Amendment issues in these
cases, and that body of law does not offer any protection for
false statements of facts made in pursuit of a sale. But it offers
extensive protection for statements of opinion based on mat-
ters of public interest and concern, in which discourse regard-
ing the future outcome of scientific events would surely fall.283
Ultimately, Schneiderman was right that the First Amendment
does not protect against fraud. But he is wrong to think that
this case comes close to that general prescription. None of the
proponents of serious global warming has a monopoly on the
truth. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said a long time ago in
Abrams v. United States, “the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market,”284 which means that no one gets a pass against criti-
cism.
The second Schneiderman charge switched from histori-
cal knowledge to the claim that ExxonMobil used different
numbers for internal and external consumption in seeking to
measure the costs, if any, of potential direct government taxes
or regulation on CO2 emissions. This claim has a more con-
temporary focus, but it is subject to the same general objec-
283. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (strengthening
First Amendment protection for speech dealing with a matter of public con-
cern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (refusing to extend like protection to statements that do not have
public interest and concern).
284. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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tions. It is, of course, common to use different numbers for
different purposes and in any event, even under the Martin
Act, the proof of materiality would require some judgment
that ordinary investors would be influenced by this one fact,
among many, in their decision to buy stock.
Inquiries of this sort are unlikely to bear fruit for two rea-
sons. First, there are many forms of public information availa-
ble regarding the prospect of government regulation or taxa-
tion—investors could look to independent sources to make
their own judgment as to the probability and severity of antici-
pated government regulation in the United States or else-
where. They need not rely on information provided by Exx-
onMobil. As Professor Fox put the point in 2016: “the market
was well supplied with information about climate change.”285
It also matters that the impact of any such regulation lies far
into the future, and thus must be discounted down to present
value to calculate its impact, if any, on share prices. As such,
the business judgments of ExxonMobil bear no resemblance
to the discrete sham transactions with immediate financial im-
pact that led to the favorable Martin Act settlements against
AIG, Greenberg, and Smith.
Second, a great number of issues influence movements in
stock price for large publicly traded companies, so it is highly
unlikely that projections about the cost of regulations that may
be forthcoming ten or twenty years into the future would be
accorded much weight by investors who know how rapidly the
political landscape can move. The election of Donald Trump
as president, the appointment of Scott Pruitt as head of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the decision to with-
draw from the Paris Accords show just how quickly events can
overtake predictions. In addition, the overall success of Ameri-
can firms in reducing their CO2 footprint without further reg-
ulation cuts in the same direction. Any substantial reduction in
CO2 emissions largely depends on what China and India do in
the next decade, again, independent variables for individuals
to weigh on their own. It is hard to point to any uniquely pri-
vate information that ExxonMobil had that could influence
share prices. Schneiderman’s campaign has all the looks of a
vendetta.
285. White, supra note 282.
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This analysis has been borne out by subsequent events. In
February 2017, ExxonMobil’s annual 10-K filing announced
that the company had cut its estimate of recoverable reserves
by about 3.3 billion barrels, out of a total of just more than 23
billion barrels.286 The amount of barrels cut was not chosen at
random, but represented the oil found in the costly to extract
Canadian oil sands. The driver was not the prospect of future
regulation intended to cope with global warming, but the
more prosaic reality that at present the oil contained in these
sands was too costly to extract economically under the prevail-
ing low prices—the most material of all circumstances. The
move was widely anticipated and, as even the pro-global warm-
ing website, Inside Climate News acknowledged, had nothing
to do with climate change.287 The lessons here are two-fold.
First, the market does indeed know how to value stocks, ren-
dering global warming regulation an exotic irrelevancy. Sec-
ond, there are no substantive differences between the federal
securities laws and the Martin Act. Both the SEC and the
NYAG could investigate the changes, and both should back off
in light of the changes that did occur. Let this be a lesson for
future cases.
b. Global Warming and Public Nuisance
The question then becomes whether this initial foray
against ExxonMobil contains any lessons for dealing with the
more recent set of suits that have been filed by a number of
municipalities in New York,288 California and elsewhere on the
question of whether global warming constitutes a public nui-
sance that has been created by ExxonMobil and other oil com-
286. Geoffrey Smith, Exxon’s Big Oil Sands Write-Off Could Help It Dodge SEC
Troubles, FORTUNE (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/exxon-
mobil-oil-sands-sec/.
287. Nicholas Kusnetz, Exxon Relents, Wipes Oil Sands Reserves from Its Books,
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
22022017/exxon-mobil-tar-sands-alberta-canada-climate-change-oil-prices
(“Low prices force the oil giant to stop counting 3.5 billion barrels as an
asset, a major turnaround in its accounting.”).
288. Complaint, New York v. BP PLC (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-cv-182)
(footnote omitted), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/
press-releases/2018/complaint-filed-8031957-20180109.pdf.
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panies, which make and distribute fossil fuels throughout the
United States.289
Much abbreviated, the key allegations in the New York
complaint read:
Defendants’ past and ongoing actions are harming
New York City now: the City already has suffered
damage from climate change, including inundation,
erosion, and regular tidal flooding of its property.
The City now faces further imminent threats to its
property, its infrastructure, and the health and safety
of its residents. . . .
Global warming-induced sea level rise is expected to
be higher in areas surrounding New York City than in
many other parts of the world. According to the
NPCC’s [New York City’s expert committee] “high
end” projection, the sea level surrounding the City is
expected to rise above the 2000-2004 baseline level
(which already includes climate-change related sea
level rise) by ten inches by the 2020s, by thirty inches
by the 2050s, by fifty-eight inches by the 2080s, and by
seventy-five inches—more than six feet—by 2100.
Even the “middle range” projections are dire: four to
eight inches by the 2020s, eleven to twenty-one in-
ches by the 2050s, eighteen to thirty-nine inches by
the 2080s, and twenty-two to fifty inches by 2100.
Even without storms, this sea level rise threatens low-
lying areas of the City—for example, by the 2050s ap-
proximately forty-three miles of the City’s coastline
(including many residential neighborhoods) could
be at risk of daily or weekly tidal inundation, even
during non-storm conditions. And a sea level rise of
six feet would put parts of all five boroughs —includ-
ing portions of the Financial District, Red Hook, and
the vast majority of Coney Island and the Rocka-
ways—under water.290
289. For the record, I have worked as an advisor to the Manufacturer’s
Accountability Project on the legal issues that have stemmed out of these
lawsuits.
290. Complaint, supra note 288, at ¶2.
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The public nuisance claim here is novel in all its as-
pects.291 Previously in the American Electric Power Co. v. Connecti-
cut, the Supreme Court held that this cause of action was not
viable under federal law but left open the prospect that it
might be brought under state law, at least if the doctrines of
federal preemption did not block the case.292 But this public
nuisance case is markedly different from AEP because it is not
brought against the emitters of greenhouse gases, but the pro-
ducers of fossil fuels for making and distributing these prod-
ucts.293 The extra layer creates a major question of causation,
given that the total amount of carbon dioxide emissions is de-
pendent heavily on the way in which the crude oil is processed
and used by downstream parties. For these purposes, I shall
not discuss some of the nuisance law aspects of the case,294
except to note that virtually all of these claims take the posi-
tion that in light of global warming, the risk of sea level rise is
far greater than it has ever been before so that it is appropriate
to require these defendants to fund an abatement program
that can stave off disaster before it arrives. One key difficulty
with this claim is that it is uncertain how the rate of carbon
dioxide increases translates itself into sea level rise. In fact, his-
torical averages have been roughly in the order of 1/20th of
an inch per year or five inches per century—a change that is
not obviously driven by carbon dioxide increases,295 and that
rate has been constant over the past 20 years.
For these purposes, however, one question that arises
under both the Martin Act and the federal securities law is
whether the stark claims that are raised in these complaints
are inconsistent with the representations that most local gov-
ernments have made in their various bond offerings that take
the position that denies that there are any serious environmen-
tal risks that will impair their ability to repay their debts. The
covenant in the Oakland issue is perfectly typical:
The City is unable to predict when seismic events,
fires or other natural events, such as sea rise or other
291. See Richard A. Epstein, Is Global Warming a Public Nuisance?, HOOVER
INST.: DEFINING IDEAS (January 15, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/re
search/global-warming-public-nuisance.
292. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
293. See Complaint, supra note 288, at ¶ 14.
294. See Epstein, supra note 256.
295. See infra Section III.C.2.
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impacts of climate change or flooding from a major
storm, could occur, when they may occur, and, if any
such events occur, whether they will have a material
adverse effect on the business operations or financial
condition of the City or the local economy.296
It takes no imagination to see the obvious inconsistency
between the two different assertions. But it does raise the hard
question of whether the decision to file the law suits makes the
statements in the bond covenants material misrepresentations
for the purposes of either the Martin Act or the federal securi-
ties law. It is worth noting that the exacting standards of the
Martin Act seem to cover this case even if the truth lies some-
where between the two sets of statements, so that there is some
risk, even if not one to the extent portrayed in these com-
plaints. Given that damages and reliance are not normally re-
quired in Martin Act claims, it looks as though some sanction
should be imposed on these local governments, although it is
by no means clear what it should be: a fine, an upward interest
adjustment, the immediate right to redeem bonds that have
long maturity rates, or something else. It would be instructive
to trace out the prices on these various bonds, but it appears
that they have not moved much in response to the lawsuit.
This suggests that the bond covenants are more accurate than
the allegations in the lawsuits, at which point the other ques-
tion is whether sanctions should be allowed against the plain-
tiffs because of the frivolous nature of their claims. The litiga-
tion is in its earliest stages, but ExxonMobil has already
brought suit in Texas for an order authorizing it “to conduct
depositions and obtain documents pertaining to potential
claims of abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and violations of
ExxonMobil’s constitutional rights.”297 We can be confident
that this is only the opening salvo in this case, which will go
through many iterations before it reaches a final conclusion,
both on the public nuisance claims and the securities law
claims. But in principle there is no reason why the Martin Act
296. Josh Rosner, Have California Munis Misled Investors and Bond Insurers
About Climate Risk?, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 9, 2018), https://seekingalpha.com
/article/4136231-california-munis-misled-investors-bond-insurers-climate-
risk.
297. Verified Petition for Pre-Suit Depositions of Matthew F. Pawa et al.
(N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 096-297222-18), https://www.courthousenews.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ExxonDepositions.pdf.
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should not be a two-edged sword that can be applied with
equal force against parties who understate their potential lia-
bilities under the securities laws. Let us hope that the bond
covenants are entirely accurate, which means that the public
nuisance claims are necessarily incorrect.
Nevertheless, matters have progressed in these various
lawsuits in what will surely be a long and arduous process.  In
the New York litigation, the most pointed question from the
bench thus far involved the role of the plaintiffs in bearing any
responsibility for climate change.  If the distribution of fossil
fuels with full knowledge of the claimed climate consequences
is improper, then what about the extensive use of the same
fuels by the City of New York in its own activities?  Judge Kee-
nan noted that the New York City police, fire and sanitation
departments all have cars and trucks. As Judge Keenan asked
plaintiff’s attorney Matthew Pawa, “Aren’t the plaintiffs using
the product that’s the subject of the lawsuit?” To which Pawa
replied yes.298  At this point the plaintiffs were in pari delicto—
of equal blame—which could block the claim altogether
under tort law principles. Given that concession, the defen-
dant’s lawyer, Theodore Boutrous, stressed that this problem
did not need a piecemeal, but a global solution.
The litigation in California took a very different tack, as
Judge William Alsup—who has an engineering back-
ground299—posted a list of eight questions that spoke to the
full range of historical and technical issues raised by these
cases.300  These questions were followed by an extended de-
298. Saqib Rahim, NYC tests climate ‘nuisance’ theory in federal court, GOVER-
NOR’S WIND & SOLAR ENERGY COAL. (June 15, 2018), http://governorswind
energycoalition.org/nyc-tests-climate-nuisance-theory-in-federal-court/.
299. Judge Alsup earned a Bachelor of Science in mathematics from Mis-
sissippi State University in 1967 prior to obtaining a J.D. from Harvard Law
School. Alsup, William Haskell, FED. JUD. CTR., www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
alsup-william-haskell (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
300. The questions are as follows:
1. What caused the various ice ages (including the “little ice age”
and prolonged cool periods) and what caused the ice to melt?
When they melted, by how much did sea level rise?
2. What is the molecular difference by which CO2 absorbs infra-
red radiation but oxygen and nitrogen do not?
3. What is the mechanism by which infrared radiation trapped by
CO2 in the atmosphere is turned into heat and finds its way
back to sea level?
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bate on March 21, 2018.301  The plaintiff’s expert witness, Pro-
fessor Myles Allen, got bogged down trying to explain the basic
relationship between increases in CO2 and temperature
change under a logarithmic relationship known as Arrhenius’s
law.  The defense did not use any expert witness, but followed
the far cleverer strategy of having Chevron’s lawyer Theodore
Boutrous lay out his case with an effective dramatic twist.  He
began with the notion that Chevron accepts the consensus of
the scientific community on climate change as announced in
the IPCC,302 and quickly concluded that “climate change is a
global issue that requires global engagement and global ac-
tion.”303 Thereafter he teased out many of the uncertainties in
the various iterations of the IPCC’s triennial reports.304  He
mentioned that the IPCC noted “economic and population
growth” as drivers of these changes, which result also from
“the cyclical patterns of climate changes over hundreds of
thousands of years” and predated the current increase in CO2
4. Does CO2 in the atmosphere reflect any sunlight back into
space such that the reflected sunlight never penetrates the at-
mosphere in the first place?
5. Apart from CO2, what happens to the collective heat from tail
pipe exhausts, engine radiators, and all other heat from com-
bustion of fossil fuels? How, if at all, does this collective heat
contribute to warming of the atmosphere?
6. In grade school, many of us were taught that humans exhale
CO2 but plants absorb CO2 and return oxygen to the air (keep-
ing the carbon for fiber). Is this still valid? If so, why hasn’t
plant life turned the higher levels of CO2 back into oxygen?
Given the increase in human population on Earth (four bil-
lion), is human respiration a contributing factor to the buildup
of CO2?
7. What are the main sources of CO2 that account for the incre-
mental buildup of CO2 in the atmosphere?
8. What are the main sources of heat that account for the incre-
mental rise in temperature on Earth?
Some Questions for the Tutorial, California v. BP PLC, No. C 17-06011 WHA
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-
litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180306_
docket-317-cv-06011_order.pdf.
301. See Transcript of Proceedings, California v. BP PLC, No. C 17-06011
WHA (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4435
400-SF-Oakland-Transcript-of-Alsup-Tutorial-032118.html.
302. Id. at 80.
303. Id. at 82.
304. Id. at 90–91.
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attributable to human beings starting in about 1950.305 It was
these changes that contributed to the Little Ice Age, which the
IPCC report attributes to such issues as lower solar activity and
volcanic activities—neither of which involves changes in CO2
concentrations.306  In so doing he sketched out an argument
that separated climate change from changes in carbon dioxide
levels.
On June 25, 2018, Judge Alsup dismissed the California
and Oakland litigation in a pointed sixteen-page opinion for
failure to state a claim.307  After a detailed review of the sci-
ence presented at the March 21 proceedings, including find-
ing Arrhenius was concerned with global cooling rather than
warming,308 the opinion treated the underlying science of
global warming as a given: “This order fully accepts the vast
scientific consensus that the combustion of fossil fuels has ma-
terially increased atmospheric carbon dioxide levels[.]”309
Elsewhere, he acknowledged “other causes” were also at
work.310 Nevertheless, perhaps reflecting the wisdom of Chev-
ron’s litigation strategy, the issue in the case “is not over sci-
ence” but was a “legal one.”311 Applying the basic tort law of
public nuisance, Judge Alsup found the question came down
to balancing the historical civilizational utility of extracting fos-
sil fuels against the real harm incurred by plaintiffs to deter-
mine whether the defendants’ conduct was reasonable.312 His
order held that the grand global nature of this policy question
makes it a federal one, but because of its gargantuan eco-
nomic and foreign relations implications, one for the political
branches to determine, not the courts.313  Judge Alsup’s order
thus refrained from weighing in on the substantive scientific
305. Id. at 94.
306. Id. at 98.
307. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints, City of
Oakland v. BP PLC, No. C 17-06011 WHA (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2018), http://
blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/
sites/16/case-documents/2018/20180625_docket-317-cv-06011_order-1.pdf.
308. Id. at 3.
309. Id. at 12.
310. Id. at 4.
311. Id. at 6.
312. Id. at 7–8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826–832 (AM.
LAW INST. 1979)).
313. Id. at 14–16.
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issues discussed above.  But it does suggest a blow to activists
who continue to press suits in New York and elsewhere.
It is still unclear whether these remaining cases will be set
for trial or dismissed, perhaps on the grounds that the need
for a comprehensive solution is inconsistent with the piece-
meal relief that is requested.  But for these purposes, what is
most apparent is that the common law, the Martin Act, and
the federal securities acts all give ample room to raise these
issues—and to reject the claims once they are raised. What
matters ultimately are the scientific issues about which Bout-
rous discussed in his exchange with Judge Alsup.  It is to those
that I turn next.
2. The Science
It is clear that the various actions against ExxonMobil
under the Martin Act and against multiple oil companies
under the law of public nuisance raise a common core of sci-
ence issues that require some independent analysis.  The
Schneiderman position in March 2016 echoed a common
theme in this literature, which is that the science is so settled
that the only question that remains is to devise a sensible solu-
tion to the problem.  In all these cases, it seems as though indi-
vidual litigation is a poor way in which to proceed.  But
whether or not this matter is returned to the legislative arena,
as suggested by Judge Alsup’s opinion, it is important to ask
whether the science is as solid in one direction as is commonly
supposed.
The answer is that it is not.  Right now, many climate
scientists take issue with the question of whether global warm-
ing attributable to man-made CO2 poses a substantial threat,
backed by extensive evidence. Patrick Michaels and Paul Knap-
penberger articulate a view, hinted at by the title of their re-
cent book, Lukewarming, that any increase in CO2 levels could
be expected, with other things held equal, to produce some
modest increase in global temperatures which do not a pre-
sent a significant environmental danger.314  The CO2 Coali-
tion, which I have worked with from time to time, goes one
step further and claims that the recent increases in CO2 levels
314. See PATRICK J. MICHAELS & PAUL C. KNAPPENBERGER, LUKEWARMING:
THE NEW CLIMATE SCIENCE THAT CHANGES EVERYTHING 116–17 (2016).
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result in a net benefit to humanity.315  From literally hundreds
of articles that I have reviewed on both sides of the debate, it
becomes all too clear that there are few people taking a
maybe-yes/maybe-no stance.  On virtually every point, the
global warming debate gives rise to fierce hand-to-hand com-
bat that cannot easily be put to rest, and certainly not so by the
collection of factoids that Schneiderman and Pawa strung to-
gether in rapid fashion.  It is, therefore, worthwhile to step
back from his charges of fraud to ask whether the evidence on
the scope and extent of global warming is as unequivocal as he
claims.  In the context of the Martin Act, it is not necessary for
these purposes to show that the many reputable scientists are
correct in claiming that fears of global warming are over-
wrought.  It is simply sufficient to show that there are two sides
to the argument.
The first point is that one has to be careful of the com-
mon claim that 97% of scientists believe in global warming.
There are good reasons to believe that this figure misstates the
division of authority within the scientific community.316  To
see why this is the case, it is critical to isolate the key ambiguity
inherent in this formulation. As commonly stated, the 97%
consensus includes in its ranks any scientist who thinks that
some increase in CO2 concentrations will lead to some increase
in temperature, a broad and undefined class which includes
most people who are self-described climate skeptics. Indeed,
this particular claim appears to be a necessary truth.  But the
harder questions ask how much of an increase in CO2 poses a
315. See CO2 COALITION, http://co2coalition.org (last visited Aug. 12,
2018). The organization has been attacked as a pawn of the fossil fuel indus-
try. See, e.g., CO2 Coalition, DESMOG, http://www.desmogblog.com/co2-coali
tion (last visited Oct. 29, 2016); John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on
Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature, 8 ENVIRON. RES. LET-
TERS 1 (2013), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/
024024/pdf (“Our analysis indicates that the number of papers rejecting the
consensus on AGW is a vanishingly small proportion of the published re-
search.”). The study was confined to an analysis of abstracts, without any
effort to look into the merits of any of the 11,944 papers reviewed.
316. See Joseph Bast & Roy Spencer, The Myth of the Climate Change ‘97%’,
WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2014, 7:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/joseph-
bast-and-roy-spencer-the-myth-of-the-climate-change-97-1401145980; see also
Judith Curry, The 97% ‘consensus’, CLIMATE ETC. (July 26, 2013), https://
judithcurry.com/2013/07/26/the-97-consensus/.
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threat and why. That point has been repeatedly hammered
home by others, including Matt Ridley, who has written:
The supposed 97% consensus, based on a hilariously
bogus study by John Cook, refers only to the proposi-
tion that climate change is real and partly man-made.
Nobody has ever shown anything like a consensus
among scientists for the proposition that climate
change is going to be dangerous.
Professor Daniel Sarewitz put it well recently: “Even
the vaunted scientific consensus around climate
change . . . applies only to a narrow claim about the
discernible human impact on global warming. The
minute you get into questions about the rate and se-
verity of future impacts, or the costs of and best path-
ways for addressing them, no semblance of consensus
among experts remains.”317
These observations are not isolated. Recent surveys about
the attitude of members of the American Meteorological Soci-
ety “found that, while a majority of meteorologists surveyed are
convinced humans have contributed to global warming [64%],
this was a substantially smaller majority than that found among
all Earth scientists (82%).”318 It also found that “[s]ome mem-
bers have expressed that their views, which question the view
that human-caused global warming was occurring, are treated
with hostility within the [American Meteorological Soci-
ety].”319
It is pointless to dwell on political animosity, but it is criti-
cal to properly frame the conceptual issue discussed before
317. Matt Ridley, Global Warming Versus Global Greening, GLOB. WARMING
POL’Y FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.thegwpf.org/matt-ridley-global-
warming-versus-global-greening/ (citing Cook et al., supra note 315). See also
Daniel Sarewitz, Saving Science, THE NEW ATLANTIS (2016), http://
www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/saving-science. Sarewitz rightly relies
on Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report to President Truman, which charted the
course for post-war advances in scientific research. See VENNEVAR BUSH, SCI-
ENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1945), https://
www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm.
318. Neil Stenhouse et al., Meteorologists’ Views About Global Warming: A Sur-
vey of American Meteorological Society Professional Members, 95 BULL. AM. METEOR-
OLOGICAL SOC’Y 1029, 1029 (2014). Other surveys found a high fraction of
scientists, often around 80 percent, believe that “induced climate change is
occurring,” without, apparently, determining its likely severity. Id.
319. Id. at 1030.
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Judge Alsup. To do so, I rely on the clear exposition of the
problem by the CO2 Coalition. The standard formula for
global warming rests on two key variables. The first of these is
the rate of expected increase in CO2 concentrations. The sec-
ond is the size of a sensitivity coefficient, or “S.” As to the first,
the impact of temperature changes varies with the logarithmic
change in concentration, which always rises more slowly than
the percentage increase, such that a doubling of concentra-
tion leads to about a 31% increase in temperature. But an in-
crease of what? On this last point, the sensitivity index mea-
sures the rate at which the higher concentrations translate into
higher temperatures. The higher the level of sensitivity, the
greater the response will be to any given increase (or de-
crease) in the level of concentration of CO2. The setup, often
called the Arrhenius equation, is as follows:
T = S log2 (C2/C1), where T = T2 – T1.
The proposition that higher concentrations of CO2 leads
to some degree of global warming only requires that S, the
doubling sensitivity number, be greater than zero for any in-
crease in CO2 concentration to increase global temperature.
So long as any of that CO2 is produced by human beings, the
proposition that human action causes global warming is (trivi-
ally) true, but entirely consistent with the Lukewarming hypoth-
esis and, indeed, the possibility that CO2 produces net social
benefits.
The key question, therefore, for the purposes of the
global-warming debate, is just how much greater than zero is
S. Where S is low, the temperature increases are small. Where
S is large, the temperature increases are obviously greater. In
all cases, the increases get smaller in percentage terms as the
concentrations gets higher, given the logarithmic nature of
the basic relationship. The key scientific dispute in this regard
is about the magnitude of S. The conventional models, includ-
ing those used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), a leading international, UN-sponsored body
dedicated to measuring the effects of climate change, tend to
place S > 3 or so, which is a high number. Others think that
more recent evidence puts S far lower, perhaps at S < 2, at
which point the increases in temperature are far slower.320
320. See Robert P. Murphy, Patrick J. Michaels & Paul C. Knappenberger,
The Case Against the Carbon Tax (CATO Inst., Working Paper No. 33, 2015),
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This factor has in turn been challenged as being too low.321
One reason to incline toward the lower estimate is that water
vapor, also a greenhouse gas, has at least some influence on
temperature, which necessarily means that CO2 should matter
less proportionally. There is, moreover, no obvious monotonic
relationship between water vapor and temperature, which
means that shifts in its concentration over time and over differ-
ent portions of the earth can explain some of the variability in
regional responses that models based on CO2 levels cannot,
i.e., periods, such as that in the middle of the 1970s, where
cooling rather than warming has been observed.
On this score, it is instructive to look at the graph that
Professor Richard Lindzen offers of temperatures since 1920:
FIGURE 1
SCHEMATIC OF TEMPERATURE ANOMALY RECORD
Amazingly, 18 of the 18 warmest years on record occurred during last 18 years
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/cato-working-paper-
33.pdf.
321. See Joseph Majkut, Is There a Divergence Between Climate Models and Tem-
perature Data?, NISKANEN CTR.: CLIMATE & ENERGY POL’Y (Dec. 1, 2015), http:
//niskanencenter.org/blog/is-there-a-divergence-between-climate-models-
and-temperature-data/.
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During the same period, CO2 levels moved steadily up-
ward from about 320 ppm in 1960 to somewhat over 400 ppm
today. As Lindzen has observed, “the warming episode from
about 1978 to 1998 appeared to have ceased and temperatures
have remained almost constant since 1998.”322 As he then
notes, it follows necessarily that all of the temperature reports
in last 18 years have been close to the high point, given that
there has been no decline in temperature. The monotonic in-
creases in the level of CO2, whether natural or man-made, can-
not explain why temperatures first rose, then declined, and
then rose again, only to remain flat thereafter. Any single
driver for temperature thus has to be ruled out on this data.
CO2 levels surely play some role, but so must other factors.
The approximately 13 percent increase in CO2 levels over the
last 18 years has generated at most only modest atmospheric
temperature increases, which raises the claim, strongly denied
by others, of a “pause” in global warming.323 Indeed, there is
scant evidence that even major reductions in the overall level
of CO2 are likely to have an appreciable effect on long-term
global warming in light of the interplay of social forces.324 Per-
haps some insidious effects of CO2 may be delayed, but at the
very least those additional complications cast doubt on
Schneiderman’s categorical conclusions.
322. Richard Lindzen, Thoughts on the Public Discourse over Climate Change,
MERION WEST (Apr. 25, 2017), http://merionwest.com/2017/04/25/rich
ard-lindzen-thoughts-on-the-public-discourse-over-climate-change/.
323. For rival views, see Brian Kahn, No Pause in Global Warming, SCI. AM.
(June 4, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/no-pause-in-
global-warming/ (“The global warming hiatus—a decade-plus slowdown in
warming—could be chalked up to some buoys, a few extra years of data and
a couple buckets of seawater.”); John C. Fyfe et al., Making Sense of the Early-
2000s Warming Slowdown, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 224, 224 (2016) (“It
has been claimed that the early-2000s global warming slowdown or hiatus,
characterized by a reduced rate of global surface warming, has been over-
stated, lacks sound scientific basis, or is unsupported by observations. The
evidence presented here contradicts these claims.”).
324. The U.S. contribution to reduced global temperatures in 2100 would
be about 0.03 of a degree, using the EPA’s own climate model, under as-
sumptions that exaggerate the effectiveness of the policies. Note that the
standard deviation of the temperature record is about 0.1 of a degree, so
that the U.S. effect would not be measurable against normal variation. See
Benjamin Zycher, The Carbon Tax is Not Just Political; It’s Ineffective, Too, THE
HILL (Sept. 28, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/en
ergy-environment/298285-the-carbon-tax-is-not-just-political-its-ineffective.
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The rise and fall of global temperatures is also confirmed
by a comparison of the general patterns of increase for the
years between 1895 and 1946 and between 1957 and 2008.325
To be sure, the temperature range in the earlier period was
slightly lower, but the up-and-down patterns of temperature
changes were the same in the low-CO2 environment for the
early period and high-CO2 environment for the latter one,
again showing that multiple factors are necessarily in play. In
this complex environment, it is not credible that a single
driver could have the high level of influence attributable to
CO2. One countervailing force that tends to reduce tempera-
ture increase is the release of aerosols, whose presence in the
atmosphere tends to counteract any influence of CO2.326 So
long as those move independently of changes in CO2 concen-
trations, their combined effect is difficult to determine no
matter how long or short the time horizon. NYAG Schneider-
man also pointed to the shrinking of Arctic Sea ice mass, an
assertion commonly made in authoritative places.327 But re-
cent accounts point strongly in the opposite direction. One
recent report recounts “[s]ince hitting its earliest minimum
extent since 1997, Arctic sea ice has been expanding at a phe-
nomenal rate,”328 noting that Arctic Sea ice levels have in-
creased by about 25% between 2012 and 2016.329 Historically,
moreover, Arctic Sea ice has sometimes been at much lower
325. See CO2 COALITION, A PRIMER ON CARBON DIOXIDE 6 (2016), http://
co2coalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Primer-on-CO2-and-Cli
mate-1.pdf.
326. Id. at 7.
327. See, e.g., Arctic Sea Ice Minimum, NASA: FACTS, https://climate.nasa
.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
328. Paul Homewood, Record Arctic Sea Ice Growth in September, NOT A LOT
OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT (Sept. 25, 2016), https://notalotofpeopleknowthat.
wordpress.com/2016/09/25/record-arctic-sea-ice-growth-in-september/.
The charts are always capable of multiple interpretations, but one useful
point is that the extent of the Arctic Sea ice today is about 33% higher than
it was at the same date in 2012, which in turn was only about 75% of what it
was at its 2001 peak. The movement over the last ten years has been roughly
stable. See also Thomas Richard, Arctic Sea Ice Rebounds as Polar Temperatures
Start to Plunge, BLASTING NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), http://us.blastingnews.com/
news/2016/09/arctic-sea-ice-rebounds-as-polar-temperatures-start-to-plunge-
001129573.html?utm_source=CFACT+Updates&utm_campaign=4c96e5bd2
3-Call_off_the_death_spiral_9_19_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_
a28eaedb56-4c96e5bd23-260145993.
329. Homewood, supra note 328.
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levels, so that in the 1903–1908 period, famed Arctic explorer
Roald Amundsen was able to navigate a northwest passage
through the Arctic by boat.330 The cyclical nature of Arctic Sea
ice seems to be largely independent of CO2 concentrations, so
that the recent record increases in CO2 concentrations have
seen both ebbs and flows in Arctic Sea ice concentration.
Indeed, most of the alarmist predictions have been off
base. Oftentimes this position is denied categorically, as in the
open letter prepared by MIT President, L. Rafael Reif, pro-
testing the decision of Donald Trump to withdraw from the
Paris Accords on global warming. Reif led with this categorical
statement: “As human activity emits more greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere, the global average surface temperature
will continue to rise, driving rising sea levels and extreme
weather.”331 Reif’s letter offered no evidence for this proposi-
tion and it prompted the following pointed response on these
points from Willie Soon and Christopher Monckton:
The average sea level rise since 1870 has been 1.3–1.5
mm (about a twentieth of an inch) per year, or five
inches per century. Professor Nils-Axel Mo¨rner, a re-
nowned sea-level researcher who has published more
than 500 peer-reviewed articles on this topic, has
been unable to find observational evidence that sup-
ports the models’ predictions of dramatically acceler-
ating sea level rise.
Observations over the last few decades indicate that
extreme weather events, including tornadoes and
hurricanes, have been decreasing, rather than increas-
ing, both in number and in intensity. Moreover, total
accumulated cyclonic energy has also been declining.
As MIT Emeritus Professor Richard Lindzen has ex-
plained, the decline in storminess is a consequence
of reduced temperature differentials between the
tropics and exo-tropics that arise when global average
temperatures are slightly warmer.
330. Roald Amundsen, 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA ARCTICA: BIOGRAPHIES 18–24
(1951), http://collections.dartmouth.edu/arctica-beta/html/EA15-05.html.
Amundsen made the trip in a 46-ton fishing boat. The trip took three years,
but clearly the Arctic ice had to melt during it. Id. at 19, 20–22.
331. Letter from L. Rafael Reif, President, Mass. Inst. Tech., to MIT Com-
munity (June 2, 2017), http://news.mit.edu/2017/letter-mit-community-us-
withdrawal-paris-climate-agreement-0602.
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Looking at the United States, major hurricane activ-
ity is at a record low. As of June 1, 2017, it had been
eleven years and seven months since a category 3 to 5
hurricane last struck the U.S. mainland. According to
NOAA Hurricane Research Division data, the previ-
ous record was nine years, set in 1860–1869.332
Those general observations on sea level are borne out by
comparing predictions of sea level change with the observed
data since 1996—a period which has seen substantial increases
in carbon dioxide levels.333
FIGURE 2
GLOBAL SEA LEVEL
332. Willie Soon & Christopher Monckton of Brenchley, Response to MIT
President: Paris Exit Scientifically Sound (Part II), MASTER RES. (July 6, 2017),
http://www.masterresource.org/climate-science/mit-president-exit-paris-ii/.
I supported the President’s decision on scientific, not political grounds. See
Richard A. Epstein, Forget the Paris Accords, HOOVER INST: DEFINING IDEAS
(May 30, 2017), http://www.hoover.org/research/forget-paris-accords;
Richard A. Epstein, Containing Climate Change Hysteria, HOOVER INST.: DEFIN-
ING IDEAS (June 5, 2017), http://www.hoover.org/research/containing-cli
mate-change-hysteria.
333. This figure, and others of similar import are available through a sim-
ple Yahoo Images search for the term “ocean level rise chart.”
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Other studies report similar results, including a rejection
of the claim that global warming increases general ecological
instability, which in turn increases the number of extreme
events, like hurricanes and cyclones. Instead the data tend to
show that these events have been in a modest, but consistent,
decline over the last century.334 Indeed, between Hurricane
Wilma in 2005 (just a few weeks after the far more devastating
Hurricane Katrina) and Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the United
States experienced a decade of relatively modest hurricane ac-
tivity resulting in one of the quietest periods since the data has
been collected,335 shattered only by the devastating down-
pours from Hurricane Harvey in late August 2017.336 But once
again it would be a mistake to attribute this behavior to in-
crease in CO2 levels, for it is well established that the cycles
between El Nin˜o (which sends cold air west to the Atlantic)
and La Nin˜a (which does not) have much to do with the move-
ment of hurricanes from the West Coast of Africa to the Carib-
bean and the Southern United States.337 That phenomenon is
driven by the so-called El Nin˜o Southern Oscillation (ENSO),
which involves the constant cycling of surface ocean tempera-
tures in the Pacific equatorial region that drives climate pat-
terns across both oceans.
The skeptical account of the role of CO2 in global warm-
ing receives additional support from one finding that embar-
rasses the global-warming hypothesis. A compilation of about
100 estimates of global warming, when applied over the period
334. See CO2 COALITION, supra note 325, at 17–19. Despite the late twenti-
eth century warming period, the data show no upward trend in strong torna-
does; in fact, there appears to be a slight downward trend in the frequency
of strong tornadoes. See id. at 19.
335. Without discounting the effects of other storms such as Superstorm
Sandy in 2012 (which made landfall as a Category 2 storm), there were no
Category 3 or above hurricanes to make landfall in the United States for
nearly a decade until Hurricane Harvey. See Complete List of Continental U.S.
Landfalling Hurricanes, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.: HURRICANE
RES. DIV. (June 1, 2017), http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E23.html.
336. Erin Ailworth, Dan Frosch & Christopher M. Matthews, Harvey to Hit
Flooded Houston Again, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:07 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/harvey-to-hit-houston-again-1503927231.
337. For a brief account, see Aylin Woodward, La Nin˜a Forecast May Mean
Even Worse Atlantic Hurricanes in 2018, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 25, 2017), https:/
/www.newscientist.com/article/2151474-la-nina-forecast-may-mean-even-
worse-atlantic-hurricanes-in-2018/.
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between 1979 and 2013, predicted an increase of 1°C, when
the actual result for this period is about 0.2°C to 0.25°C—a
four- to five-fold disparity, depending on whether satellite or
balloon measurements are used.338 Surely a deviation between
prediction and reality of that magnitude cries out for fresh
thinking about the underlying problem. Since measures of
CO2 increase can be accurately observed, the key inquiry must
surround the proper determination of S, which is not directly
observable. But a better fit for the data comes from noting that
S is on the lower side of the relevant estimates. Nothing that
Schneiderman and other defenders of global warming have
said addresses these difficulties. It cannot simply be assumed
that the IPCC has made the best estimate of S.
Even if recent temperature increases are modest at best,
the same is not true of the level of greenery on the earth’s
surface. Matt Ridley, in his lecture “Global Warming Versus
Global Greening,”339 offers powerful evidence that the main
consequence of CO2 has been an increased level of global
greening, to the tune of 14% of land coverage over the last
thirty years. That one number, if true, suggests that the so-
called social cost of carbon may well be, at least for restricted
ranges, negative and not positive.340 A group of Australian
scientists also published an earlier study that predicted
“[u]sing gas exchange theory” that a “14% increase in atmos-
pheric CO2 (1982–2010) led to a 5 to 10% increase in green
foliage cover in warm, arid environments. Satellite observa-
tions, analyzed to remove the effect of variations in precipita-
tion, show that cover across these environments has increased
by 11%.”341 In this instance, there is ample reason to believe
that these large greening effects are attributable to increases
in CO2, given that in controlled experiments, plant growers
338. For the graph, see Climate Science: Assumptions, Policy Implications, and
the Scientific Method: Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Sci., Space & Tech., 115th
Cong. 35–51 (2017) (Testimony of John R. Christy).
339. Matt Ridley, Lecture at the 2016 Global Warming Policy Forum:
Global Warming versus Global Greening (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.the
gwpf.com/matt-ridley-global-warming-versus-global-greening/.
340. Id.
341. Randall Donohue et al., Impact of CO2 Fertilization on Maximum Foliage
Cover Across the Globe’s Warm, Arid Environments, 40 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS
3031 (2013), https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream /1885/
73415/2/01_Donohue_Impact_of_CO_2__fertilization_2013.pdf.
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pump in CO2 to increase growth rates. Other correlated vari-
ables include temperature, precipitation and radiation.342
Studies have also found that rising CO2 levels can lead plants
to use water more efficiently, increasing vegetation every-
where, in particular the dry areas.343
To let CO2 in, plants have to open up pores called
stomata in their leaves, which in turn allows water to
sneak out. Plants thus need to strike a balance be-
tween taking up carbon to build new leaves, stems
and roots, while minimizing water loss in the process.
This led to sophisticated adaptations that ha[ve] al-
lowed many plant species to conquer a range of arid
environments.344
To make this analysis even more comprehensive, it is criti-
cal to take into account the interplay of both global and local
forces in any particular case. Thus, a claim that water levels are
rising in Florida could be attributable to water rising or to land
sinking, or some combination of both. Nor is it clear how
much of the sea level increase can be attributed to global
warming, when the rise has been relatively constant at seven
inches per century for the last 3000 years.345 Similarly, the
large calving of an iceberg from the Antarctica cannot be at-
tributable to tiny changes in global temperatures, especially
342. Zaichun Zhu et al., Greening of the Earth and Its Drivers, NATURE, http:/
/www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3004.pdf. But see Carbon Dioxide Fertiliza-
tion Greening Earth, Study Finds, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/god
dard/2016/carbon-dioxide-fertilization-greening-earth (noting that rising
carbon dioxide concentrations is the chief culprit of global warming and its
beneficial impact on plants may be limited).
343. Rising Carbon Dioxide is Making the World’s Plants More Water-Wise, THE
CONVERSATION, http://theconversation.com/rising-carbon-dioxide-is-mak
ing-the-worlds-plants-more-water-wise-79427 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
344. Id. (also pointing out that the water savings could lead to increased
water runoff, and precipitation may not go through vegetation but through
direct soil evaporation, which might not necessarily benefit humans in the
end).
345. Larry Bell, Is Climate Change Elevating Coastal Flooding Risk?, CFACT
(Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.cfact.org/2016/09/26/is-climate-change-ele
vating-coastal-flooding-risk/?utm_source=CFACT+Updates&utm_campaign=
49124bbde3-Flood_of_disinformation9_28_2016&utm_medium=email&utm
_term=0_a28eaedb56-49124bbde3-260145993. On this point, the Union of
Concerned Scientists appears to overstate the case for attributing rising sea
levels to global warming. See An Open Letter Regarding Climate Change from Con-
cerned Members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, supra note 250.
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when the size of the ice pack is increasing elsewhere on Ant-
arctica. Rapid movements in ice are much more likely to be
the result of localized volcanic activity beneath the surface.
In addition, many local losses can be mitigated by undo-
ing key man-made adaptations. The Sierra Club has made just
this point when it writes, “[w]hat we can and must do is to let
nature resume control of water flow by removing barriers like
the Tamiami Trail, the Miami Canal and the L-67 canals, while
cleaning up Big Sugar’s effluent to Everglades standards.”346
Much of the runoff in the Everglades comes from the con-
struction of a network of oil exploration channels before
World War II. The rapid flow of water through these channels
disrupts the natural ecology. Filling them up should not be a
huge problem, but it has never been undertaken. In addition,
the runoff of phosphorus from nearby farms undermines the
local environment.347
There is also an extensive empirical dispute over both
long and short-term trends in global warming, wholly apart
from the explanation of its sources. On this score, recent re-
search suggests that we are now at the end of a global warming
period extending close to 11,000 years—the Holocene epoch,
during which time temperatures fell gradually as CO2 levels
increased, a finding that is in obvious tension with Schneider-
man’s claims in his March 2016 press conference. Once again
there must be some natural force to explain a relationship that
is the inverse of what is normally expected.348 The more con-
troversial portion of the long-term research swirls around a fa-
mous doomsday proposal in 2000 from Michael Mann and his
coauthors. These authors posit a “hockey stick” version of
human history that sees very stable temperatures over hun-
dreds of years, followed by a sharp increase in temperatures
around 1900, roughly corresponding to the major uptick in
346. Jon Ullman, The Everglades and Sea Level Rise: The Clock Is Ticking, SI-
ERRA CLUB FLA. NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.sierraclubflorida
news.org/2013/02/the-everglades-and-sea-level-rise-clock.html.
347. Phosphorus: Challenges Part 3, FRIENDS OF THE EVERGLADES, https://
www.everglades.org/phosphorous (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (“Phosphorus
from agricultural runoff has impaired water quality in large portions of the
Everglades and has been particularly problematic in Lake Okeechobee.”).
348. See Andy May, Lindzen, Soon and Spence Debunked?, WATTS UP WITH
THAT (May 3, 2017), https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/05/03/lindzen-
soon-and-spencer-debunked/.
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the use of fossil fuels.349 It is easy to extrapolate from that
model ruinous temperature increases in the next century that
could fully justify the most alarmist predictions possible.
But there is, however, the major question as to whether
the model is true. On this score, Mann seems to think the best
way to firm up his position is by bringing defamation suits
against those who disagree. One such suit is against the writer
Mark Steyn who claimed that Mann “has perverted the norms
of science on an industrial scale”—a slight that Mann would
have been well-advised to ignore.350 More instructive is Mann’s
litigation in Canada against the Canadian climatologist Tim
Ball claiming “Mann belongs in the state pen, not Penn.
State,” for fraudulent misstatement of data.351 This case took
an odd twist when Mann claimed that he did not have to re-
lease his raw data because it was his intellectual property—a
claim that is clearly wrong for at least two reasons. First, the
property comes from a government project for which data
generally has to be made public wholly apart from litigation.
Second, turning over the documents and data to the court
does not imply that the recipient may publish them because
they are first subject to judicial inspection to see if a more se-
lective claim of privilege can be sustained, and then, if need
be, turned over to the plaintiffs under some kind of protective
order.352
Scientifically, however, the most striking point is the com-
parison of the historical account offered by Mann—which has
low variability until the onset of the 20th century—and the
Ball version, which has far higher variability in earlier periods
and relatively modest level of temperature variability (wholly
apart from any causation question) for the post-1800 period,
349. Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley & Malcolm K. Hughes, Global-
Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate Forcing Over the Past Six Centuries, 392
NATURE 779 (Apr. 23, 1998). For a vigorous modern defense of Mann, see
Chris Mooney, The Hockey Stick: The Most Controversial Chart in Science, Ex-
plained, THE ATLANTIC (May 13, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technol
ogy/archive/2013/05/the-hockey-stick-the-most-controversial-chart-in-scien
ce-explained/275753/.
350. John O’Sullivan, Breaking: Fatal Courtroom Act Ruins Michael ‘Hockey
Stick’ Mann, PRINCIPIA SCI. INT’L (July 4, 2017), http://principia-scientific.
org/breaking-fatal-courtroom-act-ruins-michael-hockey-stick-mann/.
351. Id.
352. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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smaller than that for the 900 to 1200 A.D. period.353 See for
yourself:
FIGURE 3
BATTLE OF THE GRAPHS: MANN VERSUS BALL
Obviously, if Ball’s graph is accurate, then Mann’s is seri-
ously misleading. There is evidence of a major amount of
warming during the medieval period, which is best captured
by the accurate historical evidence that both Greenland and
Labrador had temperate climates in which grapes could grow.
That fits in neatly with the Ball model, and in fact was previ-
ously adopted in the IPCC’s 1990 Report.354 But it is much
more difficult to explain under the Mann model. It is of
course possible that the temperature changes in the North At-
lantic were not representative of overall global changes. This
point is surely debatable. Nevertheless, there are at least two
macro-level difficulties with the Mann model. First, the only
way to preserve the model’s low level of variability to postulate
a simultaneous large decrease in temperatures elsewhere that
353. See Mann, Bradley & Hughes, supra note 349.
354. For the various maps, one can do a simple Google image search to
see the variability. See GOOGLE IMAGES, https://www.google.com/images
(search for “medieval warm period little ice age graph”).
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parallel the increase in temperatures in the North Atlantic.
The second is that any such model of variability makes it
highly unlikely that changes in CO2 levels, whose impacts are
worldwide, could produce both effects at the same time. The
puzzle is even greater because the change in CO2 levels during
this period are too small to count as an effective driver. Hence,
the data would require finding other explanations, which in
turn, reduces the overall importance of CO2. All readers
should judge for themselves who has the better of the debate,
a judgment that is always subject to revision. But neither the
Martin Act nor the federal securities laws have anything useful
to contribute to this debate.
CONCLUSION
In dealing with the issues under the Martin Act, it is criti-
cal to deal with both the procedural and substantive issues. In
general, most of the dangers lie in the unique procedural fea-
tures of the Martin Act, not its substantive provisions.
The chief vice of the Martin Act stems from the incredible
discretion that it confers on the NYAG to conduct either pub-
lic or private investigations of potential targets, without limita-
tion. Similarly, broad investigative powers are also available to
the SEC, which give it, like other federal agencies, the power
to initiate lawsuits that can bankrupt major corporations and
require them to forfeit their licenses when indicted for partic-
ular offenses. There are of course important differences in
that the SEC has to act by majority vote of a five-member com-
mission while the NYAG can move unilaterally. But even here,
it is important to recall the SEC has three commissions from
the President’s party and two from the opposition, so that
votes rigidly divided along partisan lines can often lead to in-
vestigations and indictments, which are exceedingly difficult to
resist given that the sanctions for being indicted, including
loss of licenses, are more devastating than any fine that might
be imposed at the end of the ordeal. It was just this unfortu-
nate state of affairs that drove Arthur Andersen over the brink.
But it is critical to note that this was not by the SEC, which has
no authority to bring criminal prosecutions, but by the Depart-
ment of Justice, which could, like the NYAG, mount criminal
prosecution on a set of dubious charges that lacked the critical
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element of scienter.355 The parallel actions by the SEC are, at
least in theory, cabined by its rulemaking. These actions are
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,356 as well as lim-
ited by statutory language that requires the SEC rules to con-
sider “whether the action will promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation.”357 Thus the lack of institutional safe-
guards makes civil and criminal prosecutions far easier in cases
that stray far from the financial fraud cases to which the Mar-
tin Act was originally directed. That precise result seemed to
be in formation with the ill-advised efforts of NYAG Eric
Schneiderman to invoke the investigative powers of the Martin
Act to challenge the activities of ExxonMobil over the past
forty years, on evidence that turns out to be fatally weak.
If these procedural shortfalls require prompt correction,
the picture with the substantive requirements is far more
nuanced. The focus of the inquiry was whether the law’s de-
parture from the substantive common-law requirements of sci-
enter, reliance, and damages had brought about a fatal imbal-
ance in the enforcement of the law against major public com-
panies and their officials. In general, I think that critique is
overblown for at least two reasons, and that the greater danger
by far lies in the excessive concentration of power lodged in
the NYAG. Turning first to the substantive issues, the removal
of these limitations did not, in practice, create a free-for-all
that allowed the NYAG to sue any firm or executive for any
reason. Even after the passage of the Martin Act, the addi-
tional requirements used to cabin potential liability for false
words still remained in place, so that, substantively, the Martin
Act on many key points bears a close resemblance to both
common-law fraud and federal securities laws, which work in
the same area. Thus, under the Martin Act, the state is not
spared the burden of proving a false statement of fact, as op-
posed to a statement of opinion or the prediction of a future
event. In addition, it is necessary for the state to prove that the
355. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (over-
turning a charge of obstruction of justice for want of the proof of scienter).
For discussion of the undue leverage of the government in these
prosecutorial situations, see Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial,
supra note 30.
356. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–708 (2012)).
357. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f).
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false statements were material, so that they were likely to exert
a real influence on the behavior of the parties to whom they
were directed. It was also incumbent to show that the state-
ments were made incident to the purchase or sale of a security,
or of an offering to buy or sell securities, which precluded its
application to general public statements that might in some
indirect fashion at some uncertain time influence the price at
which stock is sold.
Under these rules, the law could function to allow injunc-
tions against corrupt stock transactions before they occurred,
which is why in its initial encounter with the law in Federated
the New York Court of Appeals gave it such a full-throated en-
dorsement. But the situation becomes more nuanced in those
cases where the government seeks disgorgement of profits,
and injunction against future conduct or prosecution of possi-
ble criminal conduct. In these cases, it turns out that, both for
political and legal reasons, the question of scienter is injected,
even if it is formally irrelevant under the basic liability test. It is
therefore instructive to note that while Greenberg and Smith
fought ferociously against the Martin Act counts, in the end
they lost because they admitted to scienter even as they sought
to deny fraud, which in most instances is established by proof
of scienter. Similarly, the loud #ExxonKnew campaign
floundered precisely because there was no scienter that has
been established based on Exxon’s early investigations into
global warming or in the effort to prove that ExxonMobil is-
sued false statements because they ignored the impact of po-
tential climate regulation on future profits. ExxonMobil did
revise its reserves, not because of anything to do with potential
regulatory risks of global warming, but because of the huge
downward pressure exerted on oil prices from the momentous
technological innovations most intimately associated with ad-
vanced fracking techniques.
The most important lesson to learn from this account of
the Martin Act is that the quality of its public administration
depends not only on matters of institutional design, or on its
detailed substantive provisions, but perhaps even more on the
quality of the public officials who administer it. If they are
overconfident in their judgments, they will be overzealous in
their behavior, which will lead to overheated public rhetoric
on the one side and misguided legal results on the other.
There is in public life no set of procedural safeguards that can
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wholly protect against overly aggressive public officials—which
is not to say that safeguards should be disregarded. The pro-
tection against abusive discovery, for example, could be critical
in controlling excessive enforcement at either the state or fed-
eral level. Fortunately, the line seems to have held against
Schneiderman’s direct global warming charges against Exx-
onMobil. But we should not rejoice too much over his strategic
retreat. The public nuisance cases remain. Next time we may
not be so fortunate.
